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“The jurisdiction to try crimes under international law is universal” 
Attorney General of the State of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 Int’l L. Rep. 5, 26 
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Universal jurisdiction is a long established principle of international law and much 
has been written on the subject. Even so, at present, it still remains one of the most 
confusing doctrines of modern international law. There is a wide range of views on 
the principle, in particular its content, scope and implementation, which are reflected 
in inconsistent definitions of the principle in the national legislation of states. 
Moreover, there are divergent views on which crimes are subject to its application in 
national legislation and domestic judicial practices, which, in some instances, include 
crimes that lack the basic characteristics inherent to the concept. All of these different 
views hamper substantial progress on the topic. What is more, the scope and 
application of universal jurisdiction has unavoidable implications for a range of other 
norms and concepts of international law, especially that of state sovereignty and non-
intervention. Thus the constant tension between the principle of state sovereignty and 
universal jurisdiction has to be balanced in order to maintain state integrity, but at the 
same time diminish impunity. 
In a globalizing world where states are increasingly interdependent, the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction enables the international community to bring an end to, or at 
least deter, the commission of serious crimes that harm human dignity. From the 
principle’s beginnings, primarily as a means for states to assert jurisdiction over 
piracy, there has been a gradual expansion of its content to encompass heinous acts 
such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. However, in 2003, 
Cassese, made a provocative remark when he claimed that “[i]t would seem that the 
principle of universal jurisdiction over international crimes is on its last legs, if not 
already in its death throes.”
1
 Regardless of Cassese’s expression, at present, even 
though the principle of universality
2
 faces many challenges it remains a hotly 
debated, yet sensitive, subject of modern international law. Subsequently, this study 
argues that the principle of universal jurisdiction is still in transition and will seek to 
demonstrate that various new aspects and approaches on the principle can be 
                                                          
1
 CASSESE, A.: “Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal 
Jurisdiction” Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 1(3), (2003), p. 589 [hereinafter 
CASSESE, Is the Bell Tolling].  
2




considered in order to enhance its implementation. In fact, as international law 
continues to formulate, so do its principles. Therefore the continuously evolving 
nature of the universality principle in modern international law cannot be denied; 
consequently further study on the topic cannot be disregarded. 
After two of the most horrifying and costly wars in human history, the world is not 
the same as it was at the end of the nineteenth century, when states were seen as 
absolutely sovereign and restrained only by rules of international law to which they 
gave their express or implied consent. At that time concepts of reserved domain of 
international affairs where exempted from any external scrutiny for what 
governments did to their own people, even when the conduct would constitute, what 
today is considered a heinous offence under international law. Hence, the thrust of the 
concept of universal jurisdiction was the legislative authority of a state to extend its 
prescriptive jurisdiction when there was no territorial or national linkage.  
At present, despite a wide acceptance of universal jurisdiction by states, this principle 
is not applied homogeneously, nor is its application implemented without difficulty. 
States do accept the basic idea of universal jurisdiction and its existence is not 
disputed, but since it is a highly complex legal topic (not to mention the political 
aspect surrounding it) there is a need to continue to undertake a thorough analysis on 
the principle and its characteristics. Indeed, universal jurisdiction is a unique and 
exceptional principle which is intended to form a part of the international criminal 
justice system in the fight against impunity.
3
 It is noteworthy, that after the Pinochet 
case
4
 there was a positive sign towards an effective usage on universal jurisdiction, 
after which a few steps were taken on which could have been built upon in a more 
progressive way, most importantly the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 
(2001).
5
 Nonetheless, nowadays it seems that universal jurisdiction is under negative 
pressure; especially a political one. Accordingly, it is fundamental that universal 
                                                          
3
 Impunity arises from a failure by states to meet their obligations to investigate violations and 
diminishes the rule of law and undermines human rights. The concept of ‘impunity’ is defined as the 
impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing perpetrators of human rights violation to account. 
4
 For details of the Pinochet case, see Chapter III.  
5
 The 2001 Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction. An assembly of prominent international law 
scholars from around the world drafted the Princeton Principles on universal jurisdiction, for the 
purposes of aiding legislators, judges, and government officials in interpreting and applying 
international law. The Principles mark the first systematic effort to bring order to this significant and 
growing area of international law. Available online at 
https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf [hereinafter, Princeton Principles].  
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jurisdiction becomes more openly accepted and internationally supported, in order not 
to diminish and loose its significance within international regime.  
Developments in the concept of universal jurisdiction, especially its practical 
application, must be guided by international consensus, not through advocacy action 
of parties with short term and narrow objectives. One of the major achievements in 
international law in recent decades has been the shared understanding that there 
should be no impunity for serious crimes. International cooperation and coordination 
is constantly being strengthened and new measures adopted to ensure that serious 
crimes are not left unpunished. These attempts to bring perpetrators to justice have 
given practical recognition to international criminal jurisdiction, as well as to 
prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction.
6
   
 
1.2 Scope and Limits – Outline of the Problem 
Universal jurisdiction has significantly helped with closing the impunity gap - making 
key to international justice. However, it is important to be aware of the divergent 
views and practices on its scope and application. If the principle is not carefully 
applied it could cause friction in international relations, particularly when exercised 
by developed states over nationals of developing countries. Measures are needed in 
order to end political manipulation and selective application of universal jurisdiction, 
especially by judges (described today as ‘new tyranny’ or ‘tyranny of judges’) as well 
as politicians from states outside of Africa.
7
 Clear guiding rules or criteria on the 
exercise and application of universal jurisdiction are needed to avoid subjective 
application of the principle.  
The main practical rationale for the existence of the universality principle is when the 
territorial state fails to act, and there is an absence of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) to deal with the case due to its limited scope of jurisdiction, the principle of 
universal jurisdiction becomes a major player in filling the impunity gap and denying 
                                                          
6
 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Report of the Secretary General, Sixty-fifth session on 
“the scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction”, No. A/65/181, (29 July 2010), p. 
4. Available online at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/3941234.35020447.html [retrieved 3.2.2015].  
7
 United Nations Press Release on “Delegations Urge Clear Rules to Avoid Abuse of Universal 
Jurisdiction Principle, Seek Further Guidance from International Law Commission”, (17 October 
2012). Available online at http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/gal3441.doc.htm [retrieved 20.12.2014].  
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safe havens for perpetrators. Hence, universal jurisdiction offers an additional tool for 
the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. This function of universal jurisdiction makes it 
an important component of the international criminal justice system. This thesis 
cannot, and does not intend to, describe all the matters related to the universality 
principle and should not be looked at as an exhaustive paper on the subject, but 
rather, as an emphasis on newly emerging discussion pertaining to universal 
jurisdiction.  
Simply having the universality principle is not enough, it also has to be applied in 
practice, but there lies the main challenge of the principle of universal jurisdiction. 
This thesis aims to discuss the nature and scope of the principle in a straight forward 
manner where inquiry into the recent developments in international criminal law is 
underpinned by two major concerns. The first is the concern with respect to the 
lacuna of jurisdiction generating the prevalence of impunity. The second concern is 
the assurance of fairness, impartiality, foreseeability and the protection of human 
rights in the exercise of jurisdiction. It is sometimes referred to the character of the 
principle as ‘individuality of universal jurisdiction’ stipulating to the fact that it is a 
principle with its own character and its application of criminal law depends 
exclusively on the nature of the crime.  ‘Individuality’ does not imply that universal 
jurisdiction should become the general rule when major international crimes are 
committed as it should only be exercised as a last resort.   
The present study addresses crimes and cases that are limited to those human rights 
violations prohibited by international law and are of such criminal gravity as to fall 
within the scope, and trigger, the exercise of universal jurisdiction. The commission 
of these serious offences, which undermine the most fundamental human rights, such 
as the right to life or human dignity, can never be justified as they violate the most 
basic human rights and under no circumstances can be derogated from. In modern 
international law the crime of piracy seems to be the only crime over which claims of 
universal jurisdiction are undisputed although international treaties have provided for 
universal jurisdiction over other crimes; crimes that are far more heinous.  
Indeed, the primary forums for prosecuting individuals for crimes are domestic 
courts. At the national level, states continue to have the primary responsibility for 
bringing to justice those responsible for crimes under international law. Ideally, this 
responsibility should be performed by the state in which the crime occurred, namely, 
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the territorial state where most of the evidence will be found; the accused, victims and 
witnesses are likely to be located; and they are able to understand the legal system 
and language of the court. However, in many cases this is not possible, either because 
the territorial state is unable or unwilling to do so or because the suspect has fled into 
another state. In such circumstances, other states must intervene, by exercising 
universal or some other form of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
8
    
Nonetheless, there still remains the fact that many courts have never faced a case of 
such gravity and scope, and thus have been reluctant to use the universality principle. 
International criminal jurisdiction, the jurisdiction exercised by international criminal 
courts such as the ICC
9
 and the two ad hoc tribunals; the International Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
10
; and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR)
11
, must be distinguished from that of universal jurisdiction. International 
criminal jurisdiction will not be dealt with independently, only the jurisdiction of the 
ICC will be addressed briefly in relation to the principle of subsidiarity in Chapter V. 
In addition, it is important to recall that jurisdiction can be both civil and criminal. 
However, only universal jurisdiction linked to individual criminal responsibility will 
be considered in this analysis, thus excluding jurisdiction in civil cases.
12
   
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the exercise of universal jurisdiction without 
limitations could create jurisdictional conflicts between states; subject individuals to 
abuse of process; or give rise to politically motivated legal prosecutions. The 
unwarranted exercise of universal jurisdiction could also create tension between 
                                                          
8
 See especially Chapter II on ‘Jurisdictional Regime in International Law’ and Chapter IV regarding 
‘The Idea of Subsidiarity in the Context of Universal Jurisdiction’. 
9
 The International Criminal Court (ICC). See the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Rome Statute). Available online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-
0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf [retrieved 20.12.2014]. 
10
 The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. See 
the Statute of the ICTY. Available online at http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/icty/icty.html [retrieved 
20.12.2014].  
11
 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda 
and Rwandan Citizen Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory 
of Neighboring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. See the Statute of the ICTR; 
available online at http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ictr/ictr.html [retrieved 20.12.2014].  
12
 An act by an individual may be attributed to a state in certain situations, such as when an individual 
has acted as an agent or on behalf of the state (for example, acting as a member of the government). 
Nevertheless, this study will focus on the issue of individual responsibility, rather than on the 
collective responsibility of the group behind the offence. 
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states, as it could be perceived as a means of interfering in the domestic affairs of 
another state or as a hegemonic jurisdiction exercised by some developed countries 
against individuals from developing countries. When discussing limits on universal 
jurisdiction one has to keep in mind that in the application of this principle, it is 
important to have regard to other more established international law norms, including 
the sovereign equality of states, non-interference and immunity of state officials. 
These norms are long established within international law and therefore the scope of 
application of the principle of universal jurisdiction should be limited, first and 
foremost, by respect to these norms. One principle that is consistently challenged and 
questioned when discussing universal jurisdiction is the principle of state sovereignty.  
When applying universal jurisdiction in practice, it is important to consider the rights 
of states to self-govern and any action that takes place under the principle of universal 
jurisdiction must take that into consideration. The practice is of particular concern in 
view of the potential political and legal implications of indiscrimination and selective 
use of the principle against persons who, for example, enjoy immunity under 
international law. However, the present study does not discuss the matter of immunity 
as such even though admittedly, immunity is a central impediment to the application 
of law and both fields are inextricably linked.
13 
Put simply, universal jurisdiction is one small, but essential, component of the 
emerging international system of justice in the fight against impunity and therefore 
worth considering in detail. The broad range of opinions concerning the definition 
and scope of the principle, demonstrates the need for further study of the topic. It has 
been said that universal jurisdiction has been developed as a remedy for the failure by 
states to prosecute international crimes; then why isn’t it used more often? There is a 
holistic view on what universal jurisdiction constitutes and there is even a general 
definition on its content but more problematic is to decide upon the crimes which are 
applicable to universal jurisdiction and to set out guiding rules on when and how to 
exercise the principle. 
                                                          
13
 ‘Immunities’ and ‘amnesties’ from the exercise of universal jurisdiction will not be addressed in 
details. The issue of immunity, as an obstacle to a court considering a case, would only arise after the 
court has established its jurisdiction. Any discussion relating to immunity would, therefore, be 
qualitatively different from a discussion about the principle of universal jurisdiction, and could derail 
or confuse the discussion of the latter. On immunities see inter alia the work of the International Law 
Commission (ILC), on the topic “Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction”, 
which was included into the Commission’s long term projects since 2007. Available online at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/index.htm [retrieved 4.4.2015].  
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1.2.1 International Criminal Law, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
When discussing the subject of universal jurisdiction, three branches within 
international law are touched upon, namely international criminal law, human rights 
and humanitarian law. The strict prohibition of serious human rights violations binds 
state and individuals as well. International humanitarian law and international 
criminal law provide that those individuals responsible for serious offences should be 
held accountable. Thus, conducting a trial and establishing accountability is one of 
the means to uphold respect for fundamental human rights. In addition, prosecuting 
the commission of a heinous crime by means of fair and impartial mechanism plays a 
vital role in reconciliation – the interest of the victims to see justice being done, and 
also the interest of the international community as a whole to deter such violence in 
the future. 
It is so, that the international human rights law did not fully develop until after the 
establishment of the United Nations (UN) system, while international criminal law 
and humanitarian law (which has its roots in laws of war) have a much longer history. 
When analyzing such a substantial and complex principle as universal jurisdiction, it 
is important to bear in mind that here, the development of international criminal, 
humanitarian and human rights law is studied in correlation. Its development has been 
achieved through the mutual influence of these fields of law which is likely to 
continue in the future. 
 
1.3 Aim of the Study and Central Questions 
The objective of this thesis is to identify and explore how far the law of universal 
jurisdiction has actually evolved, and how far we should expect it to evolve in the 
near future considering its constrains and challenges. Thus, in order to gain a broader 
perspective on the purpose of the principle a thorough inquiry into how the law has 
changed and what has caused the change will be demonstrated.  
Particularly, the present study seeks to examine and reassess primarily three matters; 
two issues pertaining to the scope of the universal jurisdiction; and one matter related 
to the principles' application. These matters include firstly, the relationship between 
universal jurisdiction and other concepts of international law; and secondly, an 
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analysis on the heinousness nature of the crimes falling under the umbrella of 
universal jurisdiction. Thirdly, and lastly, after having established the prerequisite and 
determinant factor on the scope of the principle, this thesis addresses the application 
of the universality principle, namely, the emerging notion of subsidiarity. It is 
necessary to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction with much caution and 
within a well-established framework in order to avoid any abuse that may go against 
the well-established principle of state sovereignty – the sovereign equality of all 
states. Universal jurisdiction should not be seen as a threat to territorial integrity. 
Therefore the exercise of universal jurisdiction must be subject to the following 
guiding principles and conditions. The need is to identify those crimes subject to 
universal jurisdiction and the circumstances under which it could be invoked in 
modern international law. The purpose of this thesis is to advance discussion on the 
principle and contribute to the ongoing discussion with some additional 
considerations.   
The aim of the present study is thus three-fold. Primarily, universal jurisdiction 
should be conceptually distinguished from other principles of international law, 
primarily that of aut dedere aut judicare (the obligation to extradite or prosecute). 
Nonetheless, universal jurisdiction should not be seen in isolation, rather, as a part of 
a bigger framework to deter impunity. Thus examination on the evolving nature of 
universal jurisdiction with respect, and in connection, to other well established 
principles of international law, namely, the principle of aut dedere aut judicare will 
be reexamined. Universal jurisdiction should not be confused with the exercise of 
international criminal jurisdiction, as previously mentioned, or with the obligation to 
extradite or prosecute. States have clearly indicated that they are different legal 
institutions, but are complementary to the goal of ending impunity. Can we use the 
aut dedere aut judicare principle and universal jurisdiction in correlation in order to 
enhance the enforcement and usage of the universality principle?   
Secondly, universal jurisdiction should be invoked only for the most heinous crimes 
(characterized as of jus cogens nature) that have been universally condemned by the 
international community. Considerations on aspects which seem to have provoked 
current controversies are such as how recent developments of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction have been affected by the concept of jus cogens, thus 
classifying universal jurisdiction as a logical consequence of jus cogens norms. What 
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crimes can be considered as triggering universal jurisdiction? Are there any newly 
emerging threats to the international community? What are the conditions for a crime 
to be of such gravity (‘gravity threshold’) to cause international attention and evoke 
prosecution on the basis of universal jurisdiction.  
Thirdly and finally, this study seeks to locate the assertion of universal jurisdiction 
within the legal system of jurisdiction and avoid it being in violation of national 
sovereignty but playing a complementary role. Therefore clarification on modalities 
and application of universal jurisdiction will be considered. It is necessary in order to 
end, or at least deter, the commission of these serious crimes to have the universality 
principle workable, not just as a theoretical topic. Hence there is a need to have some 
‘guidance’ on how and when to apply the universality principle in the modern 
jurisdictional regime. Accordingly, the question, what modalities are there in order to 
enhance the usage of universal jurisdiction and foreseeability in its exercise, while 
simultaneously respecting state integrity and preventing jurisdictional conflicts? A 
possible solution will be given on how the universality principle might be used in a 
more foreseeable and balanced way. 
In addition, it is equally important to discuss possible future evolvement and 
speculation on the principle, de lege ferenda, as well as analyzing the history and 
origins of universal jurisdiction. Challenges and responses to universal jurisdiction 
will be addressed and solutions proposed. Important case law exists where universal 
jurisdiction played an important part and will be briefly described. Furthermore, 
universal jurisdiction is not the only way to tackle impunity for international crimes 
and therefore it should not be seen in isolation from other principles of international 
law; it is part of a wider system that aims to enhance the deterrent effect of punitive 
measures and thus halt the commission of international crimes. In fact, universal 
jurisdiction being as complex as it is has given rise to more debates than it has ever 
solved; raising multiple concerns; and causing international tension. In addition, one 
must not forget that when states exercise universal jurisdiction they are not enforcing 
their own national law, but they are acting as agents of the international community 
as a whole, rendering the universality principle an important status within modern 




1.4 Structure of the Study 
This thesis is divided into three main parts which are further divided into seven 
chapters (Introduction and Conclusions included). The first part (‘General Part’) will 
deal with the nature and scope of universal jurisdiction by reexamining the 
jurisdictional framework that the universality principle is stemming from; following 
up with historical overview of the principle. Part two (‘Specific Part’) will make a 
survey into the core international crimes that attract the application of universal 
jurisdiction and the values upon which those crimes infringes. Thereafter, an inquiry 
into an effective implementation and enhancement of the usage of universal 
jurisdiction will be provided. Lastly, part three (‘Challenges and Responses’) will 
address certain restrains on the exercise and application of universal jurisdiction. 
First, in the following Chapter II, this study briefly revisit the jurisdictional regime 
within international law from which universal jurisdiction is derived, by recapturing 
the general notion of jurisdiction, the jurisdictional basis accepted in modern 
international law and the principle of state sovereignty. It will be argued that the 
original notion behind state sovereignty has changed in the twenty-first century, 
especially when considering the universal jurisdiction. 
Next, in Chapter III an examination will be undertaken on the historical background 
of the universality principle; its origins and main milestones will be described and 
how universal jurisdiction has grown from being a principle over piratical acts to 
encompass grave crimes of international concern. In addition, the concept of the 
universality principle will be observed more thoroughly, including its components, 
classification and legal status under modern international law while providing for 
case law inquire. Special attention will be given to the relationship between universal 
jurisdiction and the principle of aut dedere aut judicare in order to manifest that these 
principles cannot be seen in isolation from each other and should be studied in 
correlation. 
Based on the examination made in Chapters II and III, a more theoretical analysis will 
be undertaken in Chapter IV when discussing the nature of crimes falling under the 
scope of universal jurisdiction; its heinous nature and jus cogens status. It is important 
to note that this chapter will not seek to make a comprehensive list of crimes to which 
universal jurisdiction could be applied, rather consideration will be brought up on 
11 
 
how the concept of ‘gravity’ of crimes has changes from covering piratical acts 
(piracy analogy) to include more serious offences such as war crimes. Consideration 
on where should the ‘gravity threshold’ is for universal jurisdiction and whether 
newly emerging threats, such as cyberterrorism and serious environmental crimes, 
might fall under the umbrella of universal jurisdiction. Discussion on the definitional 
elements of a heinous offence will be provided while looking into the relevant 
conventions and case law. 
Within Chapter V, special attention will be given to the discussion of the emerging 
idea of subsidiarity as a guiding principle in the context of universal jurisdiction. It 
will be demonstrated how the usage of subsidiarity can be guided by the 
complementarity principle of the ICC, thus using complementarity as a model for the 
notion of subsidiarity in the application of universal jurisdiction. The primary aim of 
this this chapter is to illustrate one possible solution on how to enhance the 
application of universal jurisdiction within the lacuna of jurisdictional bases and 
simultaneously avoiding misuse in its exercise and foster foreseeability in the 
application of universal jurisdiction. 
The objective of Chapter VI is to recapture the observations made from the preceding 
analysis (within the previous chapters) and propose recommendations; while 
considering contemporary challenges on the scope and application of universal 
jurisdiction. Thereafter, Chapter VII makes concluding remarks. 
The aim of this thesis is to make an additional contribution to the ongoing discussion 
and propose how a proper balance may be struck between enforcement of 
international criminal law on the basis of universal jurisdiction and respect for state 
sovereignty. In addition, this thesis seeks to open up for further considerations on the 
topic. It will touch upon the nature, scope and application of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction whereas all of these factors are continuously evolving – the principle of 





PART I – GENERAL PART: NATURE OF UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION 
2 Jurisdictional Regime in International Law14 
Universal jurisdiction is usually distinguished from other jurisdictional claims, due 
mainly to the reason, that it lacks certain links that others have. In fact, universal 
jurisdiction is defined as the assertion of jurisdiction over a conduct committed 
outside of a state, by a foreigner and against a foreigner, and where that conduct 
poses no threat to the vital interests of the state asserting the jurisdiction. In other 
words, universal jurisdiction is prescriptive jurisdiction where none of the 
jurisdictional links, such as territory, nationality or interests of state exist at the time 
of the commission of the alleged offence.
15
 Premised on that, those ‘links’ are a 
manifestation of an entitlement attributed by international law. Consequently, 
doctrines have sought to find an alternative ground for universal jurisdiction in 
international law that may replace jurisdictional links. 
While there seems to be a growing consensus that the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction can be a useful tool for the fight against impunity, especially with regard 
to international core crimes (such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes); on what grounds and to what extent it is established, is still a source of 
confrontation. Given that jurisdictional links have been regarded as an indicator that 
distinguishes universal jurisdiction from other jurisdictional claims, it is all the more 
crucial at the outset to address the question of the status of those jurisdictional links 
within international legal system, before proceeding into the core of this thesis, 
namely, the principle of universal jurisdiction. Accordingly, it will be helpful to 
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Journal of International Law, Vol. 47, (2006), p. 163.  
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clarify the distinctions between these bases of jurisdiction for the purposes of this 
thesis. In addition, since this study examines the law of jurisdiction ratione loci under 
international law, it might be useful to clarify the general concept of ‘jurisdiction’ at 
the beginning.  
The nature, scope and application of universal jurisdiction are far from being clear. 
Therefore, in order for us to properly understand the principle of universal 
jurisdiction, and before proceeding with the evolvement and scope of the principle
16
, 
it is necessary at the outset to recollect the understanding of the notion of 
‘jurisdiction’ in general and the forms of jurisdiction applicable, especially with 
respect to universal jurisdiction. Moreover, it is important to make a brief survey into 
the jurisdictional bases available in modern international law in order to recapture the 
regime from which the universality principle stems from. 
The Lotus case of 1927, which remains the most quoted international decision with 
respect to assertion of jurisdiction, describes state’s right to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction and stipulates within its decision that “every state remains free to adopt 
the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.”
17
 This passage suggests that 
there are a number of generally accepted principles on the basis of which states can 
exercise criminal jurisdiction in conformity with international law. This case will be 
analyzed in more details within this chapter. Let us now turn to the notion of 
‘jurisdiction’ in international law. 
 
2.1 The Concept of Jurisdiction – General Overview 
“Jurisdiction is the means of making law functional.”
18 
It is not easy to provide a general overview of the notion of jurisdiction without 
leaning too much toward either the theoretical or the practical side. Although earlier 
authors may have found it justifiable to resort to purely doctrinal enumeration, it has 
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 BLAKESLEY, CH. L.: “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.” In BASSIOUNI, M. CH. (ed.): International 
Criminal Law: Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement Mechanism. 3rd ed. (Vol. 2.): Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2008, p. 89. 
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become increasingly necessary to discuss jurisdiction in the light of concrete 
instances of the exercise of jurisdiction or even within the limited context of, say, 
criminal jurisdiction (as is the main emphasis within this study). Aside criminal 




The phrase ‘jurisdiction’ derives from the Latin term juris dictio, or simply ‘the 
exercise of justice’. The approach of public international law to jurisdiction has 
evolved through the years with the academic and practical progress. Technically 
speaking, two approaches could be taken to the issue of jurisdiction of states. One 
being that states are allowed to exercise jurisdiction as they see fit, unless specifically 
prohibited (or a rule to the contrary exists). The other approach would be that states 
are not allowed to exercise jurisdiction unless there is a rule permitting the contrary.
20
 
At present, when speaking of state’s ‘jurisdiction’ one refers to its authority under 
international law to regulate the conduct of both natural and legal persons, and to 
regulate property in accordance with its municipal law.
21
 It reflects the basic 
principles of state sovereignty, equality of states and non-interference in domestic 
affairs. For this reason, jurisdiction is indeed a vital and central feature of state 
sovereignty. It is an exercise of authority which may alter, create or even terminate 
legal relationships between states.
22 
When looking into scholarly articles one can certainly recapture the changing 
perception on the notion of jurisdiction. For example, in 1964 Mann conceptualizes 
jurisdiction as an inherent power or ‘right’ of a state to regulate conduct. Hence, the 
power is comprised of an authority to legislate and the authority to enforce. 
Consequently, jurisdiction is a concept at the same level as sovereignty.
23
 Akehurts, 
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Criminal Justice, Vol. 2(3), (2004), p. 736. 
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 SHAW, M. N.: International Law. 6th ed. Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 645. 
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 See MANN, F. A.: “The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law” Recueil des Cours, 111, 
(1964), pp. 1-162. Mann, 20 years later reaffirms this doctrinal position. See MANN, F. A.: “The 
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in 1975, in contrast to Mann’s more doctrinal treatment of the subject, presents a 
more pragmatic view of jurisdiction and discusses various instances in which a state 
actually claims and exercises jurisdiction, without much probing as to the 
philosophical underpinnings.
24
  Partly due to the development and accumulation of 
state practice, later academics engage less in theoretical speculations but refer more to 
practical matters. For instance, in 1982, Bowett explores in his writings on 
‘Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and Resources’ the 
theoretical and practical grounds for a state’s entitlement to establish rules of 
behavior (jurisdiction to prescribe) within the limits allowed by international law.
25 
Ryngaert provides a well-balanced general view of jurisdiction and follows very 
much a classical approach in 2008, starting with the Lotus case
26
  and the territoriality 
principle, and then discussing the exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction 
before exploring the doctrinal basis of jurisdiction.
27 
Furthermore, in 2007 Cassese 
treats the issue of jurisdiction as essentially one of competing assertions made by 
national and international tribunals
28
 whereas three years later Bantekas in his 
writings, views both national and international courts as cooperative and 
complementary enforcers of the law.
29 
While scholars and practitioners often employ the term ‘jurisdiction’, and most of 
them have a notion of what it means, it is hardly self-evident to exactly define it. 
What is certain is that jurisdiction somehow relates to sovereignty. In a world 
composed of equally sovereign states, any state is entitled to give shape to its 
sovereignty or imperium by adopting laws - to ‘juris-dicere’ - to state what the law is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited after Twenty Years” Recueil des Cours 186, (1984), 
pp. 9-116 [hereinafter MANN, the Doctrine of Jurisdiction (1984)]. 
24
 See AKEHURST, M.: “Jurisdiction in International Law” British Yearbook of International Law, 
Vol. 46, (1975), pp. 145-257. 
25
 BOWETT, D. W. “Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and Resources” 
British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 53, (1982), pp. 1–26. 
26 
In the Lotus case, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) took a very liberal view of 
state’s rights to exercise jurisdiction which is only limited by ‘prohibitive rules’, supra note 17. See 
case analysis in Section 2.3.1  
27
 Because jurisdiction in its practical sense from the perspective of public international law concerns 
primarily international criminal matters, it is always useful to see how the issue of jurisdiction is 
approached in the context of international criminal law, which, given the rapidly growing case law and 
literature, can now rightfully be regarded as a full discipline of law in its own right. See RYNGAERT, 
Jurisdiction, supra note 20, pp. 29-48; 101-144.  
28
 CASSESE, A.: International Criminal Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 
[hereinafter CASSESE, International Criminal Law]. 
29
 BANTEKAS, supra note 15, pp. 355-372. 
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relating to persons, activities or legal interests.
30
 Jurisdiction becomes a concern of 
international law when a state, in its eagerness to promote its sovereign interests, 
adopts laws that govern matters of not purely domestic concern.
31 
The public international law of jurisdiction guarantees that foreign nations’ concerns 
are also accounted for, and that sovereignty-based assertions of jurisdiction by one 
state do not unduly encroach upon the sovereignty of other states. The law of 
jurisdiction is doubtless one of the most essential as well as controversial fields of 
international law, in that it determines how far, ratione loci, a state’s laws might 
reach. As it ensures that states, especially powerful states, do not assert jurisdiction 
over affairs which are the domain of other states, it is closely related to the customary 
international law principles of non-intervention and sovereign equality of states; 
guaranteeing a peaceful co-existence between states through erecting jurisdictional 
barriers which nations are not supposed to cross.  
As Ryngaert stated “the law of jurisdiction is one of the building blocks of the 
classical, billiard-ball view of international law as a ‘negative’ law of State co-
existence”
32
; hence stipulating to the fact that the underlying idea, behind the rules 
and limits on jurisdictional regime, is for the purposes of maintaining stable and 
peaceful international relations among nations. In this regard, one can certainly 
question whether the principle of universal jurisdiction fits within the jurisdiction 
regime, without infringing peaceful relation and stability among states. 
 
2.1.1 Forms of Jurisdiction 
As previously mentioned jurisdiction refers to the power asserted by states by which 
they seek to prescribe and enforce their municipal laws over persons and property. 
This power is typically employed in three forms, which correspond to the three 




                                                          
30






BANTEKAS, supra note 15, p. 329. 
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Bassiouni asserts that the terms used to enforce and prescribe law are not often of 
equal scope. That is, “that a sovereign state, or an entity exercising some of the 
attributes of sovereign state or legal entity that has some sovereign attributes can 
enforce the prescription of another state, or international law, even though the 
enforcing power may not have prescribed what it enforces.”
34
 To be clearer, there are 
three primary categories of powers: executive is considered to be the jurisdiction with 
the potential to interfere the most. The term ‘executive’ can be defined as, “the right 
to effect legal process coercively, such as to arrest someone, or undertake searches 
and seizures.”
35 
This jurisdiction is related to the ability of a government to take 
action inside the boundaries of another country and, in most cases, this is carried out 
by domestic law enforcement agencies.
36
    
Nevertheless, one should take note that according to the principles of independence of 
states and territorial sovereignty, state officials should not execute their authority on 
foreign territory nor impose the will of their state upon another territory. One of the 
most important examples in relation to this issue was the case of the Nazi criminal 
Adolf Eichmann, who was seized by Israeli agents in Argentina in 1960. Eichmann’s 
capture on Argentine soil was a patent breach of Argentina’s territorial sovereignty 
and an unlawful exercise of Israeli jurisdiction.
37
 However, the act itself of ‘illegal 
apprehension’ of suspects on foreign soil does not prevent states from exercising their 
jurisdiction in later stage. Indeed, the act of detention per se in a foreign country 
would constitute a breach of both international law and the principle of non-
intervention, thereby constituting a violation of the human rights of the person 
concerned.
38 
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Legislative means of power represent the superiority of established organs of the state 
to make binding law within its territory. In the same way, it is known that in certain 
conditions these rules may be extended to include a foreign country.
39
 However, the 
enforcement of such legislation would be complex, not only in a practical way, but 
also when considering international law due to the principle of non-intervention.
40
 
The term ‘judicial’ means that domestic courts are competent and capable of passing 
judgment on matters brought before them. Furthermore, it concerns the power of the 
national courts of a specific state to judge cases in which a foreign issue is present. It 
should be noted that by passing judgment over offences committed by another 
country, it is possible that courts will actively intervene in the internal jurisdiction of 
a country in which the offences took place.    
In short, there are a series of reasons that might influence national courts when 
making the decision to exercise this jurisdiction. Specifically, “in criminal matters 
these range from the territorial principle to the universality principle and in civil 





2.1.2 Principle of State Sovereignty in the 21st Century 
In the twenty-first century one can acknowledge that the original notion behind the 
principle of state sovereignty has indeed changed.
42
 International communication is 
getting more integrated and globalization has made communication between countries 
more intricate and complex. Nowadays, the activities of one nation affect other states 
on many levels. For instance, arbitrary exercise of sovereignty will cause the 
infraction of the sovereignty of other nations, and indeed this is the case when 
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40
 CRYER et al., supra note 35, pp. 37-38. 
41
 SHAW, supra note 22, p. 38. 
42
 See for instance a demonstrative statement, made by Ferencz B. B. (Former Prosecutor for the 
Nuremberg War Crimes Trial), on the changing nature of the notion of state sovereignty. “The system 
has changed. The days of absolute state sovereignty is absolutely obsolete […] the notion of absolutely 
sovereign state is absolutely obsolete and observe. We live in an independent world where you cannot 
do anything without international controls and directions […] everything is dependent on each other 
[…] The sovereignty does not belong to the state anymore.” Comments made during a speech at the 
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19 
 
exercising universal jurisdiction that poses substantial conceptual and practical 
challenges to sovereignty principle in international relations.
43
  
In the past years a gradual reduction has been occurring from the original notion of 
state sovereignty, which might be linked to the rise of human rights awareness and 
the need to protect people from abuse by a state. In September 1999, the former UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan suggested that the classical legal concept of state 
sovereignty may have to yield in some circumstances to the “sovereignty of 
individual”.
44
 Thus stipulating that in its most basic sense the nature of state 
sovereignty is being redefined by the forces of globalization and international 
cooperation which is “a hopeful sign at the end of the twentieth century”.
45 
‘Sovereignty’ as a core principle of international law, is expressed in the Charter of 
the United Nations within Article 2(1) as a founding principle for the UN and Article 
2(7) as a principle prohibiting intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of states. 
Sovereignty is for the purpose of this study understood as a “legal status within but 
not above public international law.”
46
 It is a principle that can be balanced by other 
international principles; such as the principle of universal jurisdiction. Generally, 
sovereignty means that one state cannot demand that another state take any particular 
internal action. Hence, it follows that no state has the authority to tell another state 
how to control its internal affairs. Sovereignty both grants and limits power: it gives 
states complete control over their territory, while restricting the influence that states 
have on one another.
47
 State sovereignty is the concept that states are in complete and 
exclusive control of all the people and property within their territory.  
The original notion behind the principle of state sovereignty embraced the idea that 
“states were not subject to the authority of any higher institutions or principle; 
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therefore, state itself was the ultimate source of political authority within its 
territory.”
48
 Every state was given the right to have a high degree of autonomy in 
governing its internal affairs. This right of autonomy implied that states were entitled 
to control the relationships between their governments and the citizens and groups 
that constitute their respective societies. In the same way, the right of autonomy 
entailed freedoms from external interference in the domestic affairs of the state, 
especially if interference was coercive in nature.
49
 It should be noted that the right of 
non-interference “provided a measure of stability, predictability, and order within the 
anarchic system of nation-states for several centuries.”
50
 In other words, from a 
sovereignty perspective, a state’s right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over acts 
committed in its territory and elsewhere by its citizens is, although not amounting to a 
prerogative, an undisputed part of its sovereignty. Moreover, the exercise of 
jurisdiction in a bystander state can be seen as undue interference and create 
dangerous friction in inter-state relation.
51 
It is possible to withhold that state sovereignty and the international criminal justice 
system are in a way two sides of one coin, but are nevertheless different 
constituencies which sometimes leads to conceptual tension. This is, for example so, 
regarding the principle of universal jurisdiction. It is especially with respect to the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction by one state that the need to establish some common 
grounds becomes important in order not to violate the sovereignty of other nations
52
 
(later chapters further explore the conflicts between the two doctrines of universal 
jurisdiction and state sovereignty). Furthermore, it has to be retained that one of the 
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 As will be illustrated, in relation to the principle of universal jurisdiction, the concept of state 
sovereignty is complex and continuous one, hence leaving many questions open-ended. 
52
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most important aspects of state sovereignty is for a state to control its internal affairs, 
although sometimes subject to limitations imposed by international law.
53
     
 
2.2 Traditional Legal Bases on which Jurisdiction may be Exercised 
At present, international law has specifically acknowledged five bases for national 
criminal jurisdiction, those being; territorial jurisdiction; nationality jurisdiction (or 
‘active personality principle’); passive personality jurisdiction; protective jurisdiction 
(also referred to as the ‘security principle’); and universal jurisdiction
54
; all of whom 
will be briefly described below. Universal jurisdiction is usually distinguished from 
the other four jurisdictional claims, due mainly to the fact that it lacks certain links 
that others have, thus making the usage of the principle controversial. 
Nevertheless, the importance of these five jurisdictional principles is that they are 
accepted by all states and the international community as being consistent with 
international law. It is so even though some principles are generally recognized and 
deemed uncontroversial while others, such as the principle of universal jurisdiction, is 
rather subject to more controversy. 
 
2.2.1 Jurisdiction with a Specific Link 
2.2.1.1 Territorial Jurisdiction 
Territorial jurisdiction, sometimes also called the ‘principle of territoriality’, is the 
basic principle of national criminal jurisdiction and the least controversial.
55
 A state is 
an international entity based on a particular territory within which it has exclusive 
competence to govern its population. Furthermore, a state has the power to legislate 
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and enforce its domestic law through various domestic mechanisms.
56
 This form of 
jurisdiction is accepted by all states as an essential aspect of state sovereignty.
57
 Any 
exception to the complete power of a sovereign within its own territory must be made 
under the consent of the nation itself, although, it has to take into account that an 
“absolute and complete nature of territorial jurisdiction can be modified either by 
general principles of international law or by specific obligations freely undertaken by 
the territorial sovereign”.
58
 One of the main functions of a state is to maintain order 
within its own territory, so there is no surprise that the territorial jurisdiction is the 
most frequently invoked ground for criminal jurisdiction.
59
 It is the most pervasive 
and least controversial principle of prescriptive jurisdiction under international law 
that confers jurisdiction based on the locus of a crime. It assumes that jurisdiction 
may be exercised by the courts of the state where the crime is committed.
60
 
The principle derives from the Westphalian model of state sovereignty and 
underscores each nation’s ‘right to political self-determination’ and dominion over 
activities within its boarder. As Chief Justice Marshall articulated in the famous 1812 
Schooner Exchange case, “the jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is 
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any 
restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a 
diminution of its sovereignty.”
61
 Accordingly, territorial jurisdiction is recognized to 
be the most basic jurisdiction under customary international law. The PCIJ declared 
in the 1927 Lotus case that “in all systems of law the principle of the territorial 
character of criminal law is fundamental” and that “the exclusively territorial 
character of law relating to this domain constitutes a principle which, except as 
otherwise expressly provided, would, ipso facto, prevent states from extending the 
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criminal jurisdiction of their courts beyond their frontiers”.
62
 Thus, the jurisdiction of 
a state is considered to have effect generally within the territory of that state. 
Furthermore, Akehurst has observed that “one of the main functions of a State is to 
maintain order within its own territory, so it is not surprising that the territorial 
principle is the most frequently invoked ground for criminal jurisdiction […].”
63
 
The notion of territoriality has been somewhat widened, for instance, to include 
jurisdiction over a crime that is only partly committed in its territory. It is therefore 
possible to subdivide the territorial jurisdiction into two parts, subjective territorial 
jurisdiction that allows jurisdiction of a state where a crime was commenced, and 
objective territorial jurisdiction, that acknowledges the jurisdiction of a state where a 
crime was completed or had effect.
64
  
Perhaps the primary reason why the territoriality principle is so undisputed is that it 
confers multiple practical advantages. First, the locus commissi delicti (the place 
where the crime has allegedly been committed) is usually the forum conveniens (the 
appropriate place of trial) since it is easiest to collect evidence and hear witnesses. 
Second, it is normally the place where the rights of the accused are best safeguarded, 
for instance the accused is more likely to be familiar with the criminal law in force, 
know and speak the language in which the trial is conducted. In this regard, the 
principle fosters efficiency and predictability. By affording respect for each nation’s 
sovereignty, the territoriality principle generally reduces the potential for international 
tension. Generally, in many criminal prosecutions, the state in which the crime 
occurred has the greatest capacity to investigate the crime; collect evidence; examine 
witnesses; and apprehend the perpetrators.
65
 As regard to the principle of universal 
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jurisdiction, these advantages adherent to the territorial jurisdiction are one of many 
reasons why states have been reluctant in the practice of the universality principle. 
 
2.2.2 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction with a Specific Link 
2.2.2.1 Nationality Jurisdiction 
Nationality jurisdiction is yet another traditional legal ground of jurisdiction, 
sometimes also called ‘active personality jurisdiction’, according to which a state may 
criminalize offences committed abroad by one of its nationals. Thus, the nationality 
of the suspect is the determining factor. It includes jurisdiction asserted by a state 
based on the domicile or residence of a suspect.
66
 It allows states to prescribe 
legislation regulating the conduct of their nationals abroad and in some cases it has 
also been applied to persons with residency rights.
67
 The competence of a state to 
prosecute its nationals on the sole basis of their nationality – and regardless of the 
territorial state’s competing claim – is based on the allegiance that is owed to one’s 
country of nationality under domestic law. 
Traditionally, the nationality jurisdiction is implemented in one of two ways. On the 
one hand, in some states, national courts have jurisdiction over certain criminal 
conduct committed by their nationals abroad, regardless of whether those offences are 
criminal under the law of the territorial states. Here the underlying rationale is the 
will of a state that its nationals comply with its own law, irrespective of where they 
are and regardless of the laws in the state where the offence is committed. On the 
other hand, criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nationals abroad is 
subordinate to the offence being punishable under the law of the territorial state, thus 
the motivation here being the desire of the state of nationality not to extradite its 
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2.2.2.2 Passive Personality Jurisdiction 
Passive personality jurisdiction is asserted by a state whose national is the victim of a 
crime.
69
 Accordingly, the link that lies between the state exercising jurisdiction and 
the offence is the nationality of the victim, thus forming a link between the state 
exercising jurisdiction and the offence through the nationality of the victim. Under 
this principle a state can therefore apply jurisdiction according to international law 
over a foreigner who has committed an act, that took place outside the territorial 
boundaries of the state, but the act was committed against one of its nationals.
70 
Historically, the validity of the passive personality principle has been regarded as 
controversial and its application has been a source of conflict between states and has 
been described as the “most contested in contemporary international law.”
71
 The basis 
for this controversy was that the principle subjects an individual to the laws of a state 
with which the perpetrator’s only connection is the victim's nationality.
72
 
Nevertheless, at present the principle has gained acceptance among countries and is 
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2.2.2.3 Protective Jurisdiction 
A state can, as an entity, suffer from acts that are committed abroad, by a foreigner. 
These acts may jeopardize the sovereignty and political independence of a state. 
Hence, under the protective or security jurisdiction, a state may exercise jurisdiction 
in respect of offences which, although occurring abroad and committed by non-
nationals, are regarded as injurious to the state’s security.
74
  
The nexus for this base of jurisdiction is the nature of the interest which is harmed. 
This jurisdiction allows a state to claim jurisdiction over offences directed against its 
security or vital interests, or other offences threatening the integrity of governmental 
functions that are generally recognized as crimes, i.e. plans to overthrow its 
government or counterfeiting its currency.
75 
 This principle is well established but it is 
still a matter of dispute as to how far it extends. 
The principle was included in the Harvard Research on International Law draft 
convention where it was stated that “a state has jurisdiction with respect to any crime 
committed outside its territory by an alien against the security, territorial integrity or 
political independence of that state, provided that the act or omission which 
constitutes the crime was not committed in exercise of a liberty guaranteed the alien 
by the law of the place where it was committed.”
76
 The latter part of this article 
observes the justification of the principle on the basis of a state’s vital interests, since 
the alien might not be committing an offence under the law of the country where he is 
residing and extradition might be refused if it encompassed political offences.
77 
Therefore the protective principle seems to be warranted as a basis for exercising 
jurisdiction by the state at which the act is directed, if the act, such as treason, is not 
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punishable in the state where it originates. However, according to the protective 
principle, actual harm needn’t have resulted from the act for a state to base its 
jurisdiction on it. 
 
2.2.3 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction without a Specific Link 
2.2.3.1 Universal Jurisdiction 
Unlike other bases of jurisdiction in international law, as described above, universal 
jurisdiction requires no territorial or national nexus to the alleged act or actors over 
which a state legitimately may claim legal authority.
78
 Subsequently, under this 
principle, each and every state has jurisdiction to try particular offences. The basis for 
this is that the crimes involved are regarded as particularly offensive to the 
international community as a whole.
79
 In other words, the usage of universal 
jurisdiction is primarily based on the gravity of the crime.
80
 The purpose of the 
principle is not to protect the well-being of a giver state or its citizens, but that of the 
whole international community. 
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It is important to highlight that there are differences in the universality principle 
definition, depending on who is using the term and that the exact expression of it can 
take a variety of forms in the domestic legal systems. In their legislation, states tend 
to establish different prerequisites for the exercise of universal jurisdiction by their 
authorities, such as the presence of the accused in their territory. Its definition 
provided for in the 2001 Princeton Principles on universal jurisdiction reads as 
follows: 
„[...]universal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature 
of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the 
nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the 
victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction.“
81 
Therefore, none of the traditional links to the prosecuting state are present in this 
case, which is the underlying idea common to all definitions of universal 
jurisdiction.
82
 As was noted by Judge Van den Wyngaert, in his Dissenting Opinion 
in the Arrest Warrant Case, “there is no generally accepted definition of universal 
jurisdiction in conventional or customary international law.”
83 
Nevertheless, there 
exist a common understanding among the international community that universal 
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jurisdiction is exercised by states having no relation to territorial or nationality 
aspects. See the following chapter on a more thorough analysis on the nature and 
formation of principle of universal jurisdiction. 
 
2.3 Jurisdictional Conflicts – Is There a Hierarchy? 
In recent decades, the transnational movement of people and goods increases and 
interdependence between states or any other societies deepens. Consequently, it 
becomes unrealistic for a state to confine the scope of its law within its borders in 
order to maintain its public order. Moreover, with the emergence of the notion of 
community interest of international society, which is allegedly unable to be reduced 
to the interest of individual states, it has been recognized that there are matters of 
international concern even when all of the relevant factors are consummated within a 
territory of one state. In response to those situations, states have extended the scope of 
their criminal law to the activities outside of their territories. This response has 
inevitably generated the concurrence of jurisdictional claims among states and has, in 
some cases, developed into the conflict of states. 
Certainly international law does ‘make an offer’ of jurisdiction. International law 
does not prohibit a state from applying its criminal law to events that occurred within 
a territory of another state. Generally, it does not either oblige a state to exercise 
jurisdiction on any of these grounds, at least not outside its territorial boundaries. It is 
a matter for the domestic law or norms of the state to decide, as long as it respects the 
minimum restrictions and obligations set out by international law. There is therefore a 
lack of hierarchy between concurrent jurisdictional claims for adjudication of 
international crimes between sovereign entities.
84 
What matters is that the basis on which jurisdiction may be exercised, is accepted by 
all states and the international community as being consistent with international law. 
However, territorial jurisdiction still takes primacy over other jurisdictional claims 
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(de facto primacy of territoriality), mostly for practical reasons.
85
 Hence, it is widely 
accepted today that territorial jurisdiction is the primary basis of jurisdiction.
86
  
The concurrence of multiple jurisdictions does certainly have advantages, but at the 
same time, it can be problematic. International law tends to encourage states to 
prepare many jurisdictional bases with the aim of enhancing possibilities for 
punishing offenders. Therefore, it is most likely that there is more than one national 
jurisdiction that can be legally exercised over a case. 
Let’s give an example. If a citizen from state A commits a crime in state B, against a 
citizen of state C, all three states may have jurisdiction. State B would have 
jurisdiction on the basis of the territoriality principle. Active personality principle 
would be practiced by state A and state C might claim jurisdiction on the basis of 
passive personality principle. What is more, if the crime is an international crime that 
gives rise to universal jurisdiction, every single state may have jurisdiction, 
irrespective of a nexus with the crime. 
There is no rule prohibiting states from establishing domestic criminal jurisdiction on 
the basis of active or passive nationality, or universality over an extraterritorial 
situation that is already covered by the jurisdiction of other states, especially the 
territorial state.
87 
As the PCIJ stated in its famous Lotus case: 
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from 
exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which 
relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on 
some permissive rule of international law (allowing exercising jurisdiction 
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outside its own territory). […] The territoriality of criminal law […] is not an 
absolute principle of international law and by no means coincides with 
territorial sovereignty.
88 
Moreover, international customary law recognizes no hierarchy among the different 
types of criminal jurisdictions outlined above. There is a lack of hierarchy between 
concurrent jurisdictional claims for adjudication of international crimes between 
sovereign entities. In particular, there is no conclusive evidence regarding the 
existence of a rule of customary international law which may provide for the priority 
of the territoriality principle. However, one can recognize a tendency among states to 
accord priority to the principle of territoriality. 
As previously stipulated, when dealing with jurisdictional conflicts, one cannot leave 
the discussion without mentioning the Lotus case (see further Section 2.3.1). Even 
though the case can barely be considered as representative for jurisdictional conflicts, 
it nevertheless has become the main standard of reference for such conflicts in all 
legal areas. Since Lotus, the PCIJ and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have not 
directly addressed the doctrine of (extraterritorial) jurisdiction. This is not to say that 
this doctrine has not been developing, on the contrary. Yet the development has come 
about solely in national legal practice, without supervisory guidance by an 
international court or regulator. 
Furthermore, in the Arrest Warrant case, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal 
opined in their Separate Opinion that a state seeking to exercise universal jurisdiction 
“must […] ensure that certain safeguards are in place [that] are absolutely essential to 
prevent abuse and to ensure that the rejection of impunity does not jeopardize stable 
relations between states.”
89 
Further it was stated that: 
A State contemplating bringing criminal charges based on universal 
jurisdiction must first offer to the national State of the prospective accused 
person the opportunity itself to act upon the charges concerned.
90
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Similarly, the Princeton Principles on universal jurisdiction proposes that the forum 
state shall, when it receives a request for extradition to another state, take into 
account, inter alia, “the place of commission of the crime” and “the nationality 
connection of the victim to the requesting state”,
91
 hence proposing priority for the 
victim’s home state. In addition, the AU-EU Expert Report on Universal Jurisdiction 
recommended that when “prosecuting serious crimes of international concern, states 
should, as a matter of policy, accord priority to territoriality as a basis of jurisdiction, 
since such crimes […] primarily injure the community where they have been 
perpetrated and violate not only the rights of the victims but also the general demand 
for order and security in that community […].”
92
  
In sum, even though historically the dominant jurisdictional basis was undoubtedly 
territorial jurisdiction (although the other jurisdictional bases were recognized to 
some extent, they did not receive a high degree of acceptance), at present one has to 
be aware that due to globalization and constant interconnection between states and its 
nationals that the territorially based sovereigns are facing adaptation and challenges 
in this new environment. Hence, it forces legal scholars and judges to ‘adapt’ and 
constantly reexamine traditional rules for legal jurisdiction with regard to the new 
economic and social environment.
93
 Consequently, traditional legal rules are being 
constantly challenged by new social developments (such as cross-border activities 
and transnational crimes) and multiple contemporary conventions usually explicitly 
allow (or sometimes even obligate) states to establish various bases of national 
jurisdiction therefore recognizing and enhancing the usage of other non-territorial 
jurisdictions,
94
 although some argue that jurisdiction based solely on territoriality 
“served the goals of ‘predictability and efficiency’.”
95 
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2.3.1 Importance of the Lotus Case 
In 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ or the Court) delivered 
judgment in the Lotus
 
case. This decision, which marks a turning point in 
jurisdictional jurisprudence, is still at present considered the most descriptive 
example concerning the rights of a state to exercise criminal jurisdiction: hence, 
constituting the basic framework of reference for questions of jurisdiction under 
international law. 
The PCIJ was requested to settle a dispute between Turkey and France with regard to 
a collision on the high seas between the French steamer, Lotus, and the Turkish 
steamer, Boz-Kourt; as a result of which eight Turkish sailors perished. Turkey 
authorities commenced with proceedings against a French Lieutenant and Turkish 
commanders. Two days later, Lieutenant Demons, the officer of the watch of the 
Lotus, a French national, was placed under arrest. The French government asserted 
that Turkey acted in a manner inconsistent with the principles of international law by 
declaring criminal jurisdiction over the French commander. The Court was asked the 
following question whether Turkey did violate international law when Turkish courts 
exercised jurisdiction over a crime committed by a French national; outside Turkey.  
The PCIJ held that Turkey had not infringed the principles of international law by 
asserting proceeding against the French Lieutenant. In this respect, the Court stated 
that: 
“International law governs relations between independent states. The rules of 
law binding upon states therefore emanate from their own free will as 
expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing 
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between 
these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the 
achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of state 
cannot therefore be presumed. The first and foremost restriction imposed by 
international law upon a state is that failing the existences of a permissive 
rule to the contrary, it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory 
of another state. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be 
exercised by a state outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule 
derived from international custom or from a convention. It does not, 
however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising 
34 
 
jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts 
which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on.”
96
  
The PCIJ further continued: 
“What international law leaves to the states is a wide measure of discretion 
which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other 
cases, every state remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best 
and most suitable.  In this circumstance, all that can be required of a state is 
that it should not overstep the limits which international law places upon its 
jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its 
sovereignty.”
97 
On October 12, 1926, France and Turkey signed a special agreement in which they 
submitted the question of jurisdiction arisen in the Lotus case to the PCIJ. In 1927, in 
a controversial verdict, decided by the president’s casting vote, the PCIJ ruled that 
Turkey was indeed entitled to institute criminal proceedings against the French 
officer. 
To sum up, two fundamental approaches could be taken to the question of jurisdiction 
in international law according to the case. One being, in short, that a state may 
exercise jurisdiction unless there is a rule prohibiting it, the other being that a state 
may not exercise jurisdiction unless there is a rule permitting it. In the Lotus case the 
PCIJ however takes both approaches. The Court makes a distinction between types of 
jurisdictional boundaries, as they were described previously in Section 2.1.1, namely; 
legislative; judicial; and enforcement jurisdiction. The Court found that according to 
international law, states cannot exercise their enforcement jurisdiction in another 
states territorial jurisdiction, unless a permissive rule exists to the contrary.
98 
The Court is thus clear on its fundamental approach towards enforcement jurisdiction. 
A permissive rule is necessary for a state to be able to exercise this type of 
jurisdiction. However, the Court also stated that international law does not limit a 
state legislative jurisdiction. A state could therefore prescribe its rules for persons and 
events in another state territorial jurisdiction unless there was a prohibitive rule to the 
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contrary.  Finally, the Court concluded, in what has become a frequently cited passage 
and articulates what could be described as the ‘Lotus principle’: 
“[…] Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may 
not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to 
persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect 
a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited in certain cases by 
prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the 
principles which it regards as best and most suitable.”
99  
Finally, the result being that Turkey, by instituting criminal proceedings against 
Lieutenant Demons, did not violate international law. Indeed, the Lotus case could 
hardly be considered representative for jurisdictional conflicts but soon ended up as 
the main standard of reference for jurisdictional conflicts and issues in all legal areas. 
In conclusion, the Lotus ‘approach’ that stipulates that sovereign states may act in a 
way they wish so long as they do not contravene an explicit prohibition is considered 
a foundation of international law.   
 
2.4 Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
Contrary to universal jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the ICC is based on the 
territoriality and the nationality principle, founded in a treaty-based delegation of 
jurisdiction from its state parties. Accordingly, universal jurisdiction is connected to 
the competence of a state to assert the jurisdiction over persons before its own courts, 
instead of prosecuting those same persons before an international judicial body.100 
This is a core difference in the two regimes which is important to recollect. 
Jurisdiction over international crimes exercised by the ICC is therefore international 
jurisdiction, and not universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction is exercised by 
states, not by international institutions.101 Nevertheless, both universal jurisdiction and 
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international criminal jurisdiction are expected to bring about justice for gross 
violations of human rights when there is an absence of other effective jurisdiction 
capable of being applied over the case. Even though the similarities in overall 
objectives do not automatically lead to the conclusion that the same rules apply and 
the two jurisdictions should be exercised in the same manner, they are expected to 
work in collaboration.
102   
 
When drafting the Rome Statute the question of jurisdiction was an extremely 
controversial topic. There have been a number of criticisms of the ICC on the basis 
that it was not granted universal jurisdiction.
103
 The Rome Statute provides for 
jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in two primary 
situations, according to Article 12, which are: 
“(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, 
if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of 
registration of that vessel or aircraft 
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.”
104 
As the Preamble of the Rome Statute establishes, international crimes are said to 
“threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world” and “the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished.”  Hence, the refusal by the drafters of the Statute to grant the ICC 
universal jurisdiction indeed seems to be contrary to the objectives set out in the 
Preamble.  In other words one could maintain that the creators of the ICC failed to 
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endow the ICC with the mandate it needs to maintain international peace and security 
since some of the most heinous offences may go unpunished due to its limited 
jurisdiction, not to mention the limited number of crimes falling under its scope. 
It is essential to remember that both the Preamble to the Statute and Article 1 express 
a fundamental principle of the Rome Statute - which the ICC is to be 
‘complementary’ to national criminal jurisdictions. Thus national proceedings, on the 
basis of one of the five jurisdictional bases listed above, are to be given primacy. 
 
2.5 Summary 
The aim of concurrent jurisdictional structure is to eliminate safe havens for 
criminals. The objective is obvious; to close jurisdictional gaps and deter that heinous 
crimes are being left unpunished due to the failure, let’s say for example, of the 
territorial jurisdiction to effectively prosecute and punish. Thus the current legal 
situation of plural jurisdictions is seen as desirable since it greatly increases the 
likelihood of prosecution. Consequently, if one jurisdiction fails to be exercised, there 
may be another basis of jurisdiction that could be applied in order to bring about 
prosecution. 
Certainly, every issue has two sides. Not only are there advantages, but in the 
multiple systems of national (as well as international) jurisdiction, there are also 
disadvantages, because having more than one court (domestic or international), each 
with a lawful jurisdictional basis, may cause difficulties and complexities. What court 
should actually exercise jurisdiction and proceed with prosecution? In this respect one 
should think about two scenarios. Firstly, even though a crime has been committed, 
no jurisdiction is asserted by state. This causes the heinous crime being left 
unpunished and stipulates to impunity. Therefore, secondly, in order to prevent this 
happening, it is beneficial to recognize various bases of jurisdiction. In the end, the 
principle of universal jurisdiction fills a gap left where other, more basic grounds of 
jurisdiction provide no basis for national proceedings. Whereas, international law 
recognizes this form of jurisdiction, states have in effect acknowledged that any other 




The four forms of jurisdiction described in this chapter require some kind of link or 
connection with the prosecuting state. However, the application of universal 
jurisdiction to a particular offence does not require any link whatsoever. In this regard 
the universality principle is exceptional; established without any nexus. The only 
prerequisite for its exercise is the heinous nature of a crime; targeted against the 
international community as a whole.
105
  
Where the state directly affected simply cannot assume the primary burden to 
prosecute crimes, either due to sheer incapacity or lack of political will, the role of 
other states in the international system may be invoked. As observed in the Report of 
the Secretary-General on the rule of law and transnational justice in conflict and post-
conflict societies, “of course, domestic justice systems should be the first resort in 
pursuit of accountability. But where domestic authorities are unwilling or unable to 
prosecute violators at home, the role of the international community becomes 
crucial.”
106 
To conclude, national jurisdiction is an integral part of state sovereignty and is often 
claimed to be an exclusive power belonging to states, and to be within the discretion 
of states as a domestic matter. Thus, a state generally enjoys exclusive power within 
its territorial boundaries under the principle of state sovereignty. As a consequence, 
territoriality has been strongly emphasized as a basis for national jurisdiction. The 
state exercising jurisdiction is almost always the state where the crime was 
committed.  
Indeed, international law can place some limitations on national jurisdiction, and 
territorial jurisdiction must be exercised within the general framework provided under 
international law. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the principle of territorial 
jurisdiction is the strongest basis for national criminal jurisdiction as well as taking 
into account the practicality of it. However, it does certainly not preclude other bases 
of jurisdiction ipso facto, especially in a modern society where cross-border activities 
increase rapidly.  
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Now, after having established an outline of the various criminal jurisdictional bases 
accepted in international law and demonstrated how exceptional the principle of 
universal jurisdiction is; it is time to comprehensively analyze the nature and scope of 
















3 Formation and Implication of Universal Jurisdiction 
Before starting with an inquiry on actual aspects of the universality principle it is 
important to retrace the system from which the principle emerged. Thus, the history 
and evolution of universal jurisdiction is essential, since the justifications for its 




The concept of universal jurisdiction, which developed significantly following the 
Second World War, gained ground through the establishment of the International 
Military Tribunal and the adoption of new conventions containing explicit, or 
implicit, clauses on universal jurisdiction. The idea that in certain circumstances, 
sovereignty could be limited for heinous crimes became gradually accepted as a 
general principle. Later on, other international conventions, and to some extent, rules 
of customary law enlarged the principle’s scope of application. The international 
community has since then recognized that certain crimes are so inherently odious that 
they must be treated differently from ordinary offences. These are crimes against the 
universal interest, which offend universal conceptions of public policy and must be 
universally condemned. Therefore the international community is entitled – and even 
obliged - to bring to justice any individual who commits such a crime.
108
  
This chapter will begin by illustrating how universal jurisdiction has expanded 
considerably over the years, not only in theory, but also in practice; hence providing a 
brief historical excursion on its nature and scope. It will be observed how universal 
jurisdiction has gained expectation and support in a situation where states, specially 
the territorial states, were unable or reluctant to effectively exercise jurisdiction and 
where no international criminal court was available. For the purpose of clarification 
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the most significant milestones in the evolution of the universality principle will be 
briefly described. The author finds it appropriate to divide the historical evolvement 
into three evolutionary stages or periods, namely: 
1. Origins of the principle (starting from piracy); 
2. Development following the Second World War; 
3. Modern application (from the Arrest Warrant109 case and beyond). 
At the same time, the gradual acceptance of universal jurisdiction both in 
conventional and customary international law will be observed by listing some of the 
applicable instruments available for universal jurisdiction. Doctrinally the rationale 
for universal jurisdiction is based on the idea that certain crimes are so heinous that 
they affect the whole international community. In addition, the crimes in question are 
universally condemned and/or injurious to international interests. Hence, the outcome 
being that states are required to bring proceedings against the offender.
110
 In a way, 
universal jurisdiction has been viewed as an additional complementary mechanism in 
the collective system of criminal justice.
111
  
When describing the evolvement and formation of the universality principle and its’ 
decisive elements in shaping the nature of it, one has to consider other related, yet 
distinct, international law norms and concepts in correlation with the evolving nature 
of  universal jurisdiction. According to the author these related principles and 
concepts are of great relevance, mainly due to two reasons; 
A) The principles (that will be described and dealt with within this 
chapter) all together have the aim of fighting serious offences, or at 
least stipulating to the enforcement of justice, and closing the 
impunity gap. Accordingly, one has to consider them as pillars in 
the same struggle along with universal jurisdiction; 
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B) These principles (such as the doctrine of aut deder aut judicare) 
and concepts can be considered as an enforcement mechanism that 
stipulates and impels the principle of universal jurisdiction.  
Although much has been written on the connection on one hand, between the 
universality principle and, on the other, the obligation aut dedere aut judicare only a 
few commentators have actually studied them in correlation - as interrelated pillars in 
the fight against impunity.
112
 Therefore, this chapter will be finalized by emphasizing 
the close linkage between these two principles. 
The historical examination undertaken below is as chronological as possible; from 
traditional international law to modern applications. However, this study seeks only 
to clarify the most significant milestones in the evolution of universal jurisdiction 
necessary for the purposes of this thesis thus keeping the description objective and 
targeted.  
 
3.1 From Piracy to Modern Application of Jus Cogens Crimes  
3.1.1 Origins of Universal Jurisdiction  
“Some writers, like Covarruvias and Grotius, pointed out that the presence on 
the territory of a State of a foreign criminal peacefully enjoying the fruits of 
his crimes was intolerable. They therefore maintained that it should be 
possible to prosecute perpetrators of certain particularly serious crimes not 
only in the State on whose territory the crime was committed but also in the 
country where they sought refuge.”
113
  
This wording illustrates, among others, that the origins of the universality principle 
can be traced far back. To be more specific, it was in the sixteenth century when a 
number of Dutch scholars, most importantly Grotius, advocated universal jurisdiction 
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over crimes that violated the law of nature and shocked the societas generis humani, 
namely, the crime of piracy.
114
 Piracy is the oldest offence to be subject to universal 
jurisdiction. By 1928, Donnedieu de Vabres, stated that the system of universal 
jurisdiction was being recognized as a principle by the international community, but 
that it remained to be organized in practice.
115
 Ironically as it sounds, still today 
within the modern international law there is uncertainty on the application and 
exercise of the universality principle.  
States were all eager to prosecute pirates since all nations were affected by them, and 
universal jurisdiction turned out to be a neat compromise to settle “potentially 
innumerable […] conflicts of jurisdiction.”
116
 Any state that apprehended a pirate 
could try him in its courts. What is more, for centuries, no commonly accepted 
definition existed over the crime of piracy thus leading to several definitions by each 
state. The first definition of piracy, under international law, was provided for in 
Article 15 of the 1958 Geneva High Seas Convention, which describes the act of 
piracy as any illegal act of violence or depredation which is committed for private 
ends on the high seas or without the territorial control of any state.
117
 The same 
definition was later repeated in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Moreover, at present, the customary international law 
of universal jurisdiction on the high seas over piracy is codified in Article 105 of the 
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 This provision contains the essential feature of universal 
jurisdiction, namely, that every state has jurisdiction without regard to territory or 
other links, such as nationality of the victim or suspect. Consequently, universal 
jurisdiction over piracy is tied to it being committed on the high seas - terra nullius - 
in a territory over which no state has explicit jurisdiction.
119
 
In modern international law, the most cited rationale for universal jurisdiction over 
the crime of piracy lay partly in the fact that piracy often occurred on the high seas, 
outside of the territorial jurisdiction of any state. Under the principle of the freedom 
of the high seas, every state had an equal right to navigate on the high seas and could 
therefore patrol the high seas for pirates without violating any other state’s territorial 
sovereignty.
120
 Today, it is widely accepted that states may exercise universal 
jurisdiction over piracy as a crime under international law. Moreover, in the modern 
context, hijacking has been compared to piracy but universal jurisdiction over 
hijacking is provided for in Article 4 of the 1970 Hague Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, in the form of aut dedere aut judicare 
(which will be dealt with later in this Chapter).
121 
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Furthermore, Randall, for instance, has observed that a more accurate rationale for 
universal jurisdiction over piracy is the fundamental nature of piratical acts. Pirates 
are regarded as enemies of all people and piracy is punishable by every state since 
their act is often committed against vessels and nationals of numerous states and 
especially when viewed cumulatively, piratical acts could disrupt commerce and 
navigation on the high seas. At the time universal jurisdiction over piracy was 
developing, the effects of piracy were especially harmful given the importance of the 
high seas for commerce and navigation, thus rendering piracy of concern to all states. 
Nowadays, this rationale is considered questionable and debatable.
122
 
There were therefore two fundamental rationales explaining why universal 
jurisdiction was recognized for the crime of piracy under international law. Firstly, it 
was related to the gravity of the crime, amounting to ‘hostis humani generis’. This 
meant that states were motivated to acknowledge that the punishment for the crime of 
piracy provided the interests of a single state that represented the interests of 
international community as a whole.
123
 Secondly, it was related to the lack of 
jurisdiction or the doubtfulness to which a state had jurisdiction over a case. This 
uncertainty arose because the high seas had to be considered a non-area. In turn, this 
meant that any state could exercise its jurisdiction to punish and prosecute acts 
committed on the high seas. As a result of this situation, it was admitted that any state 
that was able to capture and prosecute suspects could capitalize on that opportunity 
without missing the chance to battle the crime of piracy.
124
    
However, it must be noted, that despite the universal acceptance of the practice of 
universal jurisdiction over piracy, there has always been debate among legal scholars 
about the nature of the crime and how it gave rise to universal jurisdiction. This 
debate is nowadays very relevant to understanding the historical weaknesses of 
relying on piracy for justification of modern universal jurisdiction. Although 
innumerable scholars and judges have called piracy a crime against the law of 
nations, it seems this is actually a misstatement that has come into usage from 
convenience and not legal accuracy as will be further articulated within Chapter IV. 
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Nevertheless, because of the gravity of the crime, the prosecution of piracy was 
recognized as a common interest among states. Hence, any state capable of capturing, 
prosecuting and punishing a suspect of piratical act was allowed to exercise 
jurisdiction. As a result, universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy was 
established under customary international law.  
In sum, among the main historical reasons for applying universal jurisdiction to 
piracy, has been;  
a) Statelessness of pirates; 
b) The act of piracy is committed on the high seas – terra nullius; 
c) The heinousness of the offence, thus constituting hostis humani generis 
(but one might question this rationale under modern international law); 
d) The crime of piracy is considered clearly defined, at least under 
international law.  
Additionally to the crime of piracy, some states began, in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, to exercise universal jurisdiction over slave trading even though the 1926 
Slavery Convention does not explicitly provide for universal jurisdiction in Article 2 
(in comparison to Article 3 which clearly prescribes territorial jurisdiction).
125
 Since 
then, there has been a gradual development to include slavery and slave related 
practices within international law relying on the same type of universal condemnation 
that exists with respect to piracy.
126
 
In conclusion on the first evolutionary stage of the universality principle one can 
fairly expect that since then the fundamental values and norms of the international 
system have evolved along with the number of crimes established by international 
law. As a result, the scope of universal jurisdiction has also grown and now not only 
encompasses acts of piracy but also applies to the most heinous crimes defined by 
international law as will be demonstrated in the next evolutionary stage.  
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3.1.2 Development following the Second World War  
Following the Second World War, universal jurisdiction reached several offences 
other than piracy and slave trading. The concept of universal jurisdiction developed 
significantly, gaining ground due to the establishment of the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT).
127
 Trials involving major war crimes were conducted in the IMT at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo.
128
 Advocates of universal jurisdiction firmly cite the 
principles that emerged from Nuremberg and were affirmed by the United Nations 
General Assembly as the foundation of the present-day application of universal 
jurisdiction to crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.
129
 However, more 
critical analysis of the use of universality in the Nuremberg trials cast doubt on the 
solidity of this legal foundation. Nevertheless, despite these dubious initial 
foundations which universal jurisdiction obtained for war crimes during the 
Nuremberg trials, even with the UN affirmation of the principles, it received a firmer 
boost in the subsequent Geneva Conventions of 1949.
130
  
Thereafter, due to the occurrence of certain major international crimes, various 
scholarly opinions have it that since Nuremberg the scope of universal jurisdiction 
has thus expanded significantly from piracy and slavery to incorporate war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, terrorism, crimes against peace, apartheid, 
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 Not all academics agree on all of these categories in their writings, and 
some conservative interpreters of international law argue that universal jurisdiction 
has not expanded at all, with Nuremberg being an exercise of sovereign occupational 
power and not one of universal jurisdiction.
132
 The individual conclusions of scholars 
and practitioners of international law depend on which side of the rift they occupy in 
their observation of the development of customary international law and its 
application in domestic courts of law. Indeed, when analyzing the most cited crimes 
under universal jurisdiction, one can see that there is only a small treaty base for any 
exercise of universal jurisdiction, even when considering the Geneva Conventions.  
A considerable number of international conventions were established but most 
important are the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
133
 The Geneva Conventions are 
paramount in this regard, providing in unmistakable terms for universal jurisdiction 
over grave breaches of those Conventions. International crimes were no longer to 
remain unpunished. The idea that in certain circumstances sovereignty could be 
limited for such heinous crimes was accepted as a general principle. The Geneva 
Conventions provide as follows: 
“Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for 
persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such 
grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, 
before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the 
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another 
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High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has 
made out a prima facie case.”
134 
The majority of commentators view this provision, which is found in all four 
conventions and oblige state parties to search for and try suspect in their own courts, 
as a prescription of universal jurisdiction.
135
 Others however, claim that since 
universal jurisdiction is not mentioned explicitly, it is not prescribed.
136
  
In addition, these conventions included an aut dedere aut judicare obligation either to 
exercise jurisdiction over suspects in their territories or to extradite them to state 
parties able and willing to do so, or to surrender suspects to an international criminal 
court. Hence, the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, became a standard judicial 




Several treaties are considered to establish universal jurisdiction with regard to the 
conduct they regulate. Prior to 1945, the jurisdictional clauses adopted a rather 
limited universality principle, as can be demonstrated by the 1936 Geneva 
Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs.
138
 Its 
Article 8 reads: Foreigners who are in the territory of a High Contracting Party and 
who have committed abroad any of the offences set out in Article 2 shall be 
prosecuted and punished as though the offence had been committed in that territory if 
the following conditions are realized – namely, that: (a) Extradition has been 
requested and could not be granted for a reason independent of the offence itself; (b) 
The law of the country of refuge considers prosecution for offences committed abroad 
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by foreigners admissible as a general rule. Therefore, the Drug Trafficking 
Convention permits universal jurisdiction as a subsidiary means of prosecuting the 
prohibited conduct, only after the extradition has been sought and rejected, and 
moreover, makes it dependent upon the provisions of the domestic law.  
Similarly strict conditions were included in the 1937 Convention for Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism.
139
 These conventions represent the early version of the aut 
dedere aut judicare formula.  
If the post-1945 conventions
140
 are analyzed, one can clearly see a departure from the 
sanctity of the notion of state sovereignty which explains the previous practice of 
attaching very strict conditions to prosecutions based on the universality principle. 
This trend can probably be explained by the rising desire to avoid the existence of 
safe havens for perpetrators of serious criminal offences of international concern.
141
 
In addition, in a vast majority of these post-1945 conventions, universal jurisdiction is 
provided for through the above mentioned aut dedere aut judicare formula, which is 
typically construed as follows:   
“The State party in territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to 
have committed any offence referred to in Article 4 is found shall [...], if it 
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This obligation is usually preceded by the provisions requiring the establishment of 
jurisdiction over respective offences:   
“1. Each State party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in Article 4, in the 
following cases: (a) When the offences are committed in any territory under 
its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;  
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;  
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it 
appropriate.   
2. Each State party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged 
offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not 
extradite him […] 
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in 
accordance with internal law.”
143 
Even though these provisions are copied from the 1984 Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture 
Convention or CAT) they appear in the same manner in other treaties mentioned 
above. Indeed, the relevant paragraphs make no express mention of universal 
jurisdiction however it can be clearly derived from their wording by means of 
interpretation.
144
 Paragraph 2 above does not mention any specific link necessary for 
the exercise of jurisdiction and the only condition required is the presence of an 
alleged offender in any territory under a state party’s jurisdiction.
145
 However, the 
strict textual meaning of the article allows for more interpretations as to whether a 
prior request for extradition is necessary before the obligation to proceed with 
prosecution arises or if the obligation exists even without such a request. Nonetheless, 
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it is clear from the analysis of travaux préparatoires
146
 that the second option is 
correct and leading commentaries also take this position.
147
 
With respect to universal jurisdiction, later on, other international conventions and, to 
some extent, rules of customary law enlarged the principle’s scope of application. 
Enabling all states to share the right to jurisdiction in this way is meant to function as 
a guarantee against impunity and prevent the alleged perpetrators of heinous crimes 
from ‘finding a safe haven in third countries’. Arguably, universal jurisdiction over 
offenses may derive from developments in international criminal law and the 
obligations erga omnes and jus cogens doctrines. This argument, of course, relates to 
our prior discussion of those developments.  If one asserts that “violations of certain 
[…] obligations are breaches of customary law obligations erga omnes,” it follows 
“that such violations of basic rights [...] may be punishable by any State under the 
universality principle. Thus, universal jurisdiction over additional human rights and 
terrorist offenses might arise upon showing that those acts are international crimes 
and violations of obligations erga omnes and jus cogens norms.
148
 
As a result of these developments, universal jurisdiction came to be seen as applying 
to a broader range of crimes than it had done before; including war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocide and torture. It has been argued that the prosecution of 
international crimes under universal jurisdiction is the application of a different and 
relatively new principle that used to prosecute the original crimes to which the 
principle applied. However, a better view is that the application of universal 
jurisdiction to international crimes is merely an evolution of the same concept. This 
evolution occurred concurrently with the creation of the United Nations and the 
increased acceptance of international influences into the domestic space.  
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It was not only the establishment of multiple conventions and the adding of new 
offences to the list of crimes falling under the scope of universal jurisdiction, but also 
that during this period universal jurisdiction was stipulated in practice especially in 
relation to the aut dedere aut judicare provisions. Many important and highly 
relevant proceedings, which also lay the foundation for today’s discussion on 
universal jurisdiction, took place. The most remarkable being the Eichmann 
precedent.  
 
3.1.2.1 The Eichmann Trial and its Reliance on Universal Jurisdiction  
One of the milestones in the prosecution of crimes against humanity is the well-
known Eichmann Trial.
149
 The Eichmann Trial in Jerusalem in 1962, is one of the 
most significant judicial precedents where the court relied on the universality 
principle and is considered to be the most prominent demonstration for universal 
jurisdiction over genocide. It involved the prosecution of Adolf Eichmann who was 
suspected of ordering the mass murder of Jews during the War. He was abducted by 
the Israeli secret police in 1960 from Argentina where he was hiding and indicted by 
an Israeli domestic court in accordance with Israeli law – the Nazis and Nazi 
Collaborators (Punishment) Act of 1950. This domestic law was modelled on the 
Genocide Convention, and was intended to prosecute such crimes committed against 
the Jews. What was extraordinary was that Israel exercised its jurisdiction over 
Eichmann, who was not an Israeli national or resident, for crimes committed outside 
its territory before the existence of the State of Israel. Eichmann appealed against his 
conviction by the District Court of Jerusalem in 1961.
150  
The District Court of Jerusalem relied on two distinct bases for jurisdiction – the 
universal character of the crimes in question and their specific character to 
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exterminate a Jewish population.
151
 As to the validity of the universality principle, the 
District Court confirmed that:    
“These crimes, which struck at the whole of mankind and shocked the 
conscience of nations, are grave offences against the law of nations itself 
(delicta iuris gentium). Therefore, so far from international law negating or 
limiting the jurisdiction of countries with respect to such crimes, 
international law is, in the absence of an International Court, in need of the 
judicial and legislative organs of every country to give effect to its criminal 
interdictions and to bring the criminals to trial. The jurisdiction to try crimes 
under international law is universal.”
152
  
The Israeli District Court clearly expressed its view on the legality of universal 
jurisdiction under international law. It is fair to point out that the Court phrased the 
right to punish as based on two cumulative sources, the second being, according to 
the Court’s words, the protective or the passive personality principle.
153
 Due to this 
aspect of the decision, some scholars view it as a weak support for universal 
jurisdiction.
154
 However, nothing in the District Court’s judgment seems to indicate 
that it would consider the universality principle standing alone insufficient. Quite to 




Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Israel, in its subsequent judgment, fully 
concentrated on the universality principle, particularly with regard to the fact, that 
some of the crimes in question were directed against non-Jewish groups, such as 
Poles, Slovenes, Czechs and gypsies.
156
 The Supreme Court reiterated the “harmful 
and murderous effects […] so embracing and widespread as to shake the international 
community to its very foundations.”
157
 Additionally stating that: 
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“The State of Israel […] was entitled, pursuant to the principle of universal 
jurisdiction and in the capacity of a guardian of international law and an 
agent for its enforcement, to try the appellant.”
158
 
The Supreme Court therefore upheld that it was sufficiently justifiable to apply 
universal jurisdiction because of the characteristics of the crime dealt with in this 
case. It further stated that the same arguments justifying universal jurisdiction over 
piracy – the important interest of the international community – justified the Israeli 
jurisdiction over the present case as including war crimes.
159
 As a result, both the 
District Court and the Supreme Court upheld Israeli universal jurisdiction.
160
 The 
ruling of the Israeli courts met with little or no opposition. Most importantly, 
Germany, as a country of nationality of the accused, did not protest against Israeli 
jurisdiction. 
Finally, whether or not the Eichmann trial can be interpreted as a precedent for 
universal jurisdiction will remain a point of controversy and it will be up to each 
scholar to decide. Nevertheless, my view being that the Eichmann trial has indeed 
influenced the future claims of universal jurisdiction and nowadays, many people cite 
the judgment as an indication of universal jurisdiction over genocide becoming 
customary international law.  
 
3.1.2.2 From Demjanjuk to Pinochet  
In 1983, Israel requested extradition of John Demjanjuk from the United States to 
stand trial on charges connected to his alleged service in the ‘Schutzstaffen’161 (SS) at 
the Treblinka concentration camp in Poland during the Second World War.
162
 
Demjanjuk objected to the legality of Israeli jurisdiction pleading that he was neither 
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an Israeli national nor resident; the alleged crime was committed in the territory of 
Poland; and because the nation of Israel did not exist at the time of the alleged 
commission of the crime.
163 
The US extradition request could only be granted if the crimes in question were 
committed within the jurisdiction of the requesting state. Consequently, the US courts 
had an opportunity to pronounce on the legality of universal jurisdiction. The 6th 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that 
“Israel is seeking to enforce its criminal law for the punishment of Nazis and 
Nazi collaborators for crimes universally recognized and condemned by the 
community of nations. The fact that Demjanjuk is charged with committing 
these acts in Poland does not deprive Israel of authority to bring him to trial.” 
In addition stating that: 
“This universality principle is based on the assumption that some crimes are 
so universally condemned that the perpetrators are the enemies of all people 
[...] neither the nationality of the accused or the victim(s), nor the location of 
the crimes is significant. The underlying assumption is that the crimes are 
offences against the law of nations or against humanity and that the 
prosecuting nation is acting for all nations.”
164 
These passages represents a clear confirmation of the universality principle by US 
courts and the affirmation that it is a matter of the international community as a whole 
to fight war crimes. The courts in the Demjanjuk case thus affirmed Israeli 
jurisdiction based solely on universal jurisdiction, compared to the Eichmann trial, in 
which the court recognized protective and passive personality jurisdiction, in addition 
to universal jurisdiction. Some tend to claim that a shift of emphasis can be noticed 
over the time elapsed between these two cases towards more acceptance of universal 
jurisdiction.
165 
                                                          
163




 INAZUMI, supra note 78, p. 80. 
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A few years later, in 1998, the Pinochet
166
 case became the most noteworthy within 
the development of international criminal law.
167
 The former Chilean head of state 
Augusto Pinochet was arrested in London following an extradition request by Spain 




The decision was ground-braking because the majority of the U.K. House of Lords 
held that, under the Torture Convention, a former head of state could be extradited to 
a third state (Spain), for alleged torture committed in another state (Chile) against 
nationals and non-nationals of the third state while the accused held office. Even 
though the main issue at hand was whether Pinochet, as a former head of state, 
enjoyed immunity from prosecution, a remark made by Lord Browne Wilkinson with 
respect to universal jurisdiction expressed that: 
“The jus cogens nature of the international crime of torture justifies states in 
taking universal jurisdiction over torture wherever committed. International 
law provides that offences jus cogens may be punished by any state because 
the offenders are common enemies of all mankind and all nations have an 
equal interest in their apprehension and prosecution.“
169 
Lord Millet also agreed that there exists a rule of international customary law under 
which international crimes attract universal jurisdiction.
170
 Lord Phillips pointed to 
the recent developments in international criminal law and concluded that it remained 
an open question whether international law at the given time recognized universal 
jurisdiction.
171 Taking into account the differences in the opinions of the law lords, 
commentators differ in their views on what overall impact the Pinochet judgment has 
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had on the acceptance of the universality principle.
172
 However, the reaction of the 
international community to the Pinochet judgment has been that the issuing of an 
arrest warrant by Spain against Pinochet symbolized the recognition of the interest of 
the international community in ending impunity of individuals who have committed 
heinous human rights offences. 
During the Pinochet period the jurisdictional system underwent a great transition in 
conjunction with the development of international criminal and humanitarian law. 
The two ad hoc tribunals, namely the ICTY and ICTR, where established.
173
 Even 
though their Statutes did not explicitly suggest the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
by states, they have made a great impact on universal jurisdiction. Consequently, 
encouraged by the establishment and function of the two ad hoc tribunals the effort to 
establish a permanent international criminal court gained momentum. As a result, the 
ICC Statute was adopted on 17 July 1998.
174
  
In sum, the period after the Second World War revealed the expansion of universal 
jurisdiction for core international crimes to its contemporary scope, but indeed its 
current features are reflected in the dramatic development of international criminal 
law and human rights consciousness in the aftermath of the Second World War. This 
expansion derived from the growing world consensus condemning such crimes.  
One can therefore conclude, from the foregoing analysis on the second evolutionary 
stage, that apart from piracy and slavery, universal jurisdiction was only truly 
recognized following World War II, and further harmonized when aut dedere aut 
judicare became an accepted instrument in multilateral treaties. 
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3.1.3 Modern Application  
This development has led some scholars to claim that once a crime rises to the level 
of a violation of jus cogens
175
, it is automatically subject to universal jurisdiction; 
states have an obligations erga omnes to prevent such a crime to go unpunished.
176
 
While others, along with domestic courts on the whole, have not accepted this 
argument, declining to use universal jurisdiction in the absence of specific legislature 
implementing international treaty obligations, and such legislation is not common 
even in the presence of wide treaty ratification.
177
  
The establishment of the ICC has further fuelled the debate, as it is the first 
international court whose jurisdiction is not limited to a particular conflict as the rest 
of the ad hoc tribunals are. It is the first such treaty to house jurisdiction over the 
most notable jus cogens crimes under one roof. It is, however, limited only to crimes 
committed after 2002 on the territory of member states or by their nationals, and most 
importantly, it does not actually exercise true universal jurisdiction as priority is 
given to the state where the crime was committed or the state of which the accused is 
a national. States that have ratified that Statute have been forced to reexamine their 
criminal codes and make changes to bring themselves in line with the Rome Treaty.  
 
3.1.3.1 The Belgian Law and the Arrest Warrant case 
The Belgian law (or Statute) of 1993 and 1999 has to be mentioned but they are 
considered as among the most far-reaching national laws on universal jurisdiction. 
Belgium adopted a domestic law in 1993 to punish grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions. According to this law, the Belgian courts had jurisdiction irrespective of 
the place of the commission of such offences as well as the nationality of the suspect 
or victim. In February 1999, Belgium amended the law to include explicitly genocide 
and crimes against humanity. As a result, universal jurisdiction over genocide became 
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laid down in the Belgian law. What is extraordinary is that Belgium attributed to itself 
a so-called universal jurisdiction in absentia thus enabling its courts to hear any case 
where the suspect is alleged to have committed a crime listed in the law, even without 
the presence of the suspect.
178
 The attribution of such a wide scope of universal 
jurisdiction – namely the universal jurisdiction in absentia - to the Belgian courts 
affected diplomatic relations with some states, resulting in oppositions towards the 
law. This resulted in the Belgian law being amended dramatically in 2003 and 
universal jurisdiction in absentia put ‘aside’.
179
 However, as Langer has observed in 
his recent article “Universal Jurisdiction Is Not Disappearing: The Shift from ‘Global 
Enforcer’ to ‘No Safe Haven’”, universal jurisdiction trials over core international 
crimes did in fact not diminish after the amendments to the Belgian law in 2003 and, 
the same applies to the Spanish law in 2009. Thus, the practice of universal 
jurisdiction has declined, although not substantially. According to Langer’s research, 
after the Belgian amendments, both national and international courts heard 21 of the 
39 universal jurisdiction trials over at least one core international crime committed 
during the period of 1961–2013. According to this, in the ten-year period of 2004-




The International Court of Justice dealt with a case filed by the Democratic Republic 
of Congo against Belgium in October 2000, but Belgium had issued an arrest warrant 
against the Congolese Minister of foreign affairs at that time, Yerodia Abdoulaye 
Ndombasi. Even though this case dealt mainly with the question of immunity and the 
ICJ did not rule on the legality of universal jurisdiction in absentia asserted by 
Belgium, this question was nevertheless discussed at the hearings where the judges 
displayed their different views on the subject.
181
 Belgium, among others, upheld at 
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the hearing that it also had a clear and reasonable link with the acts in question 
because of the Belgian nationality or residence of the victim of those acts.
182  
Several judges expressed views on the subject in their individual opinions; some in 
favour of universal jurisdiction but others did not approve of it. In particular, the 
widely cited joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal 
concluded that universal jurisdiction is available with regard to piracy, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity affirming that there was no law prohibiting it.
183
 For 
instance, Judge Van den Wyngaert maintained that “[t]he term ‘universal jurisdiction’ 
does not necessarily mean that the suspect should be present on the territory of the 
prosecuting State. Assuming the presence of the accused, as some authors do, does 
not necessarily mean that it is a legal requirement.”
184
 On the other hand, the 
existence of universal jurisdiction was denied by both President Guillaume and Judge 
Rezek.
185
 President Guillaume stated that “international law does not accept universal 
jurisdiction; still less does it accept universal jurisdiction in absentia.”
186
 The issue of 
universal jurisdiction in absentia will be further clarified in Section 3.2.1 of this 
study. However, from the opposing views given by the judges in this case the scope 
of the rules applicable to universal jurisdiction are still unclear.  
 
3.1.3.2 The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction  
In 2001 a group of international criminal law scholars formulated the ‘Princeton 
Principles on Universal Jurisdiction’.
187
 The Princeton Principles consist of fourteen 
points which establish guidelines for the use and development of universal 
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jurisdiction. It enumerates the fundamentals of universal jurisdiction and the crimes 
subject to universal jurisdiction, mentioning: “piracy, the crime of slavery, war 
crimes, and crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture.”
188
  
The purpose of these Principles was to advance the continued evolution of 
international law and establish parameters for the usage of universal jurisdiction. 
Unfortunately, this document merely provides guidance and it has not grown to have 
substantive influence on the development of universal jurisdiction, although it has 
provided some directions to courts invoking universal jurisdiction. Perhaps if the 
Princeton Principles would have received wider attention as a document establishing 
the basis for universal jurisdiction; universal jurisdiction might have turned out to be 
more accepted and less controversial. 
 
3.1.3.3 Debates undertaken by the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee  
It is so that the laws and practices relating to universal jurisdiction are still in 
transition in the twenty-first century. Discussions are still being undertaken at 
international forums on the principles’ scope, application and legal position. These 
continuing debates indicate how sensitive and complicated the principles are, and at 
the same time, it reveals the willingness of the international community to at least try 
to reach a consensus on the subject. 
The most noteworthy discussions and reports on the principle have been undertaken 
by the UN General Assembly on the item ‘the scope and application of the principle 
of universal jurisdiction’. These reports have been prepared pursuant to GA multiply 
resolutions by which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare reports 
on the basis of information and observations received from Member States and 
relevant observes on the subject of universal jurisdiction.  
In October 2009, the Sixty-fourth session of the UN General Assembly Sixth 
Committee started its first debate on the principle of universal jurisdiction through a 
proposal raised by the representative of Rwanda on behalf of the Group of African 
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 Due to the diversity of opinion no consensus could be reached. This 
demonstrates that nations have different views on the legal status and application of 
universal jurisdiction. By a resolution adopted at the session each member state was 
invited to express its opinion on universal jurisdiction. In 2010, comments from 
almost 44 governments were received which highlighted the fact that there are still 
major differences among states on the topic.
190
 Governments nevertheless agreed that 
major achievements had been made in international law and international cooperation 
was constantly being strengthened, thus resulting in “[…]concrete outcomes, giving 
practical recognition to international criminal jurisdiction, as well as to prosecute 
based on universal jurisdiction.”
191
  
At its Sixty-sixth session the attention had shifted from considering solely the concept 
of universal jurisdiction into emphasizing, in particular, on the conditions, restrictions 
and limitations on the exercise of universal jurisdiction (for instance, immunities, the 
presence of the suspect and that priority should be accorded to territoriality as basis 
for jurisdiction). It was, among others, concluded that if these limitations would be 
respected, states would avoid impairing friendly relations.
192
 In addition, it was noted 
that a focus should be put on distinguishing universal jurisdiction from the principle 
of aut dedere aut judicare.
193
 In 2012 (at the Sixty-seventh session) the discussions 
where concluded by representatives highlighting that universal jurisdiction should 
only be a last resort in combating impunity and should only be used in exceptional 
circumstances.
194
 It was stated that “states should only turn to the principle of 
universal jurisdiction […] when other States had failed to act”
195
 and representatives 
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warned against selective and political use of the principle, which undermines the 
sovereignty of states.
196
 Moreover, during the Sixty-eighth session it was pointed out 
that the application of universal jurisdiction should be regulated at the international 
level to avert any unwarranted and selective use.
197
 
During last summer, at the Sixty-ninth session, delegates turned to the essential 
elements of the principle, namely, that the scope and application of universal 
jurisdiction must be clearly defined to avoid abuse of the principle which might 
otherwise endanger international law and order. Many representatives called for a 
way to find consensus on the subject, pointing out that the topic had appeared on the 
General Assembly’s agenda due to abuse and ‘politicization’ of the principle, 
particularly with regard to the African states.
198
 It seems that finding a holistic 
definition on universal jurisdiction had once again become an issue. 
 
3.2 Universal Jurisdiction – Clarifying the Basic Concept 
Universal jurisdiction is indeed an exceptional principle of a special character which 
implies that a state may invoke universal jurisdiction over serious crimes committed 
by individuals without any nexus what so ever – thus usually being defined 
negatively. Unlike the other heads of jurisdiction, there is generally no accepted 
definition of universal jurisdiction at the present. Multiple definitions and 
commentaries have been set out by scholars and academics in order to clarify the 
concept, all of which usually have defined universal jurisdiction by an ‘absence’ of 
the normal jurisdictional link to the national legal system attempting to exercise 
universal jurisdiction.
199 
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The main purpose of universal jurisdiction is linked to the idea that international 
crimes affect the international community as a whole and are of such gravity to lend 
the exercise of the universality principle, as can be concluded from the case law 
inquiry on the historical development of the universality principle. 
Accordingly, the principle is often justified on the basis that the offence in question, 
whether a crime under international law or a crime of international concern, is an 
attack on fundamental values shared by the international community. A few states 
have pointed out that it is the heinous nature of the crimes concerned that makes 
universal jurisdiction acceptable under international law. For instance, as was 
explained in the Demjanjuk case (involving a request for the extradition of a person 
charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity during the Second World War):  
“This universality principle is based on the assumption that some crimes are 
so universally condemned that the perpetrators are the enemies of all people. 
Therefore, any nation which has custody of the perpetrators may punish them 
according to its law applicable to such offences.”
200
 
The same rationale was cited in the Eichmann case where the District Court of 
Jerusalem noted that: 
“The abhorrent crimes struck at the whole of mankind and shocked the 
conscience of nations.”
201 
These passages specify that the ratio legis of universal jurisdiction is justified on two 
main ideas. Firstly, some crimes are so grave that they harm the entire international 
society. Secondly, the gravity of these crimes implies that no safe haven should be 
available for those who commit them. In sum, the essence of universal jurisdiction is 
therefore the absence of a link between the crime and the prosecuting state.
202
  
Moreover, when observing the universality principle the traditional approach is to 
distinguish between two types (or rather situations) on which universal jurisdiction is 
comprised of. Primarily, whether the prosecuting state may exercise universal 
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jurisdiction only when the alleged perpetrator (after the commission of the alleged 
crime and at the time of the initiation of the exercise of the jurisdiction) is present in, 
or becomes a resident or citizen of, the prosecuting state; so called conditional 
universal jurisdiction. Secondly, whether there does not have to exist any such link 
with the prosecuting state; so called ‘absolute’ or ‘pure’ universal jurisdiction.  
 
3.2.1 Conditional or Absolute Universal Jurisdiction 
Conditional universal jurisdiction is the narrower notion of the principle, under which 
a state may prosecute a person only if he or she is present on the territory of that 
state.
203
  The issue essentially is whether, for the exercise of universal jurisdiction, the 
presence of the accused on the territory (so-called ‘forum deprehensionis’) is required 
as a condition. 
Some commentators have argued that different degrees of ‘presence’ are also 
available, for example, simple capture or residence, with one writer stating that “[i]t 
would be self-defeating to add conditions which would render universal jurisdiction 
akin to a traditional connecting factor, and thus lose its specific and raison d’être.”
204
 
In addition, conditional universal jurisdiction is usually associated with the condition 
that the suspect was not, or cannot be, extradited to a state having jurisdiction and that 
is able and willing to prosecute.
205
  
It can be asserted from international instruments as well as state practice that the 
narrower or conditional notion, of universal jurisdiction is a more preferred way. For 
instance, conditional universal jurisdiction was also supported by Cassese, who wrote 
that universality may be asserted subject to the condition that the alleged offender be 
on the territory of the prosecuting state at the time charges are brought and criminal 
investigations commence. In his own words, “[…] universality may be asserted 
subject to the condition that the alleged offender be on the territory of the prosecuting 
state. It would seem contrary to the logic of current state relations to authorize any 
state of the world to institute criminal proceedings (commence investigations, collect 
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evidence and lay out charges) against any foreigner or foreign state official allegedly 
culpable of serious international crimes.”
206
 In addition, from the UN General 
Assembly sixty-ninth session it seems that there is a tendency among states to be 
more in favor of the restrictive exercise of universal jurisdiction. Hence, some states 
require a link between the accused and the forum state; that link being at least the 
presence of the suspect in the prosecuting state.
207
 
On the other hand, absolute universal jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction when no link 
whatsoever is required between the crime and the state exercising jurisdiction over it. 
The state may prosecute the person irrespective of where the crime occurred or the 
nationality of the perpetrator or victim, and what is more, even regardless of the 
presence of the accused on the territory of that state.
208
 It is widely agreed that 
“universal jurisdiction in absentia can be roughly defined as the conducting of an 
investigation, the issuing of an arrest warrant, and/or the bringing of criminal charges 
based on the principle of universal jurisdiction when the defendant is not present in 
the territory of the acting state. This definition does not include adjudication of the 
case.”
209
 Accordingly, this concept of universal jurisdiction allows state authority to 
commence investigation of a person suspected of serious international crimes and to 
gather evidence, even without the suspect being in the territory (in absentia).
210 
The exercise of absolute universal jurisdiction is accepted only within the criminal 
codes of a few states, notably that of Belgium and Spain. The best known codification 
of absolute universal jurisdiction was the Belgian Law from 1993 with respect to 
serious violations of humanitarian law, regardless of their commission. In 1999, the 
Belgian Law was amended adding genocide and crimes against humanity to the list. 
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3.2.1.1 Pros and Cons of Absolute Universal Jurisdiction 
Currently there are high objections to the exercise of universal jurisdiction in 
absentia.
212
 There are both political and practical obstacles when it comes to the 
exercise of absolute universal jurisdiction. Consequently, it may easily lead to 
infringement of the sovereignty of foreign states and to undesirable competition 
between jurisdictions of different states (which might lead to ‘judicial chaos’). 
Among the main political reasons are immunities of high ranking state official. Thus 
diplomatic and political tension might arise between the state seeking to commence 
proceeding against the foreign Head of State or Prime minister of the forum state. 
Additionally, the opponents of universal jurisdiction in absentia also submit that the 
presence requirement would reduce the risk that the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
might be abused by states for their own political ends
213
 and that it would “create a 
chaotic and arbitrary method of enforcing international law,”
214
 permitting a 
particular state “[…]to act as a  ‘policeman’ of the world.”
215 Furthermore, practical 
obstacles such as gathering and obtaining evidence, calling witnesses and requesting 
mutual legal assistance.  
In contrast, there are also those who favor the exercise of universal jurisdiction in 
absentia. These commentators claim that the exercise of absolute universal 
jurisdiction is essential for the effective enforcement of international criminal law.
216
 
Firstly, in this regard, Colangelo for instance maintained that “universal jurisdiction 
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in absentia serves as a type of punishment of offenders, keeping them in hiding and 
preventing them from moving freely within the international community.”
217
 
Secondly, the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia may, “through a 
combination of a wake-up call and embarrassment,”
218
 induce the state preserving a 
suspect on its territory, to terminate the impunity granted to such a perpetrator. 
Ryngaert elaborates: 
“[T]he mere initiation of an investigation [by the state exercising universal 
jurisdiction] [...] could set in motion a flurry of investigative and 
prosecutorial activity in the territorial state. The bystander state's 
investigation may indeed bring to light a past that was not particularly bright, 
and strengthen the hand of progressive domestic powers that want to bring 
the presumed offenders (often belonging to a former regime) to justice in the 
territorial state. At the end of the day, that state also wants to maintain its 
reputation on the international scene.”
219
  
Commentators often refer to such impact on the state harboring the perpetrators as the 
‘Pinochet effect’, pointing to the increased willingness of Chilean authorities as well 
as other states throughout Latin America to prosecute and punish perpetrators 
belonging to former dictatorial regimes in the wake of the proceedings undertaken in 
several European countries against former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet under a 
doctrine of universal jurisdiction.
220
 Lastly, the exercise of universal jurisdiction in 
absentia is often essential in order to preserve a record and evidence of the crime. 
Commentators have noted that “if a state forestalls investigations and evidence 
gathering because the offender is not within its borders, crucial time-sensitive 
evidence may disappear before a thorough investigation can be conducted and a 
sound case brought. This delay could wipe out the possibility of conviction and result 
in an effective grant of impunity.”
221
 Hence, proposing the exercise of universal 
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jurisdiction in absentia “would increase the likelihood of conviction, since it would 
facilitate the gathering of evidence and testimony.”
222 
While many commentators favor the view that the exercise of universal jurisdiction in 
absentia is not prohibited under current customary international law,
223
 most states are 
currently reluctant to pursue such practice.
224
 Under the laws of several states, a 
perpetrator’s mere presence in a state is sufficient basis for the exercise of universal 




Underlying state reluctance to exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia are 
legitimacy concerns. The presence requirement adopted by many states “suggest[s] a 
general discomfort with the notion that States can prosecute anyone for international 
crimes regardless of any traditional nexus.”
226
 By insisting on the presence 
requirement, courts “try to create such a nexus, however thin or after the fact.”
227
 
It is so, that the application of absolute universal jurisdiction has only been applied in 
relatively few cases. Presumably the two best known cases where absolute universal 
jurisdiction was applied are the Eichmann in Israel and Pinochet in United Kingdom, 
both dealing with crimes against humanity and torture. Moreover, in the Arrest 
Warrant case, three of the ICJ judges explicitly distinguished between universal 
jurisdiction in absentia and trials in absentia, observing that “some jurisdictions 
                                                          
222
 RABINOVITCH, supra note 213, p. 525. 
223
 Ibid., p. 511. Rabinovitch reviews municipal case law that upholds assertions of universal 
jurisdiction in absentia. Ibid., p. 515. See Colangelo, who stated that “the accused need not be present 
on the territory of the state when universal jurisdiction is asserted provided that certain safeguards 
against abuse are followed.” COLANGELO, The New Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 209, p. 548; 
Further, O’Keefe, notes that if universal jurisdiction is permissible, then “exercise in absentia is 
logically permissible as well.” O'KEEFE, supra note 21, p. 830; Kresß asserts that the Resolution of 
the Institute of International Law “contains the drafter's view that the power of states to exercise 
universal jurisdiction includes investigative acts in absentia,” see KREß, C.: “Universal Jurisdiction 
over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit International” Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, Vol. 4(3), (2006), p. 576. 
224
 RABINOVITCH, supra note 213, p. 507, who stated that “[a] majority of the States that have 
implemented the various conventions establishing universal jurisdiction in their national legislation 
expressly require the presence of the offender on their territory before asserting jurisdiction.” 
225
 REYDAMS, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 19, pp. 86-179. For instance, under Australian law, 
“the mere presence (as opposed to residence) of a foreigner is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over 
offenses committed abroad.” Ibid., p. 88. Similarly, under Canadian law, “universal jurisdiction 
requires the voluntary presence in Canada of a foreign offender.” Ibid., pp. 124 - 125. 
226





provide for trial in absentia; others do not. If it is said that a person must be within 
the jurisdiction at the time of the trial itself, that may be a prudent guarantee for the 
right of fair trial but has little to do with basis of jurisdiction recognized under 
international law.”
228
 The perpetrators of international crimes often find harbor in a 





3.2.2 Variations of Additional Classification  
As the universality principle has been gaining attention, some commentators have 
tried to categorize the principle further by describing additional characteristics that 
universal jurisdiction might entail according to their view. Even though universal 
jurisdiction has traditionally been classified as only being either conditional or 
absolute, some authors have sought to distinguish universal jurisdiction further. These 
classifications are provided in order to facilitate the understanding of universal 
jurisdiction. 
For instance, Reydams distinguishes three different forms of universal jurisdiction 
namely; 1) co-operative general universality principle; 2) co-operative limited 
universality principle; and 3) unilateral limited universality principle.
230
 Reydams 
aggregated this categorization from a historical observation. To begin with, the co-
operative general principle of universality applies to all serious crimes, for instance, 
conduct which is criminal and is severely repressed in jurisdiction of most states. 
Here, Reydams withheld that no distinction is made between acts punishable under 
international law and by national law. The notion of ‘co-operative’ refers to the 
international context in which jurisdiction is exercised – the judex loci deprehensionis 
enters the proceedings, which would otherwise result from the impossibility of 
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 Co-operative limited universality principle differs from the 
aforementioned in that it applies only to international crimes. Thus some offenses, 
although they might be severe according to national law, are excluded.
232
 
Furthermore, the unilateral limited universality principle applies only to international 
crimes and does not require any connection between acts committed and the 
prosecuting state. The only condition here is international nature of the criminal 
activity or as Reydams argues “jurisdiction is truly ‘universal’ because any State may 
unilaterally launch an investigation, even in absentia.”
233
 On this third type of 
universal jurisdiction, Reydams notes, that the original purpose of this class of 
principle of universality was to fill a gap in international criminal law, which now has 
already been filled with the creation of the ICC. Therefore it would not seem right to 
attribute more power to national courts, than to the ICC. Ironical as this last passage 
seems, national courts are still the most suitable forum to deal with the prosecution of 
criminals; not to mention if international cooperation among states is at hand.
234
  
Inazumi, approached the subject from another perspective. He categorizes universal 
jurisdiction into two aspects which demonstrate the different nature of universal 
jurisdiction. Firstly, Inazumi mention that universal jurisdiction can be characterized 
by being permissive or obligatory, and secondly, whether it is supplemental or 
primary.
235
 Starting with the most classic understanding of ‘supplemental permissive 
universal jurisdiction’, which in his opinion can be understood as a right and that 
states are entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction if they choose, they are however 
not obliged to do so. This categorization regards universal jurisdiction as an 
additional right supplementing other national jurisdictions.
236
 The second category is 
‘primary permissive universal jurisdiction’ which is no longer supplemental to other 
jurisdictions. In this case, if there is any extradition request from other states there is 
no need to give priority to that request. Hence it can exercise its jurisdiction freely.
237
 
‘Supplemental obligatory universal jurisdiction’ is the third category and ‘primary 
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obligatory universal jurisdiction’ the fourth, both of which oblige states to extradite or 
prosecute; only the last category does not require that states exhaust the effort to 
extradite before exercising universal jurisdiction.
238 
 
3.3 Universal Jurisdiction and Aut Dedere Aut Judicare  
One of the related principles influencing the scope and development of universal 
jurisdiction throughout the years is the principle of aut dedere aut judicare (the 
obligation to extradite or prosecute). These two impelling and urgent doctrines of 
international law help the international society to adapt to changing conditions in the 
constantly transforming legal order.  
It is noteworthy, concerning the issue of the distinction between universal jurisdiction 
and the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, that the latter was subject of a study 
undertaken by the International Law Commission (ILC) (with its final report 
published in 2014). Making a clear distinction between the two concepts had 
previously been a salient issue for the ILC. Although it was understood that in some 
cases both concepts could apply, the ILC decided to focus on the principle of aut 
dedere aut judicare.
239
 Similarly, while the study undertaken by the working group 
created by General Assembly resolution 65/33 should recognize and explore the 
relationship between universal jurisdiction and other concepts, it focuses on the 
elements inherent in the principle of universal jurisdiction.
240
 Accordingly, these two 
principles share a number of important characteristics and thus it may prove useful to 
examine the parallels between them. 
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3.3.1 Conceptual Contradiction and Common Misconception 
Universal jurisdiction under customary international law is often analyzed in 
connection to the aut dedere aut judicare principle, which is embodied in several 
multilateral treaties aimed at prosecuting serious international crimes. The principle is 
considered as being of a more obligatory nature than universal jurisdiction. 
As seen from the historical overview in the beginning of this chapter, universal 
jurisdiction has for decades been coupled with the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare.
241
 These two rules are related but yet distinct. In other words, the obligation 
to extradite or prosecute does not amount per se to universal jurisdiction, as many 
commentators tend to think. Rather whenever a foreigner present in the state is 
suspected of committing a crime abroad against another foreigner, aut dedere aut 
judicare rule may require the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Therefore in modern 
international law these two principles should be considered as a part of one another 
usage; not as one and the same principle.  
As described above universal jurisdiction is the ability of the court of any state to try 
persons for serious crimes committed outside its territory having no link whatsoever 
with the suspect. Under the aut dedere aut judicare principle, a state may not shield a 
person suspected of these serious crimes, and it is therefore required to either 
prosecute or extradite.
242
 Accordingly, universal jurisdiction cannot, and should not, 
be analyzed without also considering the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, since 
the purpose of both concepts is to combat impunity for certain types of crimes defined 
in international legal instruments. Although, aut dedere aut judicare is distinct from 
universal jurisdiction, the obligation remains relevant and should be considered 
together, or as stated in the AU-EU Expert Report: 
“The obligation aut dedere aut judicare is nonetheless relevant to the 
question of universal jurisdiction, since such a provision compels a state 
party to exercise the underlying universal jurisdiction that it is also obliged to 
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provide for by the treaty. In short, a state party to one of the treaties in 
question is not only bound to empower its criminal justice system to exercise 
universal jurisdiction but is further bound actually to exercise that 
jurisdiction by means of either considering prosecution or extradition.”
243 
The expression aut dedere aut judicare is commonly used to the alternative obligation 
to extradite or prosecute, which is contained in a number of multilateral treaties aimed 
at securing international cooperation in the suppression of certain kinds of 
multilateral conducts. The obligation is phrased in different ways in different treaties, 
but essentially it requires a state holding someone who has committed a crime of 
international concern either to extradite the offender to another state which is 
prepared to try him or else to take steps to have him prosecuted before its own 
courts.
244
 In other words, the principle obliges the state having custody of a suspect to 
either extradite the person to a state having jurisdiction over the case, or to investigate 
its own judicial proceeding.  
The universality principle is often confused with that of aut dedere aut judicare. 
Although there is a considerable overlap between these notions, in a strict theoretical 
sense they are different notions. The objective of the principle is to avoid crimes 
being left unpunished because there is no extradition or prosecution. According to 
this principle, if there is no extradition, the state will be obligated to refer the case to 
its appropriate prosecuting authorities. However, this principle itself does not specify 
which basis of jurisdiction should be exercised. It does not imply any jurisdictional 
preferences either. Therefore, strictly speaking, it does not matter which jurisdictional 
basis is employed, as long as a suspect is prosecuted within a state where the person 
is present in the absence of extradition, the principle of aut dedere aut judicare is 
fulfilled.  
The ILC was created to promote the progressive development of international law and 
its codification. Its position as a possible source of international law has been based 
primarily on its role in codifying existing customary law, or progressively developing 
an area of law through its detailed consideration of a topic. The ILC incorporated the 
principle in its 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, and explained its rationale as follows: 
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“The obligation to prosecute or extradite is imposed on the custodial State in 
whose territory an alleged offender is present. The custodial State has an 
obligation to take action to ensure that such an individual is prosecuted either 
by the national authorities of that State or by another State which indicates 
that it is willing to prosecute the case by requesting extradition. The custodial 
State is in a unique position to ensure the implementation of the present Code 
by virtue of the presence of the alleged offender in its territory. Therefore the 
custodial State has an obligation to take the necessary and reasonable steps to 
apprehend an alleged offender and to ensure the prosecution and trial of such 
an individual by a competent jurisdiction. The obligation to extradite or 
prosecute applies to a State which has custody of ‘an individual alleged to 
have committed a crime’.”
245 
A few commentators have argued that the principle is a rule under customary 
international law
246
, but there are those who oppose such a claim
247
. Additionally, 
ILC was rather divided in its conclusion (within its newly released report from 2014) 
on the customary nature of the obligation to extradite or prosecute and whether it 
could be inferred from the existence of customary rules prescribing specific 
international crimes thus leading to no result on the principles status.
248   
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3.3.2 Interplay of Principles - Filling the Impunity Gap 
In view of the foregoing, it is accepted that the principle of aut dedere aut judicare 
may overlap with universal jurisdiction when a state has no connection to a crime 
other than the mere presence of the suspect in its territory and, in application of the 
principle of aut dedere aut judicare, chooses not to grant extradition and 
consequently must base its prosecution of the case on the principle of universal 
jurisdiction. It is understood that it is only in such a case that the two concepts 
overlap. In other words, it is in this case that universal jurisdiction plays a decisive 
role in the full application of the principle of aut dedere aut judicare.  Thus, the 
obligation of aut dedere aut judicare, provides that a state may not shield a person 
suspected of certain categories of crimes in a territory subject to its jurisdiction. 
Instead, it is required to either exercise jurisdiction (which would necessarily include 
universal jurisdiction in certain cases) over a person suspected of certain categories of 
crimes or to extradite the person to a state able and willing to do so, or to surrender 
the person to an international criminal court with jurisdiction over the suspect and the 
crime.
249 
According to some commentators, the principle of aut dedere aut judicare is 
obligatory in nature, while universal jurisdiction is only considered permissive.
250
 
Analysis of international treaties, domestic legislation and judicial practice on these 
issues must take into account the distinction between universal jurisdiction and the 
principle of aut dedere aut judicare to avoid risking erroneous conclusions. The 
principle is not just the corollary principle of universal jurisdiction, but an 
autonomous principle separated by that of universal jurisdiction. 
Universal jurisdiction involves a criterion for the attribution of jurisdiction, whereas 
the obligation to extradite or prosecute is an obligation that is discharged once the 
accused is extradited or once the state decides to prosecute an accused on any of the 
existing bases of jurisdiction (those described in Chapter II). The obligation to 
extradite or prosecute could be established in a treaty for any type of crime, without 
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such crimes necessarily being subject to universal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, both 
principles should be considered together and not in isolation from each other (or other 
principles of international criminal law for that matter).  
Indeed, analysis of various international instruments shows that the principle of aut 
dedere aut judicare generally occurs in connection, among others, with the principle 
of universal jurisdiction.
251
 There is therefore a thin line between the principles. For 
instance, the widely ratified fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1984 Torture 
Convention, require the exercise of universal jurisdiction over the offences covered 
by these instruments, or, alternatively to extradite alleged offenders to another state 
for the purpose of prosecution. From the text of the Geneva Conventions one might 
assert that the principle of aut dedere aut judicare is represented by the wording that 
state parties “[…] shall be under the obligation to search […] and it may also, if it 
prefers […] hand such persons over for trial […]”, and universal jurisdiction might be 
detected from this passage, “enact any legislation necessary.”
252
 The scheme 
contained in this provision is very close to a special category of aut dedere aut 
judicare based on the wording of Article 7 of the Hague Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircrafts of 1970. According to the current 
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interpretation of the Article 7 the obligation to prosecute arises ipso facto when the 
alleged offender is present in the territory of the state of apprehension. 
Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind that the obligation of aut dedere aut judicare is 
conceptually distinct from universal jurisdiction. The establishment of jurisdiction, 
universal or otherwise, is logically a prior step. Therefore, a state must first vest its 
courts with competence to try the suspect. It is only when such competence has been 
established that the question of whether to prosecute or extradite arises.
253
 Put 
generally, a state party to one of the treaties in question is not only bound to empower 
its criminal justice system to exercise universal jurisdiction but is further bound 
actually to exercise that jurisdiction by means of either considering prosecution or 
extradition. According to Bassiouni, international crimes that rise to the level of jus 
cogens constitute legal obligations. This, in his opinion, stipulates that the legal 
obligations which stem from grave breaches include, among others, the duty to 
prosecute or extradite. Thus a state that simply does not wish to prosecute or extradite 
suspects, can and often does, ignore its non-derogable jus cogens duty of aut dedere 
aut judicare; resulting in granting the accused individuals impunity for their 
crimes.
254 
In this context, it is relevant to briefly address the ICJ Judgment, of 20 July 2012, in 
the case concerning “Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite 
(Belgium v. Senegal) in which the ICJ found Senegal in violation of the 1984 
Convention against Torture (CAT) due to its failure to try or extradite the former 
president of Chad, H. Habré.
255
 Two notable issues, with respect to this study, are 
raised by the court. First, the ICJ reiterated the importance of universal jurisdiction in 
eliminating the risk of impunity.
256
 In determining the effect of Article 5(2) CAT on 
Article 6(2) and Article 7(1) of the CAT, the ICJ highlighted the significance of 
fulfilling the obligation to establish universal jurisdiction of its courts over the crime 
of torture: “[It] is a necessary condition for enabling a preliminary inquiry (Article 6, 
paragraph 2), and for submitting the case to its competent authorities for the purpose 
of prosecution (Article 7, paragraph 1). The purpose of all these obligations is to 
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enable proceedings to be brought against the suspect, in the absence of his 
extradition, and to achieve the object and purpose of the Convention, which is to 
make more effective the struggle against torture by avoiding immunity for the 
perpetrators of such acts.”
257
 The Court then further observed that; 
 
“[T]he obligation for the State to criminalize torture and to establish its 
jurisdiction over it [...] as soon as it is bound by the Convention, has in 
particular a preventive and deterrent character [... ] to eliminate any risk of 
impunity [....] The Convention against Torture thus brings together 150 States 
which have committed themselves to prosecuting suspects in particular on 




In other words, it was held that the establishment of universal jurisdiction represents 
an integral part of the duty to prosecute as contained in the CAT and the party failing 
to do so would entail international responsibility.  Moreover, the Court stated that 
Article 7(1) of the Convention requires the state on whose territory the alleged 
perpetrator is found to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution, “irrespective of the existence of a prior request for the extradition of the 
suspect”, and that “the extradition is an option […] whereas prosecution an 
international obligation under the Convention, the violation of which is wrongful act 
engaging the responsibility of the State.”
259
  With this passage the court stipulates the 
current interpretation of the obligation to prosecute ipso facto, regardless of 
extradition request.
260
 Furthermore, the Court stated that the crime of torture indeed 
constitutes a jus cogens, but did not find it important to examine whether the 
obligation to extradite or prosecute constitutes a customary rule.  
The universal duty represented by the principle does not present any considerable 
threat to state sovereignty since there is no hierarchy between the inherent options to 
either extradite or prosecute the individual. Aut dedere aut judicare only minimally 
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forces the will of the international community on an individual state that is merely 
obliged to act in a certain way. 
It has also been pointed out that universal jurisdiction could be applied through the 
obligation aut dedere aut judicare, under which, if the perpetrator of an offence that 
was so serious that it merited prosecution outside the territory of the state in which it 
was committed was apprehended in the territory of another state, that state shall be 
obligated to extradite the suspect to the state claiming jurisdiction in order to 
prosecute him or her, or to bring proceedings against that person in its courts. 
Although this was not the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction stricto 
sensu, because states can decide not to prosecute but to extradite, it was 
unquestionably one mechanism through which states could cooperate with one 
another in order to combat impunity for serious offences and to achieve the goal of 
universal jurisdiction.  
The principle of aut dedere aut judicare thus attaches a selective yet obligatory nature 
to universal jurisdiction. It is therefore by linking the two concepts together that the 
nature and application of universal jurisdiction might become clearer. In order to 
conclude, the importance of aut dedere aut judicare in enhancing the exercise of the 
universality principle becomes impulsive when a crime is allegedly committed 
abroad, with no nexus to the forum state, the obligation to extradite or prosecute 
would necessarily reflect an exercise of universal jurisdiction.
261 Elevated by the aut 
dedere aut judicare principle, states have increasingly implemented the principles of 
universal jurisdiction in a more systematic and concrete manner through their national 
legislation. 
 
3.4 Legal Status of Universal Jurisdiction under International Law – 
Finding an ‘Obligatory’ Nature? 
Traditionally the principle of universal jurisdiction requires no action by states; it 
only allows them the option of prosecuting certain crimes.
262
 However, one might 
assert that when a serious offence is committed that breaches multilateral treaties and 
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is of such gravity that it shocks the whole international community, then the exercise 




3.4.1 Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes 
As already stipulated, universal jurisdiction is often associated with other concepts, 
such as jus cogens or obligations erga omnes. It is therefore important at this point to 
further describe these solutions and analyze the distinctive factors but reciprocity of 
these doctrines can be a positive factor in establishing a more comprehensive 
framework for deterring impunity. 
The heinousness rationale of crime parallels the international law theory of jus 
cogens, the idea that some international norms override any contrary positive law or 
agreement between states.
264
 All three doctrines; universal jurisdiction, jus cogens 
and obligations erga omnes, involve compelling principles of law creating rights or 
obligations for every state. Additionally, erga omnes and jus cogens, may give 
support to the view that nonparties to some of the hijacking, terrorism, apartheid or 
torture conventions have the jurisdictional right to prosecute for those offences. 
Therefore, universal jurisdiction has often been coupled with the norms of jus cogens 
and obligations erga omnes.  
It has been presumed that any act violating a peremptory norm which is jus cogens 
will ipso facto be the subject of universal jurisdiction, and, what is more, that the 
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exercise of universal jurisdiction is erga omnes. Obligations erga omnes means 
literally “obligation towards all.” As indicated by dictum in the Barcelona Traction 
case: 
“[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a 
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-
á-vis another State. [..]By their very nature the former are the concern of all 
States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held 




On the other hand, jus cogens means ‘compelling law’. The concept refers to 
“peremptory principles or norms from which no derogation is permitted, and which 
may therefore operate to invalidate a treaty or agreement between states to the extent 
of the inconsistency with any of such principles or norms.”
266
 In other words, the term 
refers to a body of so-called ‘peremptory’ norms – norms that are of such paramount 
importance that they cannot be set aside by acquiescence or agreements of the parties 
to a treaty. 
Bassiouni has invoked the norms of jus cogens and of obligations erga omnes, and 
distinguishes the two doctrines as follows: 
“Jus cogens refers to the legal status that certain international crimes reach, 
and obligatio erga omnes pertains to the legal implications arising out of 
certain crime’s characterization as jus cogens.”
267 
He suggests that states should have a duty to prosecute crimes of universal 
jurisdiction, and not just an optional right.
268
 In doing so he raises a number of issues 
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on the relationship between universal jurisdiction and jus cogens and obligations erga 
omnes.  
In addition, each of the principles applies only to a very limited, and vaguely defined, 
range of situations. Hence, one might conclude that in a logically coherent and 
integrated legal order these three legal concepts might be different sides of the same 
coin, essentially coextensive and generally overlapping.  
The crimes falling under the scope of universal jurisdiction usually raise to the level 
of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes due to their heinous nature.
269
 Therefore, 
when the territorial or nationality states fail to prosecute, the usage of universal 
jurisdiction might then be considered as a responsibility (obligation) and means of 
accountability (a right) for states to protect the most fundamental human rights.
270
 For 
instance, in the Furundzija case, the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
confirmed the existence of universal jurisdiction. The court stated that the crime of 
torture (which was the subject of these proceedings) was promoted by the 
international community as constituting jus cogens, and therefore each state is 
empowered to investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite the suspect.
271
 
Accordingly, the seriousness of the crime in question is one of the essential rationales 
for universal jurisdiction.
272
 An inquiry into the crimes falling under the principles’ 
scope and the gravity “threshold” will be further dealt with in Chapter IV.  
 
3.4.2 Conventional and Customary International law 
Although the explicit inclusion of universal jurisdiction in international conventions 
is still rather scarce a positive sign is in the vast number of treaties implicitly allowing 
states to apply universal jurisdiction in their national legislation. In other words, to 
what extent can it be said that universal jurisdiction has been established in national 
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legislation? For instance, with regard to national legislation, the survey of Amnesty 
International reveals that while at least 136 (approximately 70.5%) UN member states 
have made provisions for universal jurisdiction over war crimes, the number drops to 
80 (approximately 41.5%) for crimes against humanity, 94 (approximately 48.7%) for 
genocide and 85 (approximately 44%) for torture.
273
 Moreover, it should be noted that 
most of the states that have already provided for universal jurisdiction over war 
crimes and torture are also parties to the Geneva Conventions and the Convention 
Against Torture, both of which require state parties to establish universal 
jurisdiction.
274
 It can be withheld that both of these conventions put an obligation on 
states to exercise universal jurisdiction.  However, it is important to note that within 
these conventions we can find the obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut 
judicare).
275  
Hence, on the question whether universal jurisdiction is permissive or obligatory; the 
question was raised, for instance, in the Report of the Special Rapporteur On the 
Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute - with respect to aut dedere aut judicare - and 
while not many states expressly commented on the issue, those who did, specifically 
mentioned that universal jurisdiction merely enables a state to establish jurisdiction 
and that universal jurisdiction has a permissive rather than mandatory nature.
276
 
Nonetheless, if the aut dedere aut judicare formula within applicable conventions is 
interpreted as imposing an obligation to prosecute ipso facto, it may be considered 
that there exists a general obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction (provided the 
presence of the alleged perpetrator in the territory of the prosecuting state), unless the 
state proceeds to extradite. Therefore the two above mentioned conventions, not only 
establish a right for states, but also obligation, to either extradite or prosecute, which 
might entail the application of universal jurisdiction.
277
 However, it is a noteworthy 
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point that no convention has actually prescribed that universal jurisdiction is an 
obligation upon states without mentioning the alternative of extradition to other states. 
Additionally, with respect to universal jurisdiction in absentia, at the present stage, it 
has not been manifested in a single convention. For instance, President G. Guillaume 
of the ICJ declared that “none of the texts [of the treaties] has contemplated 
established jurisdiction over offences committed abroad by foreigners against 
foreigners when the perpetrator is not present in the territory of the State in question. 
Universal jurisdiction in absentia is unknown to international conventional law.”
278
 
States seem to be reluctant to expand their jurisdiction beyond what they are obliged 
to from treaty provisions.
279
 Therefore the exercise of absolute universal jurisdiction 




Theories behind jurisdiction, including territoriality, required a connection between 
the state asserting jurisdiction and the offence.  Universal jurisdiction, however, arose 
from a new and different type of jurisdictional theory — universality — which lacked 
proper legal backing at both the national and international levels.  That principle 
assumed that each state had an interest in exercising jurisdiction to prosecute offences 
which all nations had condemned. Hence, the rationale for the universality principle 
was in the nature of the offences, which affected the interest of all states (the whole 
international community), even when they were unrelated to the state assuming 
jurisdiction. 
Piracy on the high seas, as the first crime falling under the scope of universal 
jurisdiction, was the only crime that fulfilled these ‘criteria’ at the time and thus 
claims of universal jurisdiction over it were undisputed under international law.  In 
the case of other grave crimes, international treaties, including the 1949 Geneva 
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Conventions, had provided for universal jurisdiction. That initiated the discussion of 
whether jurisdiction in certain treaties could be extended to a wider range of offences.  
Furthermore, despite the uncertainties and doubts, such as, regarding the scope of 
universal jurisdiction or admissibility of its performance in absentia, it can be said 
that universal jurisdiction still remains a very important tool in the fight against 
crimes under international law. This can for instance be concluded from the fact that 
the principle has, to date become a topic of discussion of the UNGA Sixth Committee 
where most UN member states recognized universal jurisdiction as an effective tool 
in the fight against impunity. 
Several treaties obliged states to either try a suspect or hand over that person for trial 
to a party that was willing to do so thus starting the debate on the relationship 
between universal jurisdiction and other principles (mainly the obligation to extradite 
or prosecute). 
Nonetheless, it has generally been accepted that the use of absolute universal 
jurisdiction is less desirable than that of conditional universal jurisdiction. Indeed, the 
use of a narrower notion of universal jurisdiction has been advanced by a number of 
commentators as a more sensible, realistic and politically convenient approach. It 
should be noted that applying the concept of universal jurisdiction in a more 
restrictive way, by requiring the presence of the suspect on the territory of the 
prosecuting state, should be considered better practice, especially in a case where it 
would stipulate to a more positive usage of universal jurisdiction and not undermine 
its main aim. Accordingly, it has been further argued that universal jurisdiction 
should only be used as a ‘default jurisdiction’. Meaning, that unless the territorial 
state or state of nationality is unable or unwilling to carry out proceedings, another 
state should not assert jurisdiction based on universality.
280
   
From the analytical discussion, on the relationship between the universality principle 
and aut dedere aut judicare, one can see how these principles ‘cooperate’ within the 
international criminal justice system in order to prosecute universal crimes and close 
the impunity gap.  While the purpose of the latter is to prevent impunity when 
extradition of the alleged perpetrator is not granted by the required state; universal 
jurisdiction constituted in itself a basis for exercise of jurisdiction grounded in the 
                                                          
280
 See Chapter V on ‘The Idea of Subsidiarity in the Context of Universal Jurisdiction’. 
88 
 
nature of the offence. Nonetheless, both principles, even though conceptually distinct, 
can be seen as pillars in the fight against impunity. Although the explicit inclusion of 
universal jurisdiction in international conventions is limited, more treaties implicitly 
allow for states to apply for universal jurisdiction in their national legislation.  The 
principle aut dedere aut judicare, on the other hand, can be found in most multilateral 
treaties dealing with transnational crimes. It can be said, that discussion on universal 
jurisdiction is based on greater emphasis of aut dedere aut judicare and their 
interconnected relationship.  
Hence, after having described the formation of the universality principle and 
established its essential components, it is time to engage in a more detailed discussion 
on the main substance of this thesis. Hence let us now turn to the core of universal 
jurisdiction, namely, the crimes and their heinous character that makes universal 
jurisdiction the exceptional principle that it is (see the following Chapter), and 
thereafter (within Chapter V) the newly emerging idea of ‘subsidiarity’ in the 














PART II - SPECIFIC PART: SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
4 Core International Crimes that Attract the Application of 
Universal Jurisdiction281  
Ending impunity by perpetrators of crimes of concern to the international 
community is a necessary part of preventing the recurrence of atrocities.
282
  
In other words, this statement clearly manifests the necessity of deterring the 
commission of the utmost abhorrent crimes that are threatening to the whole 
international society. It is within the interest of the international community to end the 
impunity of individuals who are responsible for gross human rights violations. One 
can agree that the idea behind the above mentioned manifesto is reflected in one of 
the underlying criteria, or constitutive elements, for the application of universal 
jurisdiction, namely the nature of the offence. It is the danger that these crimes pose 
on all nations within the international community that provides the primary basis for 
all states to exercise universal jurisdiction over such crimes under international law. 
The principle of universal jurisdiction has been regarded necessary and justifiable in 
instances where the crimes committed affected the whole international community, 
and national justice systems allowed the perpetrator to continue.
283
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For decades the nature or exceptional gravity of crimes has been a joint concern of 
the international community in the fight against impunity.
284
 Therefore, one of the 
main factors in order to get the principle of universal jurisdiction working one needs, 
among others, a clear definition of the offence, or at least its constitutive features.
285
 
But the question of which crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction under 
international law is not yet explicitly settled.
286
 This chapter will dedicate its 
discussion to the core international crimes that give rise to the application of universal 
jurisdiction and their definitional elements. Moreover, this chapters seeks to illustrate 
the effect of the recent developments in the conceptualization of universal 
jurisdiction. 
A few scholars tend to speak about ‘modern’ or ‘new’ universal jurisdiction which 
is said to stem from the exceptional gravity of the crime. It is the recent expansion of 
modern universal jurisdiction to human rights offenses which distinguishes it from 
the ‘old’ or ‘traditional’ universal jurisdiction that historically applied only to 
piracy.
287
  This new or modern universal jurisdiction arises from the nature and the 
gravity of the crime, but those crimes considered as grave international crimes are 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture. The author of this thesis, 
as is strongly indicated within this chapter, agrees with those commentators who tend 
to classify universal jurisdiction into ‘modern’ (consisting of serious human rights 
violation), on the one hand, and ‘old’ universal jurisdiction (covering the crime of 
piracy), on the other. 
All of these serious human rights offences can be found, both in international treaties 
and, even more importantly in relation to the exercise of universal jurisdiction, in 
customary international law, demonstrated by state practice and opinion juris. This is 
said to be the modern version of the principle, arising from the severity of the crime. 
Universal jurisdiction is not asserted on the basis of any nexus with the forum state, 
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but by virtue of common interests which threaten the international community as a 
whole and in which all states have an interest in their repression.
288
 This echoes the 
well-known dictum in the Barcelona Traction case regarding the observance of 
obligations erga omnes. A limited number of crimes attract universal jurisdiction. The 
crime of piracy is the classical instance but the modern day classification can be said 
to include grave crimes such as genocide, war crimes, torture and certain acts of 
terrorism. For instance, Kontorovich in his article, from 2004, on “The Piracy 
Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation”, challenges the 
generally accepted view that piracy was universally cognizable because of its 
heinousness. His article manifests that the rationale for piracy’s unique jurisdictional 
status had nothing to do with the heinousness or severity of the offense whereas 





4.1 The Characteristics of Universal Jurisdiction Crimes – Observing the 
Universal Character  
Several crimes are particularly odious offences and are of concern to the international 
community as a whole. Such abhorrent atrocities, that constitute attacks on the rule of 
law and human dignity, are usually linked to abuse of political or military systems. In 
addition, they mainly occur in the context of war or as an aggressive behavior of 
high-ranking state official, political or military leaders (or other powerful state 
actors). These crimes can be referred to as ‘universal’ crimes.  
Traditionally, offences subject to universal jurisdiction are considered universal 
crimes and differ from common delicts in several ways. Primarily, they have a 
different legal basis: universal crimes must have a foundation not only in law, but 
also in international law. Secondly, universal crimes are of such magnitude or gravity 
that they shock the consciousness of human beings irrespective of their location; 
connection to the victims; or to the place where the crimes were committed. These 
crimes are therefore labeled ‘universal’ because they reflect the core of common 
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moral perceptions and normative standards or as the preamble to the Rome Statute of 
the ICC stipulates to “atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”
290
  
The main characteristics of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction are among others; 
their uniform condemnation; these crimes threaten or harm many nations and the 
heinousness or exceptional gravity of those crimes. But this last point mentioned, will 
be further clarified within the next section.
291
 
Consequently universal jurisdiction is only applicable to a particular set of crimes that 




The next section will address the question what crimes are generally accepted as 
giving rise to universal jurisdiction in modern international law; what is their legal 
basis; and what do these crimes have in common? 
 
4.1.1 Seriousness of a Crime as a Determinant Factor – the ‘gravity threshold’ 
Universal jurisdiction only applies to “crimes that are so universally condemned that 
the perpetrators are the enemies of all people.”
293
 As such, these crimes are deemed to 
threaten the security and well-being of all nations.
294
 Unlike the other jurisdictional 
bases, universal jurisdiction is founded exclusively on the nature of the offence, the 
magnitude and particular gravity of which affect the very foundation of the national 
and international legal order and, in particular, the recognition of and respect for 
dignity as a basic value. Universal jurisdiction therefore finds basis in the especially 
heinous characteristics of some crimes.
295
 Is it possible to draw a conclusion, and thus 
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establish where the ‘gravity threshold’ lay? How has the sole concept of ‘gravity’ of 
crime relating to the exercise of universal jurisdiction changed?  
Owing to the fact that universal jurisdiction is based primarily on the ‘nature’ of the 
crime, it is essential to make an analysis of what constitutes a ‘heinous offence’ and 
enumerate, both already accepted as well as newly emerging crimes – modern threats 
– subject to universal jurisdiction. It is so, that the discussion is not an easy one and to 
decide upon the boundaries of severity of a crime can be a difficult task. 
The idea of gravity has played a pivotal role in justifying the elaboration of 
international crimes and the usage, among other, the principle of universal 
jurisdiction. However, the failure to elaborate what is meant by gravity is not merely 
a consequence of the difficulty of the definitional task. In light of the serious 
repercussions of labeling an international crime ‘grave’ one might expect the concept 
of gravity to have reasonably well-defined and accepted content in international law. 
In fact, as is with the principle of universal jurisdiction the opposite is true. 
Individuals who write and apply about international criminal law invariably reference 
the seriousness of the crimes at issue but rarely specify what they mean;
296
 thus 
making gravity an ambiguous concept. 
In this regard, the Geneva Conventions introduced the application of universal 
jurisdiction to violations characterized as ‘grave breaches’ without explicitly stating 
what the word ‘grave’ constitutes. In the Princeton Principle view, the definition of 
universal jurisdiction would be “universal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of 
the crime without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the 
alleged perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state 
exercising jurisdiction.”
297
 Thus for states considering the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction the gravity of the case, whether in terms of its nature, its qualification, its 
severity or its broader impact, acts as a relevant indicator for determining whether the 
state should assert universal jurisdiction. One might declare that this gravity linkage 
(or certain threshold) serves as a filtering mechanism to determine which cases rise to 
the level of establishing universal jurisdiction. 
                                                          
296
 DEGUZMAN, M. M.: “How Serious are International Crimes? The Gravity Problem in 
International Criminal Law” The Gravity Problem in International Criminal Law, Vol. 51, (2012), p. 
21. 
297
 Princeton Principles, supra note 5, Principle 1(1).   
94 
 
There are certain serious crimes under international treaties that have questions and 
controversies related to them, including the range of crimes that would fall under its 
jurisdiction, as well as conditions for its application. In this regard there are two lines 
of argument. Firstly, there are those that deduce universal jurisdiction from the jus 
cogens nature of crimes. Secondly, there are those who are more positivist oriented; 
they base the application of universal jurisdiction on international law and deny (or at 
least do not look at it as a primary source) that there might exist a general rule that 
universal jurisdiction is solely based on the heinousness of crime. Both of these views 
will be looked at. However, let us first turn in the next Section to the crime of piracy, 
which is the classical instance as falling under universal jurisdiction. Nevertheless at 
present, as this thesis will argue, acts of piracy seems to cause some controversies 
within modern international law when discussing crimes falling under the umbrella of 
universal jurisdiction. 
When assessing the gravity of the crime for the purpose of selecting situations to be 
investigated, the ICC Prosecutor has adhered to a single-factor quantitative test of 
gravity (i.e., the number of victims).
298
 The ICC Prosecutor also seems to attribute 
great importance to the quantitative dimension in determining which high-ranking 
officials are selected for prosecution. Upon issuing the five arrest warrants against the 
leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army (an Ugandan rebel organization) the Prosecutor 
released a statement pointing mainly to the quantitative test as the basis of his 
decision to focus investigative and prosecutorial efforts on crimes perpetrated by the 
rebel forces rather than on those perpetrated by government forces.
299
 However, both 
the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Prosecutor have observed that “the gravity of a given 
case should not be assessed only from a quantitative perspective, for instance, by 
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considering the number of victims; rather, the qualitative dimension of the crime 
should also be taken into consideration when assessing the gravity of a given case.”
300
  
According to ICC Prosecutor Regulations and policy papers published by the ICC 
Prosecutor, factors relevant to assessing gravity for the purpose of selecting cases for 
prosecution include: a) the scale of the crimes; b) the nature of the crimes; c) the 
manner of commission of the crimes; d) the impact of the crimes.
301
 The application 
of these factors has recently been approved by the Pre-Trial Chamber,
302
 which 
observed that in assessing the gravity of the crime both the Prosecutor and the Court 
should look to “the extent of damage caused, in particular, the harm caused to victims 
and their families, the nature of the unlawful behavior and the means employed to 
execute the crime.”
303
 However, there are always two sides of the coin and therefore 
some commentators have criticized this approach taken by the ICC Prosecutor in 
assessing gravity, advocating the adoption of a flexible qualitative test of gravity. 
Thus, it is possible to argue that the exercise of jurisdiction over persons who have 
committed a crime with no direct link with the prosecuting state can be justified by 
the heinousness of the crime in question.
304
 In the case of universal jurisdiction, the 
necessary legitimizing linkage turns on the nature of the crimes that are, in the words 
of Justice Jackson's statement at Nuremberg, “so calculated, so malignant, and so 
devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot 
survive their being repeated.”
305
 An argument invoking such threat to the 
international community as a whole as a legitimizing linkage supporting universal 
jurisdiction looses credibility where states exercising such jurisdiction over certain 
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atrocities readily ignore other equally atrocious crimes “where it [is] considered 
politically expedient to do so.”
306 
 
4.1.1.1 Piracy Analogy 
Universal jurisdiction as it existed for hundreds of years constitutes jurisdictional 
exception unique to piracy. The  modern version of the principle (if one decides to 
separate the two into the old universal jurisdiction and the new or modern version) 
concerns itself primary with human rights violations.  
Generally, it is believed that piracy became the subject of universal jurisdiction as a 
matter of pragmatism, not because piracy was a particularly heinous offence; 
especially if one considers modern threats such as genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. This point will be further clarified later in this chapter, but first the 
characteristics of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction will be described. Thus it 
can be argued that the level of ‘gravity’ has certainly changed its meaning through 
time.  
Accordingly, many have claimed that piracy is not the right measurement for 
universal jurisdiction. In this context, it has been argued that piracy is not an 
international crime since it lacks the gravity of other international criminal law 
offenses.
307
 For instance, Kontorovich asserts that application of universal jurisdiction 
based on the piracy analogies were wrongly grounded on the assumption that piracy 
was subject to universal jurisdiction due to its heinousness.
308
 He notes that piracy 
was actually not considered especially heinous and therefore could not have been the 
reason it became subjected to universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction over 
pirates was more a matter of theory than of practice.309 Furthermore, Cassese makes 
this distinction, asserting that the international criminalization of piracy, unlike 
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crimes against humanity or war crimes, does not serve a community value and 




One of the viewpoints that support deducing the basis of universal jurisdiction from 
the nature of a crime makes an analogy of piracy. In light of pirates being historically 
referred to as hostis humani generis (‘an enemy of mankind’), and the fact that any 
state can seize them on the high seas and bring them to trial before their domestic 
court, this view argues that the exercise of jurisdiction over persons who have 
committed a crime with no direct link with the prosecuting state can be justified by 
the heinousness of the crime in question.
311
 They were referred to as hostis, which 
made them distinct from criminals under Roman law. Additionally, these 
communities were in an enduring state of war against neighboring states due to this 
non-declaration of war. Thus formulated, this term was originally used to indicate a 
common belligerent to people in Rome and its allies, and accordingly it did not carry 
any connotation associated with the nature of the crime. Although the term hostis 
humani generis survived in the course of the later development in the 
conceptualization of piracy, it has lost substance and has gradually become 
subordinate to the concept of acts of piracy. 
As for the concept of acts of piracy itself, the scale of activity ranged from mere theft 
to massive battles throughout the history of piracy until the nineteenth century, and 
not all acts of piracy were regarded to be as heinous as genocide or other serious 
international crimes. Moreover, they could not be indiscriminately subject to 
universal jurisdiction. Indeed, via a gradual process and by the nineteenth century, 
acts of piracy had gradually been conceptualized as being subject to the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction. The justification for it was not based on the nature of the crime, 
but was to be found in the fact that piracy was committed on the high seas and ‘under 
conditions that render it impossible or unfair to hold any state responsible for its 
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 In other words, the grounds for justifying universal jurisdiction over 
acts of piracy in the nineteenth century was based on the fact that pirates were not 
under the authority and protection of any state, rather than the gravity or nature of the 
crime itself. In fact, similar depredations were conducted by privateers who had first 
obtained a license from a state (a letter of marque), but these were not regarded as 
acts of piracy by virtue of the permission given by the state.
313
 
However, the continued validity of this perception may be considered questionable 
due to, for instance, the extraordinary growth of piracy off the coast of Somalia since 
2008 and in the Gulf of Guinea more recently. The UN Security Council (SC) in a 
dozen Resolutions and reports, declared that it is “[g]ravely concerned by the threat 
that acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels pose [...]” and notes that such 
conduct “exacerbate[s] the situation in Somalia which continues to constitute a threat 
to international peace and security in the region.”
314
 Even so, this thesis seeks to 
argue that piratical acts do not amount to the same severety as crimes, such as for 
instance genocide. 
Insofar, as the need to transport goods in international commerce over the high seas is 
an interest of all states and any attempt to circumscribe this right may ultimately lead 
to conflict. An attack on the principle of high seas freedoms is an attack against the 
peace of mankind—thus justifying the application of the term hostis humani generis. 
Nevertheless, the justification for it was not based on the nature of the crime, but was 
to be found in the fact piracy was committed on the high seas and “under conditions 
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Session, 5902d Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 
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that render it impossible or unfair to hold any state responsible for its commission.”
315
 
Put differently, the grounds for justifying universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy in 
the nineteenth century was based on the fact that pirates were not under the authority 
and protection of any state, rather than the gravity or nature of the crime itself.
316
 One 
might conclude that piracy is not a crime of universal jurisdiction based on the 
heinousness of the crime, as is the case with the core international crimes (discussed 
below), but rather a crime of concurrent municipal jurisdiction based on the stateless 
nature of the crime. As Kreß noted “it should go without saying that piracy does not 
even come close to match the “heinousness” of genocide or crimes against humanity, 




The Filártiga v. Peña-Irala
318
 case, which is among the initial cases that helped 
expand universal jurisdiction to new offences, illustrates the centrality of heinousness 
in analogizing piracy in connection to modern offenses (in this context the act of 
torture). The Filártiga plaintiffs were Paraguayan citizens who alleged that the 
defendant, a Paraguayan official, had wrongfully caused their family member’s death 
by torture. The only connection Filártiga drew between the pirate and the torturer was 
that both committed crimes widely regarded as violations of “fundamental human 
rights.”
319
 While the court explained that torture was an extraordinarily heinous 
offense, and universally regarded as such, it took no such pains regarding piracy.
320
 
Moreover, Judge Kaufman in his opinion did not try to prove that piracy was 
universally cognizable because it was regarded as heinous. 
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4.2 The Source for the Application of ‘Modern’ Universal Jurisdiction  
4.2.1 Defining Elements of a Universal Offence  
In the contemporary context the concept of ‘grave breaches’ was articulated within 
the already mentioned Geneva Conventions of 1949. These draw a contrast between 
grave breaches and other less severe breaches of these conventions by enumerating 
specific acts that are considered to be grave breaches.
321
 
According to ICC Prosecutor Regulations and policy papers published by the ICC 
Prosecutor, factors relevant to assessing gravity for the purpose of selecting cases for 
prosecution within the jurisdiction of the Court, it  includes: a) the scale of the crimes; 
b) the nature of the crimes; c) the manner of commission of the crimes; d) the impact 
of the crimes.
322
 The application of these factors has been approved by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, which observed that in assessing the gravity of the crime both the 
Prosecutor and the Court should look to “the extent of damage caused, in particular, 
the harm caused to victims and their families, the nature of the unlawful behavior and 
the means employed to execute the crime.” In this regard, perhaps one might use 
similar approach or evaluation when analyzing the fundamental elements of crimes 
subject to universal jurisdiction. 
Traditionally, the ratio legis of universal jurisdiction is justified on two main ideas. 
Firstly, some crimes are so grave that they harm the entire international community. 
Secondly, the gravity of these crimes implies that no safe haven should be available 
for those who commit them. Subsequently the idea of universal jurisdiction grew to 
include crimes on the grounds of their gravity instead of the practical considerations 
of denying criminals safe haven. In other words, there exist two rationales for 
exercising universal jurisdiction, traditionally, the lack of any state’s jurisdiction over 
the locus delicti, and secondly, the modern version arising from the gravity of the 
crime.
323 
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Given the points set out above regarding piratical acts the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction over pirates in the nineteenth century was based on two rationales: first, 
that enforcement took place on the high seas and beyond the reach of any sovereign; 
and second, that enforcement occurred on a subject that was not under the protection 
of any state. In other words, as it was built on the fact that the exercise of jurisdiction 
over pirates would not be in conflict with any other state’s claim, it was therefore not 
based on the nature of the crime itself.
324
 The structure of such an exercise of 
jurisdiction was later adopted in the provisions for the repression of piracy under the 
1958 Convention on the High Seas and the 1982 UNCLOS. Both conventions provide 
two requirements for illegal acts of violence, detention, or depredation to constitute 
an act of piracy: first, the act was committed on the high seas, against another ship or 
aircraft in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; and second, the act was 
committed for private ends by the crew of a private ship or a private aircraft (Article 
15 of the Convention on the High Seas, Article 101 of UNCLOS). It should be noted 
that due to this formulation, the exercise of jurisdiction over an act of piracy would 
not coincide with the claim of another state. 
The specific characteristics of universal jurisdiction are in that it involves a principle 
that sanctions the prosecutions of serious crimes and can be applied without territorial 
or personal links to the perpetrator or the victim. The seriousness of a crime for the 
purposes of applying universal jurisdiction is determined by the extent to which it 
harms legal rights protected by specific international agreements or rules of 
international law, or has the potential to seriously impair universally recognized 
human rights. Some countries legislation tend to enumerate crimes in respect of 
which universal jurisdiction might be applied, rather than base the application on 
whether the acts committed were sufficiently harmful to the international community 
as a whole, based on the above criteria. Additionally, beyond customary and treaty 
law, there are also the fundamental peremptory norms incorporated in the doctrine of 
jus cogens as described in Section 3.4.1. Another view based on the nature of crime 
relies on the concept of jus cogens. This view is premised on the recognition of values 
shared by the international community, which cannot be reduced to the interests or 
values of individual states. The jus cogens norm is regarded as embodying such 
collective value interest, and accordingly, it is alleged that all states as members of 
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the international community are entitled to punish conduct that violates jus cogens 
norms.
325
 It is necessary to clarify the concept of jus cogens and its role and context 
in the existing international legal system. 
At present, the core crimes falling under the scope of universal jurisdiction, and this 
thesis consideres as such, are namely, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide 
and torture; all of which constitute jus cogens international crimes and thus carry the 
obligation to prosecute or extradite.
326
 It allows states to rely on universality for 
prosecution, punishment, and extradition. 
 
War Crimes 
Atrocities committed during the Second World War lead among others to the 
recognition of war crimes; as crimes grave enough to warrant universal jurisdiction. 
They are serious violations of customary or treaty rules belonging to international 
humanitarian law (also called international law of armed conflict).
327
 The prohibition 
of war crimes is a jus cogens and an obligation erga omnes.
328
 
The definition of war crimes, as a core international crime, is included in a number of 
instruments that enumerate a wide range of prohibitions and regulations. War crimes 
subject to universal jurisdiction constitute a serious violation of international 
humanitarian law during international armed conflict (including both crimes defined 
under customary international law and those defined in treaties). The most 
comprehensive codification of prohibitions and regulations are enshrined in the 1949 
four Geneva Conventions and their two Additional Protocols. 
329
 There are no 
provisions in these conventions that specifically refer to universal jurisdiction. 
                                                          
325
 BASSIOUNI, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 114, p. 107; JORDAN, J. B.: “Universal 
Jurisdiction in a dangerous world: a weapon for all nations against international crime” Michigan State 
University-D.C.L. Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, (2000), pp. 8-9; BROOMHALL, Towards the 
Development, supra note 131, pp. 405-406. 
326
 BAUMRUK, P.: “Universal Jurisdiction: A Tool against Impunity” Czech Yearbook of Public and 
Private International Law, Vol. 4, (2013), pp. 206-207. 
327
 CASSESE, Cassese’s Law, supra note 86, p. 65.  The term ‘international humanitarian law’ has 
now largely replaced the term ‘law of armed conflict’. (Even earlier terms where ‘laws and customs of 
war’ and the ‘laws of war’).  
328
 See Section 3.4.1 on thorough discussion obligations erga omnes. 
329
 BASSIOUNI, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 114, pp. 115-116. 
103 
 
However, one might assume that state parties have the right to exercise universal 
jurisdiction because it stems from the obligation to prevent and repress “grave 
breaches” enshrined within the Geneva Convention and Protocol I.
330
  
The modern concept of war crimes was developed under the auspices of the 
Nuremberg Trials based on the definition in the London Charter (or Nuremberg 
Charter)
331
. Article 6(b) of the Charter defines war crimes as: 
“[… ]violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, 
but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to Wave labour or 
for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, 
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of 
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, 
towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.”
332 
According to article 6, leaders, organizers and others who participate in the execution 
of a scheme that might evolve, among others, into war crimes, are responsible
333
 and 




An important case where universal jurisdiction was of great significance and was 
relied on in the prosecution of war crimes is the previously mentioned Eichmann 
case.
335
 In this case the district court Jerusalem concluded that the universality 
principle allowed Israel to define and punish Eichmann’s crimes under Israeli law, by 
claiming that: “the jurisdiction to try crimes under international law is universal”.
336 
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Crimes against Humanity 
However it is not until recently that the legal prohibition on crimes against humanity 
has emerged and the precise contours of the crime clarified.
337
 Article 6(c) of the 
London Charter defined crimes against humanity as: 
“[…]murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane 
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or 
prosecutions on political, racial or religious ground in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or 
not in violation of the law of the country where perpetrated.” 
Article 5 of the statute of the ICTY adds imprisonment, torture and rape to the 
definition of crimes against humanity. Similar form of definition is in Article 3 of 
ICTR and Article 7 of the ICC, which adds enforced disappearance and apartheid to 
the list and specifies that the crimes in question must have been committed as a part 
of widespread or systematic attack; not just the individual, but, by their very nature on 
humanity itself.
338
 As the Trial Chamber of the ICTY declared in the Erdemovi case 
in 1996, that crimes against humanity; 
“are serious acts of violence which harm human beings by striking what is 
most essential to them: their life, liberty, physical welfare, health, and or 
dignity. They are inhumane acts that by their very extent and gravity go 
beyond the limits tolerable to the international community, which must 
perforce demand their punishment. But crimes against humanity also 
transcend the individual because when the individual is assaulted, humanity 
comes under attack and is negated. It is therefore the concept of humanity as 
victim which essentially characterizes crimes against humanity.”
339 
Accordingly, crimes against humaity constitute an severe attack on the fundamental 
rights of the individual. What is more, according to the above mentioned statement, 
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an attack on the individual constitutes an attack on the whole international community 
thus making evident the characteristics of the offence. 
Furthermore, with respect to universal jurisdiction, one cannot maintain that there is a 
conventional law providing for it with respect to this category of crime. Nevertheless, 
crimes against humanity as a jus cogens international crimes are presumed to carry 
the obligation to prosecute or extradite, and thus allowing states to rely, for example, 
on universal jurisdiction when prosecuting for this heinous offence.
340
 As was stated 
in the decision of the Tribunal de première instance, when determining it had 
jurisdiction over Augusto Pinochet, clearly recognized universal jurisdiction over 
crimes against humanity; “[w]e consider that there exists a customary rule of 
international law, indeed jus cogens, recognizing universal jurisdiction and 
authorizing national authorities to prosecute and bring to justice, in all circumstances, 





The often quoted 1949 Genocide Conventions, whose substantive rules may largely 
be considered as declaratory of customary international law and now has a large 
number of ratifications
342
, was an important step in the process of condemning the act 
of genocide.
343
 Indeed, at present the prohibition of genocide is considered to be jus 
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cogens; thus constituting a peremptory norm of general international law which 
cannot be modified or revoked by treaty.
344 
The definition of genocide has been adopted verbatim in the statutes of the ICTY 
(Article 4), ICTR (Article 2) and ICC (Article 6). Article 2 of the Genocide 
Convention defines genocide as: 
“[…] any of following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:  
(a) killing members of the group;  
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” 
According to Article 3 the following acts shall be punishable, namely: (a) genocide; 
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide; (d) attempt to commit genocide; (e) complicity in genocide.
345
  
Article 2 limits the parameters of the victim groups to only four, namely belonging to 
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.
346
 Many have criticized this narrow 
focus by claiming that since the negotiation of the Convention, international law has 
undergone major transformation, especially with respect to the development of the 
                                                          
344
 See in this context a declaratory statement made by the ICJ that “the principles underlying the 
Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without 
any conventional obligation[…][and]the universal character both of the condemnation of genocide and 
of the co-operation required ‘in order to liberate mankind from such odious scourge’”. See 
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1951, p. 23. Further, see the Case concerning application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro)), further request for provisional measures, Order of 13 September 1993, ICJ Rep 
(separate opinion of Ad Hoc Judge Lauterpacht, para. 100 where it was stated that “the prohibition of 
genocide has long been regarded as one of the few undoubted examples of jus cogens.” 
345
 In addition see also Article IV of the 1949 Genocide Convention, Article 2 of the Statute of the 
ICTR, and Article 6 of the Statute of the ICC. These are the material elements of the crime of 
genocide. According to the case law of the ICTR in Akayesu case three criteria must be combined; 
1)the victim is dead; 2) the death results from an illegal act or from an illegal omission of the accused 
or from his subordinate; 3) at the time of the commission of the murder, the accused or his subordinate 
were inhabited by the intention to kill the victim or to carry grave infringement in his physical 
integrity, knowing that this infringement could entail the death and it was indifferent to him that the 
death of the victim results from it or not. See ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, T. Ch. I. 
Judgment, (ICTR-96-4-T), 2 September 1998, at. 589. 
346
 CRYER et al., supra note 35, pp. 208-211; CASSESE, Cassese's Law, supra note 86, pp. 119-123.  
107 
 
doctrine of human rights. Thus proposals have been made to expand the list of victim 
groups in order to include others, such as cultural and political groups, but 
unsuccessfully. In addition, there might be other acts than those listed in Article 3 that 
can be committed with a view to destroy one of the protected groups.
347
   
A necessary element which distinguishes it from all other international crimes is that 
of intent to destroy a group. The specificity of genocide is not exhausted solely with 
regard to the four groups that may become the target of genocide, but its importance 
lies mainly on the basis of the particular mens rea of the perpetrator, whose intention 
must be to destroy in whole or in part anyone of the enumerated groups. This element 
renders genocide a specific intent (dolus specialis) and differentiates it from all other 
international crimes.
348
 Conseguently, genocide is regarded as having a particular 
seriousness which is underlined by the fact that its prohibition has therefore attained 
the status of a jus cogens norm and an erga omnes
349
 obligation and has been 
described as the ‘ultimate crime’ or ‘crime of crimes’.
350
 This supports the view that 
any state has the right to fulfill their obligation by exercising universal jurisdiction 
over persons suspected of committing such crimes when other states are unable or 
unwilling to take effective steps to repress the crimes.
351   
Subsequently, even though Article 6 of the Geneva Convention, with respect to 
jurisdiction - especially universal jurisdiction - does not speak of universal 
jurisdiction per se
352
, such jurisdiction over the crime of genocide can still be found 
under customary law. Universal jurisdiction over genocide has been recognized under 
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customary law, for example, in the previously mentioned Eichmann judgment.
353
 
Moreover, the ICTR, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, rendered the first ever modern 
genocide conviction for an individual.
354
 In addition, in the Tadic case the ICTY’s 
Appeals Chamber stated, in connection with genocide, that “universal jurisdiction [is] 
nowadays acknowledged in the case of international crimes.”
355
 Similarly, the ICTR 





Universal jurisdiction over torture is provided for within the 1984 Convention against 
Torture (CAT). Article 1 of the CAT defines crime of torture as follows: 
“For the purpose of this Convention, the term ‘torture’ means any act by 
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidation of any kind, when such pain 
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” 
This definition reflects customary international law. A similar definition of torture 
can be found in the 1987 Inter-American Convention on Torture.
357 
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Within Article 5(1) of the CAT there is a general duty of state parties to take 
necessary measures to establish jurisdiction. In addition, Article 5(2) of the 
Convention requires each state party to take measures to establish universal 
jurisdiction over persons suspected of torture, unless it does not extradite the 
suspect.
358
 In the Filártiga case the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that “the torturer has become, like the pirate or the slave trader before him, hostis 
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”
359
 Moreover, in the already mentioned 
Furundžija case, the ICTY (after having addressed the human rights treaties and the 
resolutions of international organizations prohibiting torture) stated the following:  
“[t]he existence of this corpus of general treaty rules proscribing torture 
shows that the international community, aware of the importance of 
outlawing this heinous phenomenon, has decided to suppress any 
manifestation of torture by operating both at the interstate level and at the 
level of individuals. No legal loopholes have been left.”
360
 
Now, after having briefly addressed the core crimes of international law that give rise 
to universal jurisdiction, one can indeed conclude, that all of these enumerative 
examples of categories of core crimes and their descriptive elements show that the 
gravity of a crime in question matters. Therefore, the severity or gravity of an act, 
constitutes a distinguishing element in the application of universal jurisdiction.  
One can notice that the primary justification for invoking universal jurisdiction is 
undoubtedly the nature, namely the severity, of the crime in question. Indeed, 
proponents of the ‘modern’ or ‘new’ universal jurisdiction see heinousness as 
describing only a narrow class of offenses. While it may be impossible and 
unnecessary to reduce this standard to a formulation more precise than ‘heinous,’
361
 it 
must be remembered that the heinousness in question is an extraordinary or 
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aggravated heinousness as enshrined within the above mentioned provisions and all 
offences constitute a large-scale or widespread criminal conduct.  
In addition, while academics and scholars agree that the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction is generally reserved for the most serious international crimes a number 
of additional crimes which are not onsidered as constituting jus cogen have become 
the subject of universal jurisdiction by way of treaty.
362
 In this context three offences 
should be mentioned, namely, aircraft hijacking, hostage-taking and acts of terrorism. 
The 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking 
Convention) defined hijacking as an international crime and established a series of 
guidelines as to how it should be conducted.
363
 The 1979 International Convention 
Against taking of Hostages created and defines hostage-taking as an international 
crime and calls in states parties to make hostage-taking a domestic offence and to 
establish appropriate penalties.
364
 Additionally, a series of terrorism conventions were 





 and risk of nuclear terrorism
367
. These crimes, however, have not yet 
risen to the level of jus cogens and even the level of gravity is perhaps not as high as 
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 The 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings proscribes the 
delivery, placement, or detonation of an explosive or other lethal, device against a public or 
government facility with the intent to cause death, bodily injury, or extensive destruction. Available 
online at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
9&chapter=18&lang=en [retrieved 4.4.2015]. 
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is with the core international crimes. Nevertheless, their founding instruments 




4.2.2 Rising Category of Newly Emerging Threats? 
Initiating a discussion on modern threats that might fall under the umbrella of 
universal jurisdiction is certainly something worth addressing. Even though being a 
more theoretical discussion, nowadays the discussion is indeed relevant. The dynamic 
nature of international law keeps the fundamental values and principles of the 
international system continually evolving, and so do the number of crimes deserving 
its attention. What is more, there are different views concerning the offences that 
constitute crimes under international law which might be subject to universal 
jurisdiction; thus open for its evolvement.369 In fact, these newly emerging threats 
could become subject to univerasl jurisdiction as a matter of treaty obligation 
stipulating for usage of such a principle. 
 
Cyberterrorism and Serious Environmental Crimes  
At present, with the continuously globalizing world, cyberterrorism has become one 
of the most significant threats to the national and international security of the modern 
state, and cyberattacks are occurring with increased frequency.
370
 The internet not 
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only makes it easier for terrorists to communicate, organize terrorist cells, share 
information, plan attacks, and recruit others but also is increasingly being used to 
commit cyberterrorist acts. It is clear that the international community may only 
ignore cyberterrorism at its peril since these threats will not be eradicated easily. In 
the absence of feasible prevention, deterrence of cyberterrorism may at least be the 
best alternative. The most feasible way to deter cyberterrorists might be to prosecute 
them under the universality principle.  
States, private industry, and international organizations are taking important legal, 
policy and technological steps to combat cyberterrorism. Nonetheless, these steps 
taken are insufficient and therefore the need for greater international cooperation 
arises. In addition to cyberterrorism one can also mention great international 
environmental crimes, such as transboundary pollution, which might be added to the 
list of crimes as falling under the scope of universal jurisdiction.  
However, it is so that the notion of hostis humani generis may not always be clear 
and indeed, as such does not necessarily constitute a human rights offence (as is with 
the previously mentioned core crimes) and usually does not constitute direct attack 
(or threat of violence) on human rights.
371
 One might ask whether it is in the way that 
those actions are executed and the motivation behind them that have changed; making 
it a crime that seriously undermines the national and international security?   
As regarding to cyberterrorism, because of the very nature of the crime – irrespective 
of how we ultimately define it – the need for a truly universal jurisdiction may 
present itself with even greater emphasis than before; traditional crimes can almost 
always be addressed through some other method: territoriality, nationality, right of 
protection etc.; but these concepts may not prove sufficient in the case of 
cybercrime.
372
 Moreover, as Kanuck stated “cyberspace and information alike 
transcend the physical boundaries, thereby requiring a legal paradigm that looks 
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beyond merely the locus of events.”
373
 One can thus draw a conclusion that the 
prosecution of cyberterrorism under universal jurisdiction would be a more effective 
deterrent than territorial or other jurisdictional bases, due to both the broad reach of 




Serious environmental crimes, as a separate crime, have been considered among 
others within the first international conference on universal jurisdiction in Madrid 
(2014).
375
 There it was suggested (within the so-called proposal of Madrid Principles 
on Universal Jurisdiction) that universal jurisdiction should be  applicable to “serious 
crimes against nature and the environment […] seriously and generally affecting the 
fundamental rights of individuals and the community, such as food fraud, price 
gouging on staples for the survival or health of a generality of persons, […] illegal 
exploitation of natural resources that seriously affect the health, life or peaceful 
coexistence of people with the natural environment in the area where exploitation 
occurs, the illicit diversion of international funds approved to alleviate humanitarian 
disasters […] the irreversible destruction of ecosystems and any others defined as 
such in international agreements or treaties.
376 
Questions can be raised concerning, among others, the sources of international law 
that could support inclusion of a crime on that list, and whether certain crimes have 
the same degree of seriousness as others on the ‘list’ of the core crimes.  Therefore, 
the arguments for extending universal jurisdiction to cyberterrorism and serious 
environmental offences are many and varied. For instance, regarding the heinousness 
and severity of the crime in question (as discussed above regarding the core crimes) 
provides a strong justification for universal jurisdiction over cyberterrorism and 
serious environmental crimes. The rationale for heinousness states that “what should 
                                                          
373
 KANUCK, S. P.; “Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public International Law” Harvard 
International Law Journal, Vol. 37, (1996), p. 288. 
374
 GABLE, supra note 370, pp. 43-44. See in this context Bassiouni who maintained that “Universal 
jurisdiction is the most effective method to deter and prevent international crimes by increasing the 
likelihood prosecution and punishment of its perpetrators. This approach to international criminal 
accountability is also believed to be a factor in reducing impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes.” 
BASSIOUNI, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 114, p. 153. 
375
 Congress on “Universal Jurisdiction on the XXI Century Madrid” Congress took place last May 
2014 in Madrid. It was organized by the Baltasar Garzón International Foundation. Available online at  
http://www.fibgar.org/congreso-jurisdiccion-universal/english/index.html  
376
 See Madrid Principles, Principle 2. Available online at http://baltasargarzon.org/nosotros/first-
international-conference-universal-jurisdiction/  [retrieved 11.12.2014].  
114 
 
be of most concern is […] the enormity of [the] acts”, including the destruction of 
social structures, physical and psychological damage to victims, and the concern “that 
the perpetrators of such serious international crimes may carry out such acts 
again.”
377
 This version of the heinousness analysis certainly does apply to 
cyberterrorism both because of the potential for serious disruption of entire 
governments and of world commerce, and as a result of technological methods 
available the apprehension of the cyberterrorist is very difficult.  
As to the serious environmental offences, the enormity of the harm caused is so 
severe and widespread that it justifies the usage of universal jurisdiction. This is not 
to say that territorial jurisdiction or other jurisdictional bases could not be used to 
prosecute for these crimes, but it is merely to say that universal jurisdiction is likely 
to be the most feasible manner of prosecution and deterrence, since deterrence is the 
primary aim of universal jurisdiction.
378
 In conclusion, these newly emerging threats 
certainly allow for new consideration on universal jurisdiction and perhaps one can 
conclude in stating that these evolvements suggest that the scope of universal 
jurisdiction is expanding. 
 
4.3 Can Universal Jurisdiction be Solely Deduced from the Nature of a 
Crime? 
4.3.1 Deductive or Inductive Approach
379 
It is so that state practice on universal jurisdiction have been either scarce or 
inconsistent - thus lacking coherence.
380
 At the same time, some crimes are not 
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covered explicitly by the jurisdictional ground provided by relevant conventional 
regime, for instance, as is the case with genocide (as described above).
381 Hence, 
these two approaches seek to establish an entitlement to the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction.  
There are mainly two approaches that seek to overcome this scarcity of state practice. 
The first one emphasizes the nature of crimes that are targeted by the assertion of 
universal jurisdiction and seeks to deduce a jurisdictional ground for universal 
jurisdiction from the very nature of the crimes (deductive approach). The second one 
is more in line with traditional scholarship and seeks to establish a customary rule 
which provides a ground for universal jurisdiction (inductive approach). However, 
state practices were either scarce or inconsistent, which would not have been 
sufficient for a customary rule to be confirmed.
382
  
As to the deductive approach, proponents of universal jurisdiction have tended to 
seek its justification within the nature of crimes; the heinousness of crimes by 
drawing analogy to piracy or the violation of jus cogens norms, in order to deduce a 
basis for universal jurisdiction. There seems to be at least a strong indication in the 
case law analysis above (with respect to the core international crimes). International 
crimes that amount to the violation of jus cogens norms may be subject to the 
assertion of universal jurisdiction. For instance, Lord Brown-Wilkinson stated in the 
Pinochet case in the House of Lords that “[t]he jus cogens nature of the international 
crime of torture justifies states in taking universal jurisdiction over torture wherever 
committed.”
383
 Lord Brown-Wilkinson did not make any detailed arguments on this 
issue but merely referred, among others, to the Furundžija case where the Trial 
Chamber observed that:  
“it would be inconsistent on the one hand to prohibit torture to such an extent 
as to restrict the normally unfettered treaty-making power of sovereign States 
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and on the other hand bar States from prosecuting and punishing those 
torturers who have engaged in this odious practice abroad.”
384 
In other words, one might consider whether the entitlement of universal jurisdiction 
can be generally viewed as a logical consequence of the peremptory nature of the 
prohibited act (in this case the crime of torture).
385
 On one hand, from this one can at 
least draw the indication that international crimes that amounting to the violation of 
jus cogens norms may be subject to the assertion of universal jurisdiction, but on the 
other hand, at the same time one may still argue whether this is truly a logical 
consequence of the peremptory nature of these types of crimes. From this the question 
may arise, whether assertion of universal jurisdiction should be mandatory rather than 
merely a right (permissive). This consideration is premised on the postulation that 
since those offences by their very nature undermine the foundations of the 
international order, and are thus of concern of all states. Hence in order for the 
absolute nature of the prohibition to be effectuated, all states must cooperate in 
bringing those perpetrators to justice. In fact, many proponents of the deductive 
approach express support for the idea of mandatory universal jurisdiction.
386
 
Contrary to the deductive approach, the inductive approach seems to be gaining more 
support. The inductive approach includes inducing the basis for universal jurisdiction 
by confirming ordinary customary rules.  A few developing factors seem to provide 
for obvious evidence for assessing the exercise of universal jurisdiction in the context 
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of customary international law.
387
 In other words, this approach seeks to mitigate the 
conditions for the establishment of customary international law, based on the 
understanding that the foundation or support for universal jurisdiction must be 
established in international law that governs relations between states. 
Indeed, at present there are a growing number of states that have adopted legislation 
that empowers their courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over core international 
crimes, as well as increasing number of criminal proceedings. Under a modern 
positivist understanding of customary international law formation, in order to identify 
customary norms in the fields of human rights and humanitarian law where state 
practice is scarce, emphasis may be laid on unambiguous opinio juris as may be 
derived from international institutional practice.
388 Along with those national 
legislation and judicial practices, many states have made declarations in favour of 
universal jurisdiction. Of particular importance are those that were made during a 
debate of the General Assemblyʼs Sixth Committee on the agenda of the scope and 
application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. Overall, it has been generally 
acknowledged that universal jurisdiction is enshrined in international law and/or an 
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important tool for the fight against impunity, while concerns have been constantly 
raised on the possibility of its abusive use 
In sum, doctrines have sought to establish the ground of universal jurisdiction in order 
to meet the need of the fight against impunity. The deductive approach (especially in 
the context of the jus cogens doctrine) places an emphasis on the absolute nature of 
individual responsibility from which the ground of universal jurisdiction can be 
deduced, thereby eliminating the need to rely on state practice or opinio juris. Unlike 
the inductive method that relies heavily on states practice, the technique of deductive 
logic is both convoluted and abstract, extracting rules of international law from more 
general propositions.  
 
4.4 Appraisal 
The source for the application of universal jurisdiction is the gravity of the crime – 
the crimes affect the international community as a whole – thus allowing for universal 
jurisdiction to be applicable. For instance, it was the gravity of those crimes that 
provided the theoretical and political justifications for the first international criminal 
trials at Nuremberg.  
In light of the serious repercussions of labeling an international crime ‘grave’ one 
might expect the concept of gravity to have reasonably well-defined and accepted 
content in international law. In fact, as is with the principle of universal jurisdiction, 
the opposite is true. Individuals who write and apply about international criminal law 
invariably reference the seriousness of the crimes at issue but rarely specify what 
they mean.
389
 Thus gravity being an ambiguous concept. 
The failure to elaborate what is meant by gravity is not merely a consequence of the 
difficulty of the definitional task (although it is certainly an important factor), rather 
the concept has been left undefined because its ambiguity has served a productive 
function in the regime’s development; to mediate between the competing pulls of 
state sovereignty and the burgeoning human rights movement. 
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Piracy was not considered a substantively graver offense than many other crimes that 
were not subject to universal jurisdiction. While piracy was certainly a serious crime, 
it was not thought to be the worst, and thus heinousness fails to explain its universal 
cognoscibility.  
After World War I, there was some discussion of establishing a court to prosecute 
crimes against humanity, but the world was not yet ready for the necessary limitation 
of sovereignty and the effort was abandoned. World War II proved to be the turning 
point. Gravity provided the primary justification for the creation of the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Therefore, when the defendants objected that some 
of the charges violated the principle of legality, the judges demurred, invoking the 
gravity of the crimes. No one felt a need to explain what made the crimes of the 
Holocaust grave – and the same does apply to the other heinous offences. 
Nevertheless, the opposing tug of sovereignty was felt even in the face of the worst 
crimes the world had ever seen. The gravity of the crimes committed in World War II 
thus solidified the idea. Therefore the gravity threshold, with respect to universal 
jurisdiction, might ensure that states do exercise universal jurisdiction only over 
sufficiently serious offences, thus retaining the principle of state sovereignty. 
As regarding the application of universal jurisdiction, the doctrine has not changed 
since it foundations. A violation of jus cogens remains central, rendering the criminal 
a hostis humanis generis and subject to universal jurisdiction. What has changed with 
the modern era is, rather the substance of jus cogens.  
Traditionally, universal jurisdiction can be invoked merely on the basis of the gravity 
of the crime and in older cases of piracy, the crimes committed in terra nullius. 
Hence, the modern universal jurisdiction arises from the nature and the gravity of the 
crime even though the gravity criteria of the crime and its concern to the international 
community was not the foundation or the raison d'être of the original concept of 
universal jurisdiction. In sum, it can be concluded that the idea of universal 
jurisdiction grew, and has grown or developed, to include crimes on the grounds of 
their gravity instead of the practical consideration of denying criminals safe haven. In 
other words, it can be claimed that there exist two rationales for exercising universal 
jurisdiction; traditionally, the lack of any state’s jurisdiction over the locus delicti; 
and the modern version arising from the gravity of the crime.  
120 
 
It follows that one can wonder whether heinousness is a poor standard for asserting 
universal jurisdiction and whether it is the right approach. In fact, one can also 
consider why our current approach to universal jurisdiction lacks coherence.  
To conlclude on the crimes that fall, or perhaps might fall (such as severe 
environmental crimes) under the umbrella of universal jurisdicction it is so that the 
seriousness of a crime, for the purposes of applying universal jurisdiction, is and 
should be, determined by the extent to which it harms legal rights protected by 
specific international agreements or rules of international law; or as the potential to 
seriously impair universally recognized human rights. Consequently, this thesis 
advocates that by defining and specifically enumerating crimes in respect of which 
universal jurisdiction might be applied is thus perhaps not the best sollution but 
rather, such application should depend on whether the acts committed are sufficiently 
harmful to the international community as a whole, based on specific criteria (for 
instance that the offences constitute a large-scale or widespread criminal conduct). 
Hence, after having established the fundamental source, namely the gravity of a 
crime, and described briefly the crimes falling under its scope, the rules for adhering 
or exercising universal jurisdiction in relation to other possible jurisdictional bases 












5 The Idea of Subsidiarity in the Context of Universal Jurisdiction 
At the inter-state level there is no general rule of international law establishing a 
hierarchy between the various bases of jurisdiction where different national 
authorities want to prosecute the same conduct.
390
 Bassiouni, for instance, advocates 
the development of consensus principles on universal jurisdiction that establish 
“jurisdictional priorities” and provide “rules for resolving conflicts of jurisdiction” 
and minimize “the exposure of individuals to multiple prosecutions, abuses of 
process, and denial of justice.” In this regards, Bassiouni further notes that 
harmonizing universal jurisdiction with other jurisdictional theories, as well as, 
developing principles that clarify legitimate usage of universal jurisdiction is a 




Premised on these remarks one can consider whether the notion of subsidiarity in the 
context of universal jurisdiction might be such a ‘guiding tool’. In recent years, as 
will be clarified in this chapter, there has been a growing support for the notion of 
subsidiarity as a ‘guiding principle’ or ‘modality’ in the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction; hence establishing a hierarchical order between concurrent jurisdictions. 
Accordingly, the idea of subsidiarity as a guiding rule might bring foreseeability in 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction and balance the principle of state sovereignty.  
This observation of appropriateness of exercising universal jurisdiction in relation to 
other jurisdictional bases clarifies the role that universal jurisdiction is expected to 
play in modern jurisdictional regime. In this context it is important to remember the 
fact that universal jurisdiction is rather unusual (as was clarified in Chapter III 
regarding the principles’ nature and scope) considering other jurisdictional bases, 
especially the dominant (or more preferable) territorial jurisdiction. The absence of 
effective jurisdiction capable of prosecuting serious offences is one of the 
shortcomings deriving exactly from the dominance of territorial jurisdiction. This is 
the very reason why universal jurisdiction has been developed in practice and law in 
order to fill this lacuna of jurisdiction and to end, or at least deter, that serious crimes 
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 Consequently, universal jurisdiction has to be exercised when 
there is no other jurisdiction that is capable of effective prosecution. In fact, it is 
crucial for the legitimacy and viability of universal jurisdiction that the territorial or 
national state is accorded the first opportunity to prosecute. In this way, a more 
pragmatic and homogeneous implementation of the universality principle will be 
enhanced. 
Nevertheless, considering that the area of international law that governs the 
attribution and distribution of jurisdiction remains undeveloped, it is difficult to agree 
that subsidiarity has become entrenched as a legal principle. Rather, it can be seen as 
a policy consideration that functions in such a way that it renders the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction feasible and more workable. It may be argued that it is exactly 
due to the fact that the exercise of universal jurisdiction occurs in a somewhat ad hoc 
nature (even while its raison d’être cannot be denied), that the necessity of such a 
discussion has to be brought up. At the same time, because of subsidiarity’s arguable 
status and function as a policy consideration, it is even more necessary to clarify the 
rationale behind the principle and to define its scope and role within the existing legal 
system of international law. 
The emerging notion of subsidiarity will be reflected on in relation to the 
complementary principle of the ICC.
393
 It will be advocated that the principle of 
complementarity can be of guidance on how the notion of subsidiarity might be 
addressed and applied in the exercise of universal jurisdiction. In addition, it will be 
demonstrated how it could rely on its general acceptance to further its efficiency and 
implementation. In other words, subsidiarity has been compared to the operation of 
complementarity between states, thus complementarity might stipulate to the notion 
of subsidiarity, which might be a way of better enforcing the goal pursued by 
universal jurisdiction and enabling universal jurisdiction to be more pragmatically 
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 Accordingly, this chapter seeks to analyze the possible function of 
subsidiarity as a policy consideration in the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
As one will see, this thesis is in favor of the application of a subsidiarity ‘test’. 
Nevertheless, as far as reasonably possible, states seeking to exercise universal 
jurisdiction should give priority to a state with a stronger nexus to the situation - the 
territorial or the national state.
395
 It is so that the territorial or national state may 
indeed be a better forum for prosecution in light of proximity to the evidence, the 
knowledge of the accused and the victims and a better perspective on all 
circumstances surrounding the crime.
396
 Therefore, subsidiarity should not be invoked 
as a justification for inaction based on unclear intentions of the territorial state or the 
national state and/or vague investigations.397 It should come into play when a state 
where a suspect is present is confronted with a concrete choice between prosecution 
in its own courts or transfer to the ‘more practical’ forum. 
 
5.1 Existence of Subsidiarity in International Law 
Although an act may have been committed by a foreigner against a foreign target 
outside the territory of a state, jurisdiction is asserted as a matter of international 
public policy. Hence, it is indispensable to have guidelines for the application of 
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universal jurisdiction in order to avoid jurisdictional conflicts, disruptions of world 
order (in particular balancing state sovereignty), abuse and denial of justice, and to 
enhance predictability of jurisdictional priorities (mainly foreseeability) and 
consistency in jurisdictional disputes and outcomes. The emerging notion of 
subsidiarity could be a significant contribution for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction, and thus enhancing its usage and deterring political misuse by advocating 
means of better enforcing the goal pursued by universal jurisdiction.   
 
5.1.1 The Principle of Subsidiarity – Content and Objective 
The origins of subsidiarity may be traced to the history of Western political thoughts, 
but it was the Catholic socialism that modernized its rationale. In the teaching of 
Catholic socialism, subsidiarity aims to mediate the individual and social aspects of 
the human person. It asserts the human person as inherently social in the sense that 
the fulfillment of individuals cannot be realized without being in association with 
others but at the same time, human flourishing inherently requires freedom. 
Therefore, subsidiarity respects autonomy of individuals in the pursuit of their 
fulfillment and encourages intervention by larger entities only when individuals 
cannot achieve their ends by themselves and only for the purpose of the realization of 
those ends.
398
      
It is because of its applicability to all social relationships, that subsidiarity has drawn 
attention in many fields and in fact has materialized in many contexts as a principle of 
social ordering of constituent parts in order to serve and achieve the common good.
399
 
As a political principle, it establishes a preference for the entities closer to the 
stakeholders, premised on that they achieve the proposed objectives more efficiently. 
At the same time, it allows larger entities to enter in if those objectives cannot be 
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achieved equally well by the former entities. It thus provides the conditions and the 
reasons for preferring one level of authority to exercise power in a given context.
400
  
Furthermore, with respect to subsidiarity as a requirement of international law, 
Cassese has considered in certain writings that the subsidiarity principle is a rule of 
customary international law. In this regard he noted that: 
“it would seem that, at least at the level of customary international law, 
universal jurisdiction may only be exercised to substitute for other countries 
that would be in a better position to prosecute the offender, but from some 
reason do not […] In other words, under customary international law, 
universal jurisdiction may only be triggered if those other states [territorial 
and active nationality states] fail to act, or else have legal systems so inept or 




From the above noted, the role of subsidiarity is thus flexible.
402
 Subsidiarity has been 
proposed as an effective vehicle for the exercise of universal jurisdiction. This would 
accord forum determination to a foreign state only where the state with a stronger 
nexus fails to adequately deal with a particular case. In other words, states should 
exercise appropriate restraint in case the home state is able and willing to investigate 
and prosecute a situation in which a heinous offence has been committed.  
During the debate in the Sixth Committee on the agenda of ‘the scope and application 
of universal jurisdiction’, many delegates emphasized that the primary responsibility 
for prosecution should always rest with the state where the crime had been 
perpetrated. For the reason that the state where the crime was committed enjoys 
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convenient access to the evidence; is closer to the aggrieved parties; and benefits 
most from the transparency of a trial and the accountability of a verdict. At the same 
time, the delegates also supported that if the territorial state was unable or unwilling 
to exercise jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction provided a complementary mechanism 
to ensure that individuals who committed grave crimes did not enjoy a safe haven 
anywhere in the world.
403 Moreover, as applied in the area of international crimes to 
date, Spanish and German courts have applied subsidiarity as a principle of judicial 
restrains to hold that their national courts are able to exercise universal jurisdiction if 
the state that has a direct link (on the basis of territoriality or active personality) fails 
to do so, or does not do so genuinely.
404 
That said, the crucial issue is how to identify cases or situations of inability and 
willingness on the part of territorial states. It should be noted here that the principle of 
subsidiarity in itself cannot serve the purpose of identifying cases of inability and 
willingness. The identification of those cases involves resolving questions such as 
how to define the common good, and how to identify the scope of powers possessed 
by each entity. Yet, to a certain extent, they are defined and identified at a prior stage 
and through a different process that forms part of a certain political order in which the 
idea of subsidiarity is applied.
405 
In sum, subsidiarity is a principle that the international community has recently come 
to consider as an appropriate mechanism for effectively achieving the common good 
of the society in a way that is less intrusive, given the differences in the ability and 
willingness of the entities involved. Put differently, subsidiarity provides a reason for 
other states to intervene, but does not in the process of its functioning identify what 
constitutes inability and unwillingness. Given that the assessment of inability and 
unwillingness is ultimately left to the states exercising universal jurisdiction, and 
certainly constitutes the condition for the exercise of jurisdiction by these states, it is 
all the more crucial to identify these cases or situations. This will be the focus of the 
next section. 
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5.2 The Application of Subsidiarity Criteria in Connection to Universal 
Jurisdiction 
In the context of universal jurisdiction as understood here, subsidiarity is the idea that 
universal jurisdiction is merely a secondary mechanism and should be exercised 
only if the territorial or national states are unable or unwilling to exercise their 
jurisdiction.
406
 It might seem that the idea of subsidiarity provides a feasible 
mechanism for overcoming the deficiencies observed in the existing frameworks due 
to the fact that it respects the primacy of territorial or nationality states and indicates 
when other states may intervene.  
In fact, at present there is a growing support for the notion of subsidiarity in 
connection to universal jurisdiction, not only from legal doctrine and writings of 
academics but also from instruments prepared by experts407 and statements made by 
states.
408
 This increasing support has led some commentators to conclude that the 
notion of subsidiarity has already attained the status of customary international law. 
However, it would perhaps be too hasty to conclude that it has. This dissertation 
chooses rather to agree, for example with, Stigen who argues that subsidiarity “is in 
the process of being developed.”
409
 He further asserts that, while “currently not 
amounting to a duty under international law”, it is a right of the forum state to offer 
the case as a matter of policy to the territorial state or the suspects’ home state when 
that state is willing and able to prosecute. In this way, subsidiarity can be a feasible 
framework for the exercise of universal jurisdiction, avoiding unilateral and selective 
exercise of universal jurisdiction, and thus preventing the misapplication of the 
principle. It has been argued that universal jurisdiction is precisely based on the 
                                                          
406
 Further clarification on the criteria of ‘inability’ and ‘unwillingness’ will be provided in the 
following section.  
407
 CASSESE, Is the Bell Tolling, supra note 1, p. 593; KREß, supra note 223, p. 580; 
LAFONTAINE, F.: “Universal Jurisdiction–the Realistic Utopia” Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, Vol. 10, (2012), p. 1286; STIGEN, supra note 401, pp. 137-153. 
408
 See for instance UNGA, Sixth Committee, Sixty-seventh session on “the scope and application of 
the principle of universal jurisdiction”, A/C.6/67/SR.12, (6 December 2012) and A/C.6/67/SR.13, (24 
December 2012). 
409
 STIGEN, supra note 401, p. 141. 
128 
 
subsidiarity principle, and that it thus only functions as a last resort solution so as to 
prevent impunity from arising.
410 
Subsidiarity as a guiding principle or modality in the usage of universal jurisdiction 
prevents its selective and manipulative usage of the principle and simultaneously 
respects the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, in particular the principles of 
sovereign equality, political independence and non-interference in the international 
affairs of another state. But all of these factors are of vital importance in the 
application of the principle of universal jurisdiction and usually cause a restrain on its 
exercise.  
Furthermore, a number of scholars and academics are of the view that when the 
territorial state is willing and able to genuinely conduct a bona fide prosecution, other 
states should generally defer to do so and retain the supplemental characteristics of 
universal jurisdiction.
411
 For instance, Broomhall holds that “[i]f the territorial state is 
demonstrably willing and able to prosecute the accused in a fair manner, or if there is 
another, clearly more appropriate forum, the state considering universal jurisdiction 
should ordinarily defer to its courts.”
412
 Cassese asserts that “universal jurisdiction 
may only be exercised substitute for other countries that would be in a better position 
to prosecute the offender, but for some reason do not [...].”
413
 The same view is for 
instance withheld in the Report of the International Law Association (ILA) which 
recommends that gross human rights offenders should preferably be brought to justice 
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in the state in which they committed their offences, thus suggesting that universal 
jurisdiction should only be considered in the absence of such proceedings.
414
  
With respect to the conditions applicable for the exercise of subsidiarity in the context 
of universal jurisdiction, some more clarification is provided by instruments that have 
been prepared by academic experts. For instance, the preamble of the Resolution of 
the Institut de droit international (2005),
415
 refers to the ‘primary responsibility’ of all 
states to effectively prosecute the international crimes committed within their 
jurisdiction or by persons under their control. It provides in Article 3(c) that a 
custodial state should, before commencing a trial on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction, inquire the territorial or national state on whether it is prepared to 
prosecute that person, unless these states are manifestly unwilling or unable to 
prosecute, in which case the inquiry would not be required.
416
 
Similarly, the AU-EU Report (2009) sets forth slightly more detailed and nuanced 
conditions, albeit as a matter of policy. While the Report does not recognize any 
hierarchy among doctrines as a positive obligation of international law, it 
recommends to accord priority to territoriality as a basis of jurisdiction taking into 
consideration the fact that it is the territorial states that would be mostly affected by 
crimes that should be subjected to universal jurisdiction.
417
 This is in accordance with 
the general view that universal jurisdiction should function as a secondary 
mechanism. Furthermore, Recommendation 10 of the Report provides that a state 
considering the exercise of universal jurisdiction may initiate criminal proceedings 
when they have a serious reason to believe that the territorial state and the suspects’ 
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In this context one can note that for instance Spanish courts and prosecutors have 
conducted a subsidiarity analysis at least since 1998 (even though the application of 
the principle of subsidiarity to the prosecution of international crimes is not a 
statutory requirement).
419
 As an example, in the 2003 Peruvian Genocide case, the 
Spanish Supreme Court applied the subsidiarity principle but termed it the “principle 
of necessity of jurisdictional intervention”.
420
 Furthermore, in the Guatemalan 
Genocide case, from 2003, where the Spanish Supreme Court found that Spanish 
Courts could apply universal jurisdiction only if there were legal impediments or 
prolonged judicial activity in the territorial state or the home state of the 
perpetrator.
421
 It was stated within the minority’s opinion that 
 “[i]n the present case, from the documentation presented by the complaint 
and validated by the investigating judge, it is manifestly clear that many 
years have passed since the occurrence of these acts, and for some reason or 
another, the courts in Guatemala have not been able to effectively exercise 
jurisdiction with regard to genocide of the Mayan population.”
422 
In addition, similar talk was taken in the Al-Daraj case, regarding alleged war crimes 
in Gaza in 2002, where the Audiencia Nacional in 2009, when deciding on the 
applicability of universal jurisdiction, noted that “the judicial authorities of Israel 
have not initiated any criminal proceedings with the objective of determining if the 
events denounced could entail some criminal liability”.
423
 Hence it is seems that 
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Spanish courts will defer from exercising its jurisdiction only if the case is being 
genuinely dealt with by the territorial state.  
Various instruments likewise propose for the priority of the territorial state. For 
example, the Princeton Principles on universal jurisdiction proposes that the forum 
state shall, when it receives a request for extradition to another state, take into account 
inter alia, “the place of commission of the crime” and “the nationality connection of 
the victim to the requesting state.”
424
 Likewise, one might also mention, Article 4(2) 
of the African Union Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over 
International Crimes (2012)
425
 provides that, in exercising universal jurisdiction, “the 
[c]ourts shall have priority of the court of the State in whose territory the crime is 
alleged to have been committed provided that the State is willing and able to 
prosecute.” This last instrument is one of particular note, because it was adopted 
during the nineteenth summit of the African Union in May 2012 and later approved 
by its Executive Council in July 2012, where the Council encouraged “Member States 
to fully take advantage of this Model National Law in order to expeditiously enact or 
strengthen their national laws in this area.”
426
 Given that the African Union has been 
critical of the abusive exercise of universal jurisdiction for quite some time, this 
approval seems to indicate that the idea of subsidiarity is considered to be acceptable 
to African countries and can be applied in these countries as a guiding principle that 
may prevent the abusive use of universal jurisdiction. 
From all of these various statements (whether scholarly writings, case law or other 
legal instruments) one can certainly note a divergent view on the scope and tone of 
the subsidiarity linkages to universal jurisdiction, but one can also conclude that they 
share the same fundamental assumption that the territorial states are to be given 
primacy. At the same time, they allow other entities to step in where the territorial 
state is not genuinely able or willing to exercise its jurisdiction, without the need to 
obtain consent from the state. Doubtlessly, this seems reasonable because while 
territorial states have been regarded as entities that are closer to the relevant 
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stakeholders and have more effectiveness in the exercise of jurisdiction, their 
dysfunction or limitation has been the rationale for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction as a tool for the fight against impunity. What is more, only when the 
directly affected states fail to investigate and prosecute appropriately; they lose their 
legal interest in primary prosecution and thus enable a third state to fill the 
prosecutorial vacuum in order to protect and withhold the interests of the international 
community. 
As already stated, the subsidiarity criterion might be said to resemble the principle of 
complementarity, set forth in Article 17 of the ICC Statute, pursuant to which the ICC 
only declares a case admissible when a state fails to genuinely investigate and 
prosecute it. That said, the following sections will make an inquiry into how the 
complementarity mechanism of the ICC works, and it will be shown how it could be 
considered as a ‘model’ for the application of the subsidiarity principle. 
 
5.2.1 Drawing a Parallel with the Complementarity Principle of the ICC 
Thirteen years after being established, the International Criminal Court has proven 
successful in promoting peace and international justice, and today enjoys 
international acceptance and respect.  One might indicate whether the entry into force 
of the Rome Statute is about more than the establishment of a new court; hence 
creating a global compliance system for the enforcement of international criminal 
law. Within this system, the ICC operates as the exemption and not the norm (at the 
vertical level), and the same can be said to apply for universal jurisdiction (at the 
horizontal level), where the primary responsibility for the repression of international 
crimes resides with domestic institutions, primarily within the territorial state.
427
 In 
this section it will be demonstrated how the ICC’s principle of complementarity can 
serve as a useful model on how the subsidiarity criterion for universal jurisdiction 
should be defined and applied.  This makes it all the more important that the most 
essential aspects of the complementarity principle, aimed at safeguarding the integrity 
of states vis-à-vis the ICC, are applied mutatis mutandis to the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction. 
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It is just relatively recently that a small number of academics and scholars have 
considered the fact that the complementarity principle of the ICC might be looked at 
as a paradigm for the emerging principle of subsidiarity in the application of universal 
jurisdiction.
428
 However, it is worth noting that the concept of complementarity has a 
much longer history than just within the ICC regime. Indeed, one might believe that 
the principle of complementarity was genuinely negotiated for the first time with the 
initiation of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute for the ICC.
429
 However, as the drafting 
history of the 1949 Genocide Convention makes evident, this is far from the truth and 
the concept can for instance be reflected within the travaux preparatoires of the 
Genocide Convention. It was the ad hoc Committee's chair, Maktos of the United 
States, who proposed a rule of subsidiarity or complementarity, by which an 
international court would only have jurisdiction if the state with territorial jurisdiction 
could not, or had failed to act. The ad hoc Committee adopted the principle of 
complementarity by four votes to none, with three abstentions.
430 
Contrary to universal jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the ICC is based primarily on the 
territoriality and the nationality principle, founded in a treaty-based delegation of 
jurisdiction from its state parties. This is a core difference in the two regimes.
431 
Furthermore, pursuant to Article 17 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, the ICC will only exercise its jurisdiction if a state fails to genuinely 
investigate and prosecute a situation in which crimes against international 
humanitarian law have been committed. The jurisdiction of the ICC is thus 
complementary to the jurisdiction of states. In the absence of relevant decisions by 
the ICC Prosecutor or the Court on the issue, the complementarity principle has been 
the subject of a heated scholarly debate.
432 Both the Preamble to the Statute and 
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Article 1 express a fundamental principle of the Rome Statute: that the Court is to be 
“complementary” to national criminal jurisdictions.
433
  
Even though complementarity is not defined as an analysis of the articles on 
admissibility, it demonstrates that complementarity does not mean “concurrent” 
jurisdiction. Instead the Court may exercise jurisdiction only if: (1) national 
jurisdictions are “unwilling or unable” to; (2) the crime is of sufficient gravity; and 
(3) the person has not already been tried for the conduct on which the complaint is 
based.
434 
The principle of complementarity can be defined as a functional principle aimed at 
granting jurisdiction to a subsidiarity body when the main body fails to exercise its 
primary jurisdiction. Admissibility to the ICC is based on a principle of 
complementarity. An alternative to this would be to base the jurisdiction of the ICC 
on universal jurisdiction, where a case would be admissible regardless of national 
proceedings. A contextual interpretation of complementarity inferred from the other 
provisions of the Rome Statute suggests that the ICC can assume jurisdiction over 
certain crimes only when the Court is satisfied that domestic authorities are “unable” 
or “unwilling” to exercise jurisdiction through investigations or prosecution. This is 
one of the cornerstones of the ICC, manifested in the Preamble and Art. 1 of the 
Rome Statute.
435 
As stressed by El Zeidy, the principle of complementarity in international criminal 
law requires the existence of both national and international criminal justice systems 
functioning in a subsidiarity manner for curbing crimes of international law; when the 
former fails to do so, the latter intervenes and ensures that the perpetrators do not go 
unpunished.
436  
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5.2.2 The Standard of ICC Article 17 as a Guiding Principle 
As previously stated, the complementarity principle can be used as a standard in the 
usage of the subsidiarity principle in its application for universal jurisdiction. As an 
admissibility principle, complementarity forms part of the statutory scheme foreseen 
in Article 17 for determining whether a particular case should be heard before the 
court. The ICC Appeals Chamber has characterized the Statute’s admissibility as 
“referable in the first place to complementarity (Article 17(1)(a) to (b)), in the second 
to ne bis in idem (articles 17(1)(c), 20) and thirdly to the gravity of the offence 
(Article 17(1)(d)”. Complementarity thus assumes the existence of an interested state 
or states with a competing claim to jurisdiction with the Court.
437
 The 
complementarity principle is to assess - in a similar way as the notion of the 
subsidiarity principle should do with respect to jurisdictional claims vis-à-vis states - 
who should exercise jurisdiction where two or more forums are available for 
prosecution. 
Article 17(1)(a) further stipulates when a case is inadmissible before the ICC by 
stating that “the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution”. According to this wording, and particularly in regard to 
the element of unwillingness, the lack of efforts to genuinely prosecute the crime 
needs to be determined positively; it is not sufficient that investigations or 
prosecutions might merely be conducted more effectively by the ICC or – in the case 
of third party prosecutions – by other states.  References for this interpretation are 
contained in Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute: 
“In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall 
consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by 
international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: 
a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was 
made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in 
article 5; 
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b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice; 
c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the 




It follows that, while there is a growing support for the idea of subsidiarity, the 
assessment of inability and unwillingness, apparent ‘common’ interest in the fight 
against impunity may turn into a source of confrontation. Therefore, it is all the more 
important to articulate a feasible framework. Bearing this in mind, the next section 
tries to elaborate on the criteria of inability and unwillingness. The material and 
procedural rules governing the ICC’s principle can serve as a useful model for how a 
subsidiarity criterion for universal jurisdiction should be defined and applied.  
In sum, at this point one can already notice the similarities between the notions of 
subsidiarity and complementarity, in that both regard the unwillingness and inability 
as a threshold for other entities to enter in. Where there is a concurrent exercise of 
jurisdiction over a particular case at the international or national level, the judges of 
the ICC will need to make an assessment as to the genuineness of the domestic 
proceeding in question. In this regard, the Court needs to engage in its assessment of 
unwillingness and inability; but what do these two criterions consist of? Nevertheless, 
while the objectivity of judgment on inability and unwillingness of states can be 
secured in the ICC through procedural mechanism challenging the admissibility of a 
case, there is no equivalence in the subsidiarity between states. Therefore, it is all the 
more crucial regarding the notion of subsidiarity between states (at the horizontal 
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5.2.1.1 What Constitutes a ‘Genuine’ Investigation? 
Unwilling 
The meaning of ‘unwillingness to act’ is provided in Article 17(2) of the ICC Statute. 
Within these provisions three criteria are laid down for determining whether 
unwillingness exists, namely: (a) shielding a person from criminal responsibility; (b) 
unjustified delay in the proceedings which is inconsistent with the intent to bring the 
person to justice; and (c) proceedings not conducted independently or impartially and 
in a manner inconsistent with bringing the person to justice.
439
 Stemming from this, 
one can see that the notion of unwillingness shows a state’s lack of a positive attitude 
towards prosecuting and trying perpetrators of international crimes. 
On the inter-state level, in determining the ‘good faith’ of prosecutorial efforts in the 
territorial state the complementarity principle of Article 17 of the Rome Statute is a 
useful reference as it establishes the preconditions that a state has to meet in order to 
avoid the ICC exercising its jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that the horizontal relation 
between two states is different from the vertical relation between a state and the 
ICC,
440
 the standards established by the complementarity principle can be taken into 
consideration and may be, as a guiding principle, transferred to inter-state relations.  
On an inter-state level a positive determination whether another state is genuinely 
conducting an investigation or prosecution should be made. A state cannot refuse 
investigations simply pointing to another state and claiming it is carrying out an 
investigation. A state has to consider whether universal standards of investigations are 
met by the other state. Only with an affirmative answer to that question can a state 
invoke the priority of the territorial state’s jurisdiction as a matter of policy.
441
 
When analyzing case law one can notice that state practices apparently reflect the 
idea of subsidiarity, which will also serve to demonstrate the condition for exercise of 
jurisdiction based on subsidiarity. For instance, the decision of the German General 
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Federal Prosecutor on CCR v. Rumsfeld is worth examining.
442
 In this case, the 
General Federal Prosecutor expressly relied on the principle of subsidiarity built in 
§153(f) StPO (Strafprozessordnung or the German Code of Criminal Procedure), in 
considering whether there was room for the German investigative authorities to take 
action. As a first step, the General Prosecutor observes: 
Only if criminal prosecution by primarily competent states, or an 
international court, is not assured or cannot be assured, for instance if the 
perpetrator has removed himself from criminal prosecution by fleeing 
abroad, is the subsidiary jurisdiction of German prosecutorial authorities 
implicated. This hierarchy is justified by the special interest of the state of 
the perpetrator and victim in criminal prosecution, as well as by the usually 
greater proximity of these primarily competent jurisdictions to the 
evidence.
443 
According to this principle, it must be left up to the primarily competent states as to 
what order and with what means they carry out an investigation of the overall series 
of events. Thus, other states may only intervene if the investigation is being carried 
out “only for the sake of appearances or without a serious intent to prosecute.” It was 
concluded that there were no indications that the US authorities and courts “[were] 
refraining, or would refrain, from penal measures as regards the violations described 
in the complaint”, since there had already been several proceedings conducted against 
co-perpetrators. Thus, the means and the time frame for the investigation of further 
possible suspects were considered to be left up to the judicial authorities of the United 
States.
444
 Although the Federal Prosecutor did not specify what exactly falls into the 
category of the investigation conducted “only for the sake of appearances or without a 
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serious intent to prosecute”, it can at least be inferred from the decision that a broad 
discretion is given to the primary responsible states as far as the former’s judicial 
system is functioning normally. Additionally, in German legislation, with regard to 
universal jurisdiction, it is clearly inspired by the complementarity principle. For 
instance, the federal prosecutor may hand over a case to an international or foreign 
national court when it constitutes “zulässig und beabsichtigt” (admissible or 
intended).
445
 The German legislator has explained that the “jurisdiction of third-party 
states must in any case be understood as subsidiary jurisdiction which should prevent 
impunity, but not otherwise inappropriately interfere with the primary responsible 
jurisdiction.”
446 
In order to explore further the substance of the notion of unwillingness, let’s look into 
Spanish case law, where series of cases (namely regarding amnesty law) exist where 
the examination of unwillingness was constructed. It should be noted that the Spanish 
legislation does not establish the subsidiarity principle, but in the previously 
mentioned Guatemala Genocide case the subsidiarity character of universal 
jurisdiction was confirmed. The Supreme Court found that the Spanish Courts could 
apply universal jurisdiction only if there were legal impediments or prolonged 
judicial activities in the territorial state or the home state of the perpetrator. It thus 
continued to declare in the inactivity of the territorial state by stating that the lack of 
activity of the state (here namely the legislative branch) can be detected from the fact 
that the “laws have been passed to shield the accused from prosecution so that the 
domestic courts are prevented by their own legislation from initiating proceedings 
against them […].”447 
Another important decision in this regard is the decision of the Criminal Chamber of 
Audiencia Nacional on the Pinochet case.448 In light of its interpretation of Article VI 
of the Genocide Convention, the Chamber concluded that Article VI would not 
exclude other jurisdictions, such as the Spanish jurisdiction based on Article 23 (4) of 
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LOPJ, than those it stipulates, while suggesting that the former jurisdictions is made 
subsidiary to the latter.
449
 After having confirmed the ground of jurisdiction, the 
Chamber further examined the fact that the Chilean courts declared the cases in 
question dismissed with prejudice (el sobreseimiento definitivo). Accordingly, the 
Chamber had to address whether it would amount to the Spanish court’s lacking of 
jurisdiction for failure to meet the requirement of Article 23(2)(c) of LOPJ (Ley 
Orgánica del Poder Judicial or Spanish Judiciary Act), which provided ‘the criminal 
has not been acquitted, pardoned, or punished abroad or, in the latter case, has not 
served the sentence’ in order for Spanish courts to exercise jurisdiction. In answering 
this in the negative, the Chamber stated: 
“The offenses to which reference has been made should be deemed not to 
have been judged. Independent of the fact that Decree-law 2,191 of 1978 
could be considered contrary to jus cogens, this Decree-law should not be 
considered a true pardon pursuant to the Spanish law applicable in this 
proceeding, and can be characterized as a provision decriminalizing certain 
conduct for reasons of political convenience, such that its application does 
not render the accused one who has been acquitted or pardoned abroad 
(Article 23(2) of the Organic Law on the Judicial Branch), except in the case 
of conduct that is not punishable, because of a later decriminalizing 
provision, in the country in which the offense was committed (Article 
23(2)(a), LOPJ), which is of no relevance in the cases of the 
extraterritoriality of Spanish jurisdiction by application of the principles of 
universal protection and prosecution, having seen the provision of Article 
23(5) of the Organic Law on the Judicial Branch.”
450
  
Here, the Chilean Decree-law of 1978 was regarded as a provision decriminalizing 
certain conduct for reasons of political convenience and thus a decision based on its 
application was not interpreted as a product of proper administration of criminal 
justice. 
Similarly, the modes of the investigation may be included in the assessment of 
‘unwillingness’. For instance, in the previously observed Al-Daraj case (regarding 
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alleged war crimes by the Israeli Defense Forces in Gaza in 2002) the Audiencia 
Nacional granted leave to proceed with the investigation on 29 January 2009. At this 
stage, it succinctly noted that there had been no evidence that any proceedings had 
been brought to investigate the facts. Challenged by the public prosecutor, the 
Audiencia Nacional reconsidered the case on 4 May 2009. This time it went further 
into the assessment of the modalities of the investigation that had actually taken place 
in Israel, noting that “the judicial authorities of Israel have not initiated any criminal 
proceedings with the objective of determining if the events denounced could entail 
some criminal liability.”
451
 Consequently, the court pronounces that the Israeli 
authorities who had conducted the investigation and concluded that there was no need 
to initiate a criminal investigation were not independent or impartial, none of their 
decisions made a legal assessment of the event, and actually there had been no 
criminal investigation since 2002. In response, Israel informed the Spanish authorities 
that the case was subject to the proceedings in Israel. After another challenge by the 
public prosecutor, in July 2009, the Appeals Court reversed the decision to prosecute 
by a 14-4 vote, referring to the Israeli investigation. As one might expected, this 
prompted widespread criticism, condemning the Spanish judiciary and claiming it had 
yielded to political pressure from the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and 
Israel.
452 
All of the above mentioned decisions suggest that Spanish courts will abstain from 




It is not difficult to identify the practices which reflect it the notion of inability, as this 
can be based on a judgment of fact; a de facto dysfunction of the judicial system. 
Under Article 17(3) of the ICC Statute the notion of inability is defined. It first 
includes the non-functioning of a judicial system to such an extent that investigation, 
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prosecution and trial of perpetrators are impossible. For example, in the Austrian case 
of Public Prosecutor v. Cvetjkovic, there was no functioning judicial system in 
Bosnia due to the ongoing war and the ICTY was not yet available.453 This reason 
underpinned the Austrian Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Genocide 
Convention, which amounted to justifying Austria’s exercise of universal jurisdiction: 
Article VI of the Genocide Convention, which provides that persons charged 
with genocide or any of the acts enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a 
competent tribunal of the State where the act was committed, or by such 
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those 
Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction, is based on the 
fundamental assumption that there is a functioning criminal justice system in the 
locus delicti (which would make the extradition of a suspect legally possible). 
Otherwise - since at the time of the adoption of the Genocide Convention there 
was no international criminal court - the outcome would be diametrically 
opposed to the intention of its drafters and a person suspected of genocide or any 
of the acts enumerated in Article III could not be prosecuted because the 
criminal justice in the locus delicti is not functioning and the international 
criminal court is not in place or its jurisdiction has not been accepted by the 
State concerned.
454 
According to the Court, it is the existence of a functioning criminal justice system 
that confers the locus delicti a primacy over other jurisdiction. This seems to 
demonstrate the notion of inability in the subsidiarity approach. In addition, a 
territorial state in such a situation would not protest against third states’ assertion of 
jurisdiction in any way, as was exactly the situation with Bosnia in this case. 
What is more, inability can also include situations in which it is impossible to 
conclude trials. Such situations could stem from exceptional circumstances usually 
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5.2.2.2 Ne Bis In Idem    
In this context one should also mention the interest of the international community in 
prosecuting and punishing the individual responsible for serious crimes under 
international law. These proceedings should be achieved through fair and impartial 
trials. Fairness and impartiality are beginning to be emphasized, for instance, in the 
application of the principle of ne bis in idem. Truly, the universal jurisdiction is 
considered a tool for promoting greater justice, but the rights of the accused must also 
be protected. Hence one of the most important guarantees is the principle of ne bis in 
idem, which protects persons against multiple prosecutions for the same crime. 
Hence, the most difficult case may arise where the alleged perpetrators have already 
been subjected to criminal proceedings in other states. Generally it is recognized in a 
domestic context that courts are not allowed to prosecute a defendant who has already 
been convicted, acquitted, or pardoned. This is the principle of ne bis in idem or the 




It is so that states cannot protect a person from being subject to prosecution before a 
court in another state (or an international criminal court) by means of a sham trial in 
its domestic courts. This has been observed in the proposition to exclude a sham trial 
from the applicability of the principle of ne bis in idem; which signifies that no one 
shall be tried twice for the same offence.
456
 The national ne bis in idem principle is 
established as an individual right in international human rights legal instruments, such 
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as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 1966, in 
Article 14(7). At the regional level, Article 8(4) of the American Convention of 
Human Rights (1969) and Article 4 (I) of the Seventh Protocol of the European 
Convention of Human Rights merit mention. In Europe, the ne bis in idem principle is 
enshrined in Article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 
14 June 1985, which prohibits the initiation of a second trial for the same offence 
when final judgment has been imposed upon a person by a court of a contracting 
party.
457
 However, there is no such principle in an international context.
458
 While 
most states seem to recognize the principle, there are so many qualifications and 
restrictions to it that it is difficult to describe its status in international law.
459
 The 
principle comes primarily into play in relation to the initiation of proceedings by the 
state, acting under the universality principle, in situations where the territorial or 
nationality state has already started investigations which resulted in conviction or 
acquittal of the defendant.
460 
In this context, one can at least mention the Princeton Principle. Within the Principle 
9(1), it is recognized that ne bis in idem when “the prior criminal proceedings or other 
accountability proceeding have been conducted in good faith and in accordance with 
international norm and standards” and “[s]ham prosecutions or derisory punishment 
resulting from a conviction or other accountability proceedings shall not be 
recognized as falling within the scope of this Principle.” This holds that a person, who 
has been tried and convicted or acquitted of a serious crime under international law 
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before national court, may not be tried again “except if the proceedings were of a 
sham character.” 
The principle of ne bis in idem ensures fairness and impartiality in the exercise of 
jurisdiction and constitutes a newly emerging part of the still developing system of 
international criminal law endorsed by new concerns. The principle of ne bis in idem 
is gaining ground in international criminal law and works as a criterion to ensure the 
actual exercise of jurisdiction to prosecute crimes, and what is more, to ensure 
fairness and impartiality in the exercise of jurisdiction. It may not only provide 
conditions for the exercise of universal jurisdiction (in case the accused person has 
already been acquitted or even pardoned in a foreign country), but it might also serve 
to restrict an unlimited exercise of universal jurisdiction. In this context relevant is the 
statement made by Bassiouni that the key component of the strategy to reconcile the 




5.2.3 Who Should Determine the ‘Genuineness of Action’ taken by States? 
After having enumerated and established the criteria for a genuine prosecution, a 
most complicated issue may arise on the question of who is competent to determine 
whether the proceedings in the priority states are inadequate and thus yielding a third 
state to launch proceedings on the basis of universal jurisdiction. As within the ICC 




Within the ICC regime, the final word lies with the ICC according to Article 119(1) 
of its Statute.
463
 For obvious reasons a state which is unwilling or unable to conduct 
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genuine proceedings cannot be entrusted with the authority to determine whether its 
own proceeding have been genuine, and vis versa, the state seeking to invoke the 
subsidiarity principle cannot make the final determination either. Both the forum state 
and the bystander state, seeking to exercise universal jurisdiction, might not be 
viewed as making independent and impartial decisions. Moreover, these states most 
probably lack the means and resources to conduct a thorough and holistic evaluation 
of another state’s proceedings. 
In order to avoid accusations, misunderstandings and diplomatic conflicts, it has been 
suggested to entrust an international judicial organ, such as the ICC, with the 
authority to make this decision.
464
 For instance, Kreß maintains that an international 
judicial organ should be entrusted with the power to decide on the genuineness of the 
proceedings at the forum state, where such a decision is necessary in order to decide 
as to whether another state was or is unwilling or unable to prosecute. What is more, 
Kreß has put forward the idea that this function could possibly be assumed by the 
ICC.
465
 Another possible choice would perhaps be, to turn to the ICJ. This means that 
the bystander state, contesting the exercise of jurisdiction of the forum state, could 
seek guidance within the ICJ or as Stigen suggest that “[a]lternatively, presupposing 
that clear rules on subsidiarity are established, the state contesting the exercise of 
jurisdiction could always turn to the ICJ, arguing that the forum state has violated the 
principle.”
466
 Having an international arbiter thus seems as a most reasonable and 
suitable solution when deciding on the fulfillment of the criteria, because if a state 
where to assess he genuineness of the proceedings of another state, the outcome 
might stipulate to inter-state tension and create disruption in international relations. 
At this point, it is important to note that the rationale underpinning subsidiarity is the 
respecting of the autonomy of territorial or national states. This autonomy could 
entail discretion in deciding whether to initiate criminal proceedings and in what 
mode such proceedings should be conducted. It could be argued that this is the main 
reason behind the growing support that subsidiarity has been attracting from states, 
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(including the African states that have been critical of the potential abuse of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction). 
 
5.2.4 When Should Subsidiarity be Applied? 
Another aspect is when subsidiarity is to take effect and be applied; should it be once 
an investigation starts, after the investigation or before a trial begins? There seems to 
be a broad agreement among commentators that the principle of subsidiarity should 
not be applied at the initial investigative stage.
467
  This position also finds support in 
the Joint Separate Opinion in Congo v. Belgium, which only calls for the application 
of the subsidiarity principle where a state contemplates prosecuting a particular 
suspect on the basis of universal jurisdiction.
468
 According to this view, 
“investigations can be initiated simultaneously in different countries and the results 




Consequently, it seems reasonable to distinguish between a case where proceedings 
are already being conducted (in a state with primary jurisdiction) and the case where 
no action has yet been taken. If proceedings have started, subsidiarity should bar the 
opening of any additional investigation on the basis of universal jurisdiction. When 
no action has been taken by the state having primary jurisdiction, the initiation of an 
investigation in a third state should be possible without further delay.
470 
However, for instance, in the already mentioned CCR v. Rumsfeld case the German 
Federal Prosecutor applied the subsidiarity principle before the opening of an 
investigation. Even though this might seem appropriate, the forum state still does not 
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need to apply subsidiarity that early. It would be more reasonable to first allow the 




The above, somewhat comparative analysis of the harmonization of the modalities on 
the application of the complementarity and subsidiarity principles in the context of 
universal jurisdiction has been advocated. The process of determining willingness and 
ability of the territorial or national state was briefly addressed. 
As a matter of law, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a territory is reflective of 
one of the most traditional aspects of sovereignty – contradicting the basic principles 
of non-intervention. As a rule, the exercise of the principle of universal jurisdiction 
should remain the exception, to be triggered where warranted by circumstances; 
a) based on an assessment of the inaction of the territorial state (or based on 
other jurisdictional bases) and/or; 
b)  their unwillingness or inability to conduct proceedings for the most serious 
crimes of international concern.  
Thus if the state closer to the crime does not act, the responsibility will fall to the 
international community to foster the conditions necessary to enable proceedings to 
take place by third states.
472
 Consequently, where the state directly affected simply 
cannot assume the primary burden to prosecute crimes, either due to sheer incapacity 
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The emerging principle of subsidiarity with respect to the universality principle 
enables states to exercise their jurisdiction on different grounds without prescribing a 
hierarchy between those types of jurisdiction. However, one can recognize a policy 
rule to accord priority to the principle of territoriality in combination with a model of 
conditional subsidiarity of universal jurisdiction once an investigation is concluded. 
The conditionality of the exercise of universal jurisdiction, while not settled 
conclusively, may be based on the ‘good faith’ exercise of the primary jurisdiction 
and may be construed following the case law of human rights courts and the basic 
concept established by Article 17 of the Rome Statute for the vertical state-ICC 
relation.  
It follows that, if the territorial state is unwilling or unable to genuinely conduct 
investigations or if the investigations or prosecutions are no more than sham 
proceedings to shield the perpetrator, then a third state may initiate its own criminal 
proceedings. For an investigation to be considered genuine, it must meet the universal 
standards of effectiveness, promptness, independence and impartiality. As a result, an 
international body or mechanism tasked with assessing the legitimacy and legality of 
procedures undertaken on the basis of universal jurisdiction might serve to decide on 
these criteria and simultaneously alleviate some of the international tension related to 
the perceived abuses of the jurisdictional basis and to legitimize both specific 
prosecutions and universal jurisdiction per se. 
This analysis has shown that a subsidiarity principle for universal jurisdiction can be 
convenient both for states seeking to combat international crimes and for states 
reluctant to interfere in other states’ affairs. Furthermore, the idea was demonstrated 
by using the ICC’s principle of complementarity as a model for many points on 
subsidiarity. It was shown how the rules governing the principle of complementarity 
can serve as a useful model for how a subsidiarity criterion for universal jurisdiction 
should be understood and applied. 
Subsidiarity criterion can, on one hand, justify the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
by stressing that neither the territorial state nor the perpetrator’s home state is willing 
or able to proceed with an investigation. On the other hand, it can also justify non-
                                                                                                                                                                     
unwilling or unable to prosecute violators at home, the role of the international community becomes 
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interference by referring to it as an unqualified rule of priority for the affected states. 
It would indeed limit the interference in state sovereignty (thus respect state 
autonomy) and advance foreseeability in the exercise of universal jurisdiction, 
especially when it comes to resolving jurisdictional conflicts.474 Consequently, the 
main rationale behind universal jurisdiction will be better reflected. Attaching a 
sensibly formulated subsidiarity criterion to the exercise of universal jurisdiction will 
promote the purpose underlying such jurisdiction, if of course the forum state 
proceeds genuinely with the case. It will give the forum state a subsidiarity right to 
prosecute when necessary to prevent impunity, not an unconditional right to prosecute 
only on the grounds of the seriousness of the crime (as analyzed in Chapter IV) thus 
stipulating to an enhanced application of universal jurisdiction within the modern 
jurisdictional regime.  
Finally, while the subsidiarity principle does not yet amount to a duty under 
international law, it can be said that it constitutes a right of the forum state. For 
instance, Colangelo notes that: 
“It is probably premature to conclude that state practice and opinio juris 
already have combined to definitely establish that a State with territorial or 
national jurisdiction has adjudicative priority over States with only universal 
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, a legal trend appears to be developing in this 
direction.”
475 
From all of the above it is fair to suggest that a subsidiarity principle as modality in 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction is in the process of being developed; using the 
ICC’s principle of complementarity as a useful model for its application. One can 
certainly argue that having subsidiarity as a guiding principle in the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction, would enhance its usage while ensuring the balance between 
avoiding impunity and safeguarding the sovereignty of the state affected.  
In conclusion, if one pretends that international law submits the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction to the notion of subsidiarity then it is to conclude that general 
international law provides for a hierarchy within the different jurisdictional bases 
accepted in modern international law.  
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PART III – CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES  
6 Toward a more Effective Usage of Universal Jurisdiction 
6.1 Universal Jurisdiction as a Bridge between the International Criminal 
Justice System and the National Criminal Justice System  
Cooperation amongst national governments and existing international courts (or other 
institutions and NGOs) would reinforce international justice and the international 
legal order.
476
 There is a need to look at the principle of universal jurisdiction from 
another point of view – in a much wider context. Improving international judicial 
cooperation and national cooperation (consistent with their international obligations 
and national practice) and provide all means of support to each other, including 
mutual legal assistance to ensure the expedient and effective investigation and 
prosecution of individuals responsible for grave crimes, would consolidate the 
application of universal jurisdiction. 
Moreover, although it has been stated from the previous discussion on the principle of 
aut dedere aut judicare, that universal jurisdiction, international criminal jurisdiction 
and the obligation to extradite or prosecute are different legal institutions that should 
not be confused with one another, they should nevertheless be considered as 
complementary institutions - not seen in isolation from each other - in order to 
enhance the effort to end impunity.  
In fact, many states are parties to treaties containing the obligation to extradite or 
prosecute. Universal jurisdiction could be applied through the obligation aut dedere 
aut judicare, under which, if the perpetrator of an offence that was of such a gravity 
that it merited prosecution outside the territory of the state in which it was committed 
was apprehended in the territory of another state, that state shall be obligated to 
extradite the suspect to the state claiming jurisdiction in order to prosecute him or her, 
or to bring proceedings against that person in its courts.
477
 Although this is not the 
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application of the principle of universal jurisdiction stricto sensu, because states can 
decide not to prosecute but to extradite, it is unquestionably one mechanism through 
which states can cooperate with one another in order to combat impunity for serious 
offences and to achieve the goal and purpose of universal jurisdiction. Thus putting a 
greater emphasis on the parallels between those two principles. 
Furthermore, the international community will continually need to rely on national 
prosecutions, where universal jurisdiction plays a pivotal role, unless an ad hoc 
criminal tribunal will be established with exclusive, comprehensive jurisdiction over 
those crimes that will be considered as serious offences under international law.
478
 
Until that becomes a reality, universal jurisdiction remains the most suitable solution 
where national courts play a primary role.  
 
6.1.1 Sharing the Responsibility of Investigation and Prosecution – the State 
Incentive to Cooperate is Vital 
The exercise of universal jurisdiction by national courts is not likely to disrupt or 
jeopardize international relations, instead it may powerfully contribute to the 
consolidations of international justice. If both the conditions on which the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction were made contingent and the other limitations restraining this 
exercise, laid down in a treaty, much of the current uncertainties surrounding 
customary law would be dispelled.  
However, at present the cooperation among governments is still scarce and assistance 
mechanisms, that facilitate the exercise of universal jurisdiction, are lacking. With 
sufficient international coordination and cooperation, universal jurisdiction 
prosecutions can be an essential part of a safety net against impunity and denial of 
safe havens to perpetrators of international crimes. While several treaty provisions 
oblige states parties to cooperate in the investigation of international crimes, such as 
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Article 88 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
479
 and Article 9 
of the CAT convention
480
, the practical mechanisms for information and exchange 
have been largely absent. 
Additionally, the exercise of universal jurisdiction also requires procedural conditions 
to be fulfilled because with the prosecution and trial of offences occuring abroad the 
difficulties are profound with respect to the availability and safekeeping of evidence, 
respect for the rights of defendants, and the protection of witnesses and victims.
481
 
The need for procedural guarantees when exercising universal jurisdiction in order to 
facilitate investigations and collection and evaluation of evidence is profound. 
Therefore, in this regard international judicial cooperation and assistance is vital. 
Mutual legal assistance in the application and exercise of universal jurisdiction is thus 
a key factor. Subsequently, placing the investigation in a framework where it has 
some independent meaning, as well as, having a set of procedure when it comes to 
prosecution on the basis of universal jurisdiction would stipulate to a more coherent 
application of the principle. In fact, such an approach would permit universal 
jurisdiction to become a far more effective component of a global anti-impunity 
strategy.  
As stipulated so many times before in scholarly writings and debate, the cooperation 
among states is the primary factor of competing impunity. It is the main power source 
in the struggle against perpetrators that commit heinous offences. What is more, it is a 
main factor when it comes to the application of universal jurisdiction. But, why are 
states so reluctant to cooperate in matters that should matter the most – protecting 
human rights and deter serious human right violations. Will governments ever get out 
of the political ‘bubble’? 
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In the end it all comes down to the ‘sensitive’ notion of state sovereignty. For 
example, when discussing whether to include the principle of universal jurisdiction in 
the Rome Statute, the most powerful states objected. Ironically, had the ICC been 
granted universal jurisdiction it could have been reasonable to expect that fewer states 
would ratify the Statute. Accordingly, if fewer states would ratify the Statute it would 
lead to a smaller budget for the Court, and thus fewer instances in which the Court 
could take action. 
 
6.2 When is Universal Jurisdiction a Legitimate and Proper Form of 
Jurisdiction?  
It is important to consider the issue on the desirability and appropriateness of 
universal jurisdiction within the modern jurisdictional regime. Seeking an answer to 
the question when and how can universal jurisdiction be exercised responsibly, is thus 
relevant.  
As outlined in Chapter II primacy has been given to territorial jurisdiction and 
nationality jurisdiction, and universal jurisdiction considered as retaining 
supplemental character. For instance, as Cassese noted, under customary international 
law “universal jurisdiction may only be exercised to substitute for other countries that 
would be in a better position to prosecute the offender, but for some reason do not 
[…].”
482
 Many scholars agree with this statement and contend that when the territorial 
state is willing and able to conduct out bona fide prosecution, other states should 
refrain from it.
483
 From the historical overview (provided for in Chapter III) universal 
jurisdiction emerged in international law as an exception, its goal being to end 
impunity and establish accountability. Accordingly, the primacy should be given to a 
state having a closer nexus to the offence when the trial can be exercised in an 
effective, fair and impartial manner. 
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The sole purpose of universal jurisdiction is to deny a safe haven for criminals and 
being a means of last resort when states with a closer nexus are incapable of 
conducting a trial. It is in light of those statements that this thesis seeks, among 
others, to establish a guiding framework within which conflicts relating to 
jurisdictional claims, which resulted from claims of universal jurisdiction, be 
evaluated and guided with the notion of subsidiarity. As this thesis maintains, 
subsidiarity in the context of universal jurisdiction, has been gaining support in 
designating universal jurisdiction as a default mechanism. In general, it is important 
that jurisdiction, irrespective of its basis, is applied in good faith and consistently with 
other principles of international law in order to enhance the rule of law and stipulate, 
among others, to a more uniform usage of universal jurisdiction.
484
 In other words, it 
is essential that the goal of ending impunity does not contradict or generate abuse 
with other existing rules of international law. 
Universal jurisdiction, if regulated at the international level, might prevent its 
unwarranted use in a selective and unilateral manner. What is more, politically 
motivated decisions might be averted. Therefore guidelines in the exercise and 
applications of universal jurisdiction, such as the notion of subsidiarity analysis in 
Chapter V, might stipulate and establish clearly when and under what conditions 
universal jurisdiction might be invoked.
485
 Hence, establish international consensus in 
this respect.  
In fact, in order for the principle to be effectively and coherently applied, one has to 
consider as well and look at those deterring factors, or the arguments, against the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction. Accordingly, in order to have the principle of 
universality functional, one has to be aware of its obstacles. The next section will deal 
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6.3 Continuing Restrains on Universal Jurisdiction in the 21st Century  
At present, significant limitations remain which hinder the effective exercise of 
universal jurisdiction. These limitations have either spread with the evolving principle 
of universal jurisdiction over the past years; or they are obstacles that have been 
coupled with the principle for decades. These continuing obstacles are not necessarily 
inherent in the nature of universal jurisdiction and thus with sufficient political will 
could be overcome and the lack of transparency in the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction could be diminished.   
 
6.3.1 The Constant Tension between State Sovereignty and Universal 
Jurisdiction  
Hugo Grotius believed that sovereignty was not absolute with regard to “injuries 
[that] excessively violate the law of nature or of nations.”
486
 Hence, one can consider 
how should we then mediate between the competing claims of state sovereignty and 
the application of universal jurisdiction in deterring impunity? Or looking at it from a 
bigger perspective; the fact to be considered is the interest of the international 
community as a whole versus safeguarding of state sovereignty. From the analysis 
made in this thesis, one can see that universal jurisdiction may be a positive and 
important tool in the efforts to vindicate the fundamental values of the international 
community; to promote and to protect human rights and to fight impunity. However, 
its negative side is that the exercise of universal jurisdiction is in tension with the 
principle of sovereign equality and is easily subjected to political abuse including 
discrimination as manifested in selective prosecution, thus destabilizing international 
relations. What does the exercise of universal jurisdiction mean for international 
relations? 
Nowadays it seems that there are two main currents of thought in respect to state 
sovereignty. On one hand, there are some attempts in the international community to 
restrain state sovereignty in favor of international cooperation between and among 
sovereign states and for universal values, such as, human rights and the environment. 
On the other hand, there is the conservative tendency among some states jealously to 
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retain their sovereignty in the face of allegedly unfavorable circumstances in the 
world.
487
   
There is a need for balancing between the interests of the international community (in 
punishing those accused of heinous crimes) and the will of states to safeguard their 
sovereignty and shelter their nationals from foreign interference.  Would the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction by national courts disrupt or jeopardize international relation, 
or rather, does it contribute to the consolidation of international justice? Indeed, 
sovereignty of each nation is equal. Accordingly, every nation may decide to exercise 
jurisdiction based on the principles described in Chapter II which might cause that 
two or more nations might have a certain link to the offence causing unavoidable 
conflicting jurisdiction among different nations. Under these circumstances, any state 
that exercises its jurisdiction purely out of its own will, regardless of the fact that 
opinions and propositions of some nations, may offend the sovereignty another. In 
other words, the state which exercises jurisdiction might be breaching the principle of 
equality of sovereign nations, thus causing conflicts between nations. Hence, as such 
one can argue that underlying idea behind state sovereignty, hinders (not in purpose) 
the protection of human rights. .., as this thesis stipulates the contemporary meaning 
of ‘sovereignty’ has lost much of its normative and/or descriptive meaning, primarily 
due to the fact that states are bound by an increasingly dense network of formal and 
informal rules and regimes.  
State sovereignty is affected when universal jurisdiction is exercised by developed 
countries that may entail the danger of imposing Western values on developing 
countries in which most serious international crimes are committed. It is still 
predicted that countries that dominate in the military, economic, and political arena 
will continue to hold their values as binding on smaller or weaker states. Permitting 
powerful states to exercise universal jurisdiction could therefore allow it to be used as 
a political means of arbitrarily influencing weaker countries. The principle of equality 
of states may be breached when the people on trial and their actions are equated to the 
acts of the state of the alleged criminal. More importantly, these acts could instigate a 
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violent reaction from the territorial nation in which bilateral or even multilateral 
diplomatic relations would be damaged.    
Consequently the need to ‘strike the right balance’ between interests of the 
international community in punishing perpetrators accused of grave offences, and the 
will of states to safeguard their sovereign prerogatives and shelter their nationals from 
foreign interference becomes the essential  issue. For instance, as Bassiouni believes 
the way forward is to clarify the legitimate usages of universal jurisdiction. In his 
view, consensus on the principles that guide legitimate use of universal jurisdiction 
must take due account of long established grounds of jurisdiction that are squarely 
grounded in bedrock principles of state sovereignty.   
 
6.3.2 Other conflicting Norms and Limits – Can Universal Jurisdiction be 
without Limits? 
In addition to the constant tension between the principle of state sovereignty and 
universal jurisdiction, other obstacles have to be addressed. In this manner, Bassiouni 
believes the way forward is to clarify the legitimate usages of universal jurisdiction. 
In his view, consensus on the principles that guide legitimate use of universal 
jurisdiction must take due account of long established grounds of jurisdiction that are 
squarely grounded in bedrock principles of state sovereignty.   
Immunities of high-ranking state officials and amnesties have been among the most 
debated obstacles to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. With respect to immunities, 
an official position is not a defense and cannot be a basis to negate the criminal 
responsibility of a person who would otherwise be guilty of an international crime, 
even if the crime was committed in the course of his or her official duties.
488
 
However, the ICJ held for instance in the Arrest Warrant case that certain officials of 
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foreign governments, such as accredited diplomats, current heads of state (or heads of 
government such as prime ministers) and current foreign ministers, are entitled to a 
temporary procedural immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of foreign states which 
lasts for as long as the person holds the post. Once an individual ceases to hold the 
position of head of state/government or foreign minister, he or she loses immunity 
from the criminal jurisdiction of foreign states.
489
  At present, the lack of respect for 
immunities is in fact the main concern expressed by the African Union in its ongoing 
tirade on the ‘abuse’ of universal jurisdiction.
490
 Indeed, to allow states to arrest and 
prosecute a sitting high-level official can only seriously disrupt international relations 
and undermine the necessary interstate cooperation and friendly relations needed to 
attain the common goal of universal jurisdiction – accountability for the most severe 
crimes. For instance, in 2003, a French court rejected an application for an arrest 
warrant against Robert Mugabe for torture because he enjoyed immunity from 
prosecution as the current head of state of Zimbabwe. Interviews with French 
officials revealed that French judicial authorities refer cases with potential immunity 
issues to a special unit of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, which decides on the matters. 
This raises the concern that political, rather than legal, standards may be applied 
when determining whether a suspect is entitled to immunity from French jurisdiction.    
 
6.3.2.1 Obstacles to the Legitimacy of Universal Jurisdiction 
Concerns that arise in relation to political abuse or otherwise imprudent exercise of 
universal jurisdiction, have a bearing on international relations, the principle of 
equality among sovereigns, and the fairness of criminal proceedings.
491
 Bassiouni has 
observed that “if used in a politically motivated manner or simply to vex and harass 
leaders of other states, universal jurisdiction could disrupt world order and deprive 
individuals of their basic rights.”
492
 As noted by commentators, the likelihood that 
domestic courts exercising universal jurisdiction will become a means of furthering 
the political agenda of the country in which they sit or of particular interested groups 
within that country “is high since the crimes involved are often committed in the 
                                                          
489
 The Arrest Warrant case, supra note 83, paras. 53-55; 60-61.  
490
 See i.e. the AU-EU Expert Report, supra note 81, p. 34. 
491
 Amnesty International Report, supra note 65, pp. 52-54. 
492
 BASSIOUNI, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 34, p. 39.  
160 
 
context of protracted political and military conflicts in which the interests of third 
countries, including the one exercising universal jurisdiction, are usually involved.”
493
 
In view of this reality, the former President of the ICJ, Judge Guillaume, contended 
that permitting states to assert absolute universal jurisdiction would “encourage the 
arbitrary for the benefit of the powerful, purportedly acting as agent for an ill-defined 
international community. Contrary to what is advocated by certain publicists, such a 
development would represent not an advance in the law but a step backward.”
494
  
The profound inequalities most likely to arise in the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
do not merely concern its use by states as a political weapon aimed at shaming and 
denouncing other states or influencing their policies in various areas of international 
relations.
495
 The inequalities also include states’ reluctance to exercise universal 
jurisdiction “when citizens of allied and/or powerful nations are involved.”
496
 
Commentators have observed that such reluctance has been exemplified by the 
refusal of German and French authorities to commence an investigation under the 
principle of universal jurisdiction regarding the role of high-level U.S. officials in the 
torture of detainees under U.S. control in Iraq and elsewhere.
497
 Since 1994, more 
than thirty individuals have been tried in national courts on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction.
498
 None of them was a national of a Western country.
499
 Indeed, 
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inequality of individuals before the law in the exercise of universal jurisdiction has 
much to do with a de facto inequality of sovereigns. It has been observed that, “[i]n 
practice, universal jurisdiction appears inconsistent with the notion of sovereign 
equality among states [...]. Currently, universal jurisdiction is generally exercised by 
powerful countries over acts that occurred in developing countries and that were 
committed by persons from such countries.”
500
 
Despite its problematic nature, universal jurisdiction has its place in international law. 
Means should be sought, for instance by the ILC comments, in order to clarify its 
scope and enhance its usage. Having a principle that can, if used appropriately in the 
fight against the commission of serious crimes of international concern, be so 
‘powerful’. Bassiouni argues that “unbridled universal jurisdiction can cause 
disruptions in world order and deprivation of individual human rights when used in a 
politically motivated manner or for vexation purposes.”
501
 
Limitations primarily concerning legitimacy, authenticate a genuine concern in 
respect to whether courts exercising universal jurisdiction, have the legitimacy in 
order to operate on the worldwide platform. Among others, one obstacle to the 
successful investigation and prosecution of international crimes is the relative lack of 
familiarity with the investigation and prosecution of such cases at the national level. 
Some of the countries examined in this report have responded to these challenges by 
creating units within police and prosecutorial authorities that specialize in the 
investigation and prosecution of transnational crimes, including universal jurisdiction 
cases. Mutual legal assistance arrangements are complex and can result in lengthy 
delays in the investigative process. Nevertheless, investigators interviewed by Human 
Rights Watch indicated that, once the formalities had been completed, local 
authorities in the territorial state did afford the necessary cooperation to enable the 
investigation to proceed in most cases.  
The legitimacy of national courts to exercise universal jurisdiction at the 
international level is a crucial point to be considered. All courts have to contend with 
the issue of legitimacy. State can and should have some form of universal 
                                                          
500
 BOTTINI, supra note 493, pp. 555-556. 
501
 BASSIOUNI, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 114, p. 82.  
162 
 
jurisdiction. The ability to observe it has to be given to legitimacy. Without it the 
jurisdiction of the court would be undermined.  
Moreover further limitation and shortcoming on the universality principle can be 
mentioned, for example, when the legal basis is adequate, the question of who makes 
the decision to proceed and based on which factors, are likely to become pivotal as 
universal jurisdiction shifts from an aspiration to a working legal reality. Whereas, 
these questions will determine how often universal jurisdiction will be exercised, and 
on what conditions, they call for a more sustained examination. In order for these 
proceedings to withstand criticisms regarding them being politically motivated will 
clearly be affected by the manner in which discretion is exercised in the prosecuting 
state.
502
 Indeed, most of the national courts have never faced such extremely 
extensive cases and therefore there is a need to look more closely and establish 
precedent and guiding points on the handling of such cases (of course each case is 
different when it comes to the matter at hand, but the basic procedural elements 
remain the same).  
What is more, other practical problems such as procedural rights of the suspect and 
double jeopardy need to be more coherently defined and guaranteed when exercising 
universal jurisdiction since there is a potential lack of due process in the principles‘ 
application. These rights of the suspect are important for the international community, 
states and the defendant himself for the purposes of understanding the nature of due 
process during the investigation process. From this follows that more attention should 
be placed on the investigation as an independent procedure and report. Nevertheless, 
these procedural rules are not clear since there is a lack of a set of clear and consistent 
procedure that relates to the exercise of universal jurisdiction, which need to be 
established. In fact, without a comprehensive system of laws and regulations at the 
national level, universal jurisdiction cannot be expected to function properly in 
practice.
503
 Indeed, this calls for further considerations on the issue of how much will 
the rights of suspected persons be protected in case of universal jurisdiction. 
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In sum, by overcoming the above mentioned obstacles and threat to the legitimacy of 
universal jurisdiction (such as, inadequate legislation, inadequate knowledge in the 
criminal justice system, lack of political will, amnesties and immunities, and 
ineffective international monitoring) or at least emphasizing in addressing these 
limiting constrains with respect to universal jurisdiction, the universality principle 
might become a more effective and transparent rule for all nations to use in the global 
fight against impunity. It is only when one looks at and addresses these shortcomings, 
that effective usage can be obtained.  
 
6.4 A New Approach to Universal Jurisdiction – Looking Ahead 
There are some obstacles that still remain and prevent full implementation of 
universal jurisdiction. A positive sign on the exercise of universal jurisdiction came in 
1998 after the groundbreaking Pinochet case and it seemes that there were a few steps 
that could be built on with respect to universal jurisdiction.
504
 Nevertheless, at present 
it rather seems that the principle has been under a negative ‘attack’ from scholars
505
 
(who wonder whether the principle has only stipulated to false expectations) as well 
as politically motivated countries which have hampered its exercise.
506
 
The search for means to assure effective functioning of the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction must continue through scholarly writing and discussions at international 
and national forums and also continue to establish guiding rules for its applications 
and exercise, such as the subsidiarity criteria and making clarification on the scope of 
the principle. Universal jurisdiction has to be openly accepted and internationally 
supported and for that we need to have certain standards to follow. Therefore, in order 
to ‘revive’ or resume the principle one need to start looking into the basic components 
and identify and clarify the descriptive elements that make universal jurisdiction as 
‘exceptional’ as it is. 
An important factor for future enhancement of the principle are the actors connected 
to the application of universal jurisdiction, namely, the victims of crimes. The need to 
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take into account the perspective of victims and allowing them to participate is 
essential. 
Universal Jurisdiction should not be looked at in isolation from other principles that 
might enhance its effectiveness (such as the principle of aut dedere aut judicare) but 
at the same time one should also take due diligence to limiting principles (such as the 
principle of state sovereignty and immunities of state officials). When looking at the 
principle as a part of the whole international justice system, and as an international 
criminal justice response to atrocious crimes beyond the reach of existing 
mechanisms one can certainly notice that the universality principle undoubtedly 
deserves its place within the modern international law as has been demonstrated in 
this thesis. The only incentive needed is for states to be truly willing and ready to 
apply it and enforce it.  
According to the words of the Nigerian delegate to the GA, who stated that “[t]he 
time has come for us to narrow our views and agree on real substance, especially as it 
concerns the assertion of criminal jurisdiction by a state for certain grave offenses.”
507
 
Indeed, building on this statement further clarification and consensus-building would 
not only strengthen the application of universal jurisdiction, but would, most 
importantly, give legitimacy and credibility to its usage. Leaving interpretation of 
international crimes to national courts could have adverse effects on the integrity of 
international law. 
A crucial point to remember is that the site of most international criminal law 
enforcement is not intended to be international courts, which have only arisen 
because of the failure, or the absence, of national justice efforts, but they are not 
meant to replace them. One of the major roles which international judicial 
mechanisms have is the promotion of the more effective use of national criminal 
justice systems. If international criminal law is to be effectively enforced, the national 
systems must take a greater part in the prosecution of international crimes.
508
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Likewise, the issue of the presence of the suspect on the territory of the prosecuting 
state and the discretionary power of the prosecuting authorities, limits the scope of 
jurisdiction. Finally, one must not forget that the use of universal jurisdiction implies 
that another state has also jurisdiction according to the classic criterions of 
jurisdiction and as such, could have primacy over the case. This is the reason why the 



















7 Conclusions  
At present, it is impossible to look at each state as an isolated unit. Cooperation and 
collaboration between both international and national actors is an important factor in 
the fight against impunity which could facilitate linkages and create synergies for 
pursuing suspected offenders. The principle of universal jurisdiction is only a small 
pillar in this struggle. The experience of universal jurisdiction demonstrates that it 
may give rise to complex legal, political and diplomatic questions.  
One can certainly speak of a ‘rise and fall’ of universal jurisdiction. With a rise to its 
peak in 1998 with the arrest of Augusto Pinochet in London, and the fall coming with 
the amendments of Belgium’s universal jurisdiction amendments in 2003, or with the 
amendments of Spain’s universal jurisdiction regulations in 2009 and 2014. From the 
principle’s beginnings - primarily as a means of maritime states to assert jurisdiction 
over piracy – there has been a gradual expansion of its content to encompass other 
heinous acts, such as war crimes, genocide and torture. The expansion has had 
unavoidable implications for a range of other long established concepts of 
international law, such as state sovereignty, equality of states and/or immunities. The 
principle of state sovereignty has been throughout history, and still continues to be, 
one of the major barriers on the effective exercise of universal jurisdiction. Hence, 
even if it is a ‘sensitive’ matter, striking a balance between these two concepts, as 
well as other limiting principles of international law, is the only way forward.  
Where there is no prospect for criminal trials being undertaken in the state(s) directly 
affected by the crimes, or in situations falling outside of the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction may offer the only prospect for holding 
perpetrators accountable. What is more, the assertion of jurisdiction by a foreign court 
may stipulate to public debate and a re-examination of domestic immunities or 
amnesties in the territorial state.
509
 Undoubtedly, for some states this may be a 
reactive posture to protect vested interests under the cloak of national sovereignty. 
However, for an increasing number of states it appears to arise out of concern for the 
viability of a sustainable rule of law system. Even though one thinks that after having 
analyzed the principle of universal jurisdiction and searched for some sort of 
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clarification on the topic it might become clearer, but it is usually so when dealing 
with universal jurisdiction that it raises more questions than it answers. It is for this 
fact that the principle will continue to form a significant component of an overall 
global strategy to combat impunity and evolve further within international law. 
Moreover, clarifications, continuous improvements and discussion are necessary to 
achieve the objective of a properly functional principle. This thesis hopefully added 
some.  
The purpose of the principle of universal jurisdiction is to avoid loopholes in the 
prosecution of core international crimes. Although the principle seems well 
established both in conventional and customary international law (as described in 
Chapter III and partially within Chapter IV) its application remains controversial and 
complex and according to the analysis undertaken, parties to the multilateral 
conventions obligate themselves to prosecute or extradite some of today’s ‘hostis 
humani generis’.
510
 However, the gap between the existence of the principle and its 
application still remains quite wide. This is due to various factors as described within 
this thesis. Therefore when applying the principle of universal jurisdiction, four 
factors should be considered. These factors are among others; 
a) Universal jurisdiction may only be exercised and applied over the most 
serious international crimes; 
b) Universal jurisdiction is supplemental to other jurisdictional bases that 
have a stronger link to the crime, such as territorial jurisdiction or national 
jurisdiction. In the event the state where the crime occurred or the state of 
nationality of the alleged perpetrator or the state of nationality of the victim is 
able to prosecute the crime in question, universal jurisdiction should not be 
exercised; 
c) Any state having custody over an alleged perpetrator, before exercising 
universal jurisdiction, should consult the state where the crime occurred and 
the state of nationality of the person concerned to determine whether either 
state is preparing to prosecute the alleged perpetrator. The custodial state 
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should extradite the person concerned to either of those states for prosecution 
if requested. If those states are unable or unwilling to exercise their 
jurisdiction over the crime in question, the custodial state may proceed with 
its universal jurisdiction. 
Hence it should never be exercised as a primary basis (only as a subsidiary to the 
other jurisdictional bases) if the forum state is genuinely able and willing to proceed 
with the prosecution. Thus consensus principles on universal jurisdiction that 
establishes ‘jurisdictional priorities’ and provides rules for resolving conflicts of 
jurisdiction, hence minimizing the exposure to multiple prosecutions and denial of 
justice, is of great importance.  
d) Universal jurisdiction should never be considered in isolation from other 
principles of international law but always in accordance with accepted 
international standards (both standards that enhance its usage and that limit its 
scope and exercise). 
The legitimacy and credibility of the universality principle depends upon its 
consistent application with respect to other principles and rules of international law.   
Despite several breakthroughs for universal jurisdiction in the past years, some 
obstacles remain and prevent its full implementation. It is necessary to reach a shared 
understanding on the principle of universal jurisdiction in order to apply it properly 
and avoid its selective application. It is therefore important to consider primarily, to 
what kind of crimes universal jurisdiction applies and in this respect analyze their 
definitional elements and legal basis, and secondly, consider its status within the 
jurisdictional bases (its subsidiarity character). This thesis sought to remedy partially 
on this shortfall or at least give some clarification on its exercise, such as; 1) 
Obligatory nature (looking at the principles together); 2) Crimes (gravity threshold – 
looking at the basic elements of a crime – jus cogens); 3)Jurisdictional conflicts 
(subsidiarity) - Universal jurisdiction is an exceptional principle that has a special 
character and should only be applied as a last resort and complementary to other 
jurisdictional bases.  
The principle of universal jurisdiction is still evolving and it will continue to do so 
and adapt to the changing nature of international law and the changing nature of 
crimes. International cooperation is vital when considering a topic so big as 
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international justice and the fight against impunity. The principle of universal 
jurisdiction is just a small, but extremely important, part of the whole system. 
Therefore, when analyzing the universality principle one cannot, and should not, look 
at it in isolation. Although states have clearly stated that universal jurisdiction, 
international criminal jurisdiction and the obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut 
dedere aut judicare) are different legal institutions that should not be confused with 
one another; it is the view of this author that they are complementary institutions in 
the effort to end impunity. 
International cooperation between different jurisdictions may increase the efficiency 
and viability of launching criminal proceedings on the basis of universal jurisdiction. 
The discussion and analysis in this thesis on the principle of universal jurisdiction 
manifest that it may give rise to complex legal, political and diplomatic questions. 
Nonetheless, where there is no prospect for criminal trials being undertaken in the 
state(s) directly affected by the crimes (or in situations falling outside of the 
jurisdiction of the ICC) the exercise of universal jurisdiction may offer the only 
prospect for holding perpetrators accountable. Accordingly, nowadays states are 
becoming more aware of the fact that no safe haven should be allowed for 
perpetrators of grave and severe offences. Greater clarification of the nature of the 
crimes falling under the scope of universal jurisdiction was necessary as well as 
describing the constituent elements.  
Certainly, universal jurisdiction is not the only way to fight serious crimes and deter 
impunity; it is a part of a wider system that aims to enhance the deterrent effect of 
punitive measures. Universal jurisdiction should be exercised only where national 
courts that could exercise jurisdiction on basis of territoriality or active or passive 
personality were unable or unwilling to do so (and where international courts did not 
have the jurisdiction to deal with the case). As was described and clarified in Chapter 
V, the emerging idea of subsidiarity as a guiding principle within the lacuna of 
jurisdictional bases and claims of jurisdiction, might stipulate to a more coherent and 




Universal jurisdiction has existed for hundreds of years – on one hand, a jurisdictional 
exemption unique to piracy – on the other, the modern universal jurisdiction 
concerning itself primarily with human rights violations. One can certainly conclude 
that there are not only diverse opinions on the principles scope and applicability but 
in fact, also on its viability and justification within modern international law. 
Consequently, there is a need to reconcile the diverging positions on the universal 
principle among states.  
Nowadays, pragmatical, political and other legal considerations sometimes pose 
obstacles to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction should be 
exercised objectively (in order to ensure its none-selective implementation) and for 
that reason uniformity is needed, as well as harmonization with some terms and 
concepts of international law in order to achieve an even wider acceptance of 
universal jurisdiction. It is so, that only general and uniform practice can create a 
basis for common recognition of universal jurisdiction as a binding rule of customary 
international law.  
Nevertheless, apart from these constrains one has to keep in mind that the principle of 
universal jurisdiction - an exceptional rule - is an important part of the international 













In a globalizing world where states are increasingly interdependent, the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction enables the international community to bring an end to, or at 
least deter, the commission of serious crimes that harm human dignity. From the 
principle’s beginnings, primarily as a means for states to assert jurisdiction over 
piracy, there has been a gradual expansion of its content and scope to encompass 
other heinous acts such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. As the 
international criminal law continues to formulate, so do its principles; thus rendering 
the universality principle an important status within modern international law. 
At present, despite a wide acceptance of the principle of universal jurisdiction, it is 
not applied homogeneously, nor is its application implemented without difficulty, due 
to its complex issues of legal and political nature - thus remaining one of the most 
confusing doctrines of modern international law. There is a wide range of views on 
the principle, in particular its content, scope and implementation but all of these 
different views hinder the substantial progress on the topic. This thesis argues that the 
principle of universal jurisdiction is still transforming and various newly emerging 
factors can be taken under consideration in order to balance the principle and enhance 
its usage. 
The aim of the present study is three folded, namely, two issues are dealt with 
pertaining to the nature and scope of universal jurisdiction and the third one in 
connection to its application and exercise. Primarily, universal jurisdiction should be 
conceptually distinguished, but not isolated, from other accepted principles of 
international law, especially that of aut dedere aut judicare (the obligation to 
extradite or prosecute). Secondly, universal jurisdiction should be invoked only for 
the most heinous crimes (characterized as of jus cogens nature) that have been 
universally condemned by the international community. Thirdly and finally, the thesis 
seeks to locate the assertion of universal jurisdiction within the modern jurisdictional 
regime – thus playing a complementary role - and simultaneously balancing its 
application with the principle of state sovereignty.  
The dissertation is divided into three main parts which are further divided into seven 
chapters (including Introduction and Conclusions). The first part (‘general part’) will 
deal with the nature and scope of universal jurisdiction by reexamining the 
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jurisdictional framework that the universality principle is stemming from; following 
up with historical overview of the principle. Part two (‘specific part’) will make a 
survey into the core international crimes that attract the application of universal 
jurisdiction and the values upon which those crimes infringe. Thereafter, an inquiry 
into an effective implementation and enhancement of the usage of universal 
jurisdiction will be provided. Lastly, part three (on ‘challenges and responses’) will 
discuss certain limitations to the exercise and application of universal jurisdiction 
where the weight of the thesis is rather on the theoretical aspect of universal 
jurisdiction with a critical examination drawn out in the end. 
In Chapter II on “Jurisdictional Regime in International Law” an outline is 
established of the various criminal jurisdictional bases accepted in international law 
and demonstrated how exceptional the principle of universal jurisdiction is. 
Moreover, the principle of state sovereignty is described and it is argued that the 
fundamental meaning behind the concept of state sovereignty is gaining new 
understanding in the twenty-first century in connection to the application of universal 
jurisdiction.  
Within Chapter III “Formation and Implication of Universal Jurisdiction” an 
examination of the historical background of the principle of universal jurisdiction is 
undertaken - tracing its origins and main milestones; to modern application. The 
descriptive components of universal jurisdiction and its legal status under 
international law and case law inquiry are provided. Special attention is given to the 
relationship between universal jurisdiction and the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare in order to manifest that these principles cannot be seen in isolation from 
each other and it is maintained that these two principles are interrelated, yet distinct 
principles, and should not be seen in isolation from each other but as a parallels in 
deterring commission of heinous offences. It is concluded that the obligation to 
extradite or prosecute strengthens the usage and exercise of universal jurisdiction; 
hence rendering it an obligatory nature.  
Crimes falling under the exercise of universal jurisdiction in modern international law 
and their characteristics are the objective of Chapter IV on “Core Crimes that Attract 
the Application of Universal Jurisdiction”. Its heinous nature and jus cogens status 
and consideration are brought up on how the concept of ‘gravity’ of crimes has 
changed from covering piratical acts, to include much more serious offences such as 
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war crimes. A study into relevant conventions, case law and academic debate shows 
that the primary source for the application of universal jurisdiction is the gravity of 
the crime - crimes that affect the international community as a whole – thus allowing 
for universal jurisdiction to be applicable. Further, newly emerging threats that might 
be considered as falling under the umbrella of universal jurisdiction are mentioned. 
Chapter V on the “The Idea of Subsidiarity in the Context of Universal Jurisdiction” 
describes the newly emerging idea of subsidiarity as a guiding principle in the 
application of universal jurisdiction. The usage of subsidiarity in the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction can be guided by the complementarity principle of the ICC, thus 
employing the complementarity principle as a model for the notion of subsidiarity in 
the application of universal jurisdiction. The Chapter concludes that the notion of 
subsidiarity can constitute a guiding criterion or a modality in the application of 
universal jurisdiction within the lacuna of jurisdictional bases, and simultaneously 
avoiding misuse in its exercise and foster foreseeability of the universality principle 
within the modern jurisdictional regime. Accordingly, subsidiarity criterion can, on 
one hand, justify the exercise of universal jurisdiction by stressing that neither the 
territorial state nor the perpetrator’s home states are willing or able to proceed with an 
investigation. On the other hand, it can also justify non-interference by referring to it 
as an unqualified rule of priority for the affected states. 
Finally, within Chapter VI “Toward a More Effective Usage of Universal 
Jurisdiction” considerations are made on contemporary challenges and restrains on 
the scope and application of universal jurisdiction, such as concerns that arise in 
relation to political abuse or otherwise imprudent exercise of universal jurisdiction; 
concerns related to international relations; the principle of equality among sovereigns; 
and the fairness of criminal proceedings. Improving international judicial cooperation 
and national cooperation (consistent with their international obligations and national 
practice) and provide all means of support to each other, including mutual legal 
assistance to ensure the expedient and effective investigation and prosecution of 







V globalizovaném světě, kde jsou státy na sobě stále více závislé, umožňuje výkon 
univerzální jurisdikce, aby mezinárodní společenství ukončilo závažné trestné činy, 
které poškozují lidskou důstojnost. V počátku rozvoje pomáhala univerzální 
jurisdikce jednotlivým státům především proti pirátství. Postupem doby došlo k 
následnému rozšiřování jejího obsahu a rozsahu i na další hanebné činy, jako jsou 
například válečné zločiny nebo zločiny proti lidskosti a genocida. Vzhledem k tomu, 
že se mezinárodní trestní právo nadále vyvíjí, vyvíjejí se spolu s ním i jeho všeobecné 
principy, které mají své důležité místo v rámci rozvoje moderního mezinárodního 
práva. 
V současné době, i přes široké uplatnění principů, není univerzální jurisdikce 
aplikována rovnoměrně kvůli složitým otázkám, jak právní tak i politické povahy, a 
ani není její použití bez problémů. Kvůli tomu zůstává univerzální princip jedním z 
nejvíce matoucích doktrín moderního mezinárodního práva. Široká škála názorů je 
zejména na jeho obsah, rozsah a realizaci a tyto různé pohledy zabráňují jeho vývoji. 
Z této práce vyplývá, že zásady univerzální jurisdikce se stále vyvíjejí pod vlivem 
různých nově vznikajících faktorů a tím se zvyšují možnosti jejího využití. 
Tato práce se skládá ze tří částí, první dvě se zabývají problémy týkajícími se povahy 
a rozsahu univerzální jurisdikce a třetí část pak návazností na její uplatňování a 
aplikaci. Univerzální princip by měl být koncepčně rozlišen, jak je uvedeno v první 
části. Neměl by být izolován od ostatních uznávaných principů mezinárodního práva, 
a to především ne, od zásady aut dedere aut judicare (povinnost vydat osobu nebo 
trestně stíhat). V druhé části je uvedeno, že by univerzální jurisdikce měla být 
uplatňována pouze pro ty hanebné zločiny (označené jako jus cogens povahy), které 
byly všeobecně odsouzeny mezinárodním společenstvím. A konečně v třetí části, se 
práce snaží ukázat, že univerzální jurisdikce v moderním režimu – hraje doplňkovou 
roli – ale současně vyváženou a související s principem státní suverenity. 
Tyto tři hlavní části, jsou rozděleny do sedmi kapitol (včetně úvodu a závěru). První 
část (‘Obecná část’), se zabývá povahou a rozsahem univerzální jurisdikce a zkoumá 
jurisdikční rámec, princip jurisdikční univerzálnosti a to v návaznosti na historický 
přehled o vývoji principu. Druhá část (‘Zvláštní část’), analýzuje zavažné 
mezinárodní zločiny, které souvisejí s aplikací univerzální jurisdikce a zároveň s 
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hodnotami, které tyto zločiny porušují. Jsou zde poskytnuty informace, jak lze účinně 
přispět k lepšímu rozvoji ve využítí univerzální jurisdikce v praxi. Třetí část (‘Výzvy 
a odpovědi’) rozebírá možnosti omezení uplatnění a použití univerzální jurisdikce, a 
důraz této práce je spíše kladen na teoretický aspekt univerzální jurisdikce s kritickým 
přezkoumáním, který je podrobně vypracován v závěru práce. 
V kapitole II. o ‘Jurisdikční režimy v Mezinárodním Právu’, jsou nastíněny různé 
základy trestní jurisdikce přijaté v mezinárodním právu. Poukázáno je zde na to, jak 
výjimečný je princip univerzální jurisdikce. Současně, je popisován princip státní 
suverenity, ze kterého například vyplývá (jak tato práce nadále argumentuje) že 
původní význam pojmu státní suverenity má jiný smysl v 21. století, a to zejména při 
uplatňování univerzální jurisdikce. 
V rámci kapitoly III. ‘Vznik a Důsledek Univerzální Jurisdikce’ je analyzován 
historický vývoj principu univerzální jurisdikce; jak jeho historické kořeny a hlavní 
milníky, tak i moderní aplikace principu. Dalé jsou analyzovány popisné složky 
univerzální jurisdikce a její právní postavení podle mezinárodního práva a 
vyšetřování soudních procesů. Zvláštní pozornost je věnována vztahu mezi 
univerzální jurisdikcí a zásadou aut dedere aut judicare. Důraz je kladen na tvrzení, 
že na tyto dva principy nelze nahlížet odděleně od sebe. Tyto dva principy jsou 
vzájemně propojené, a přestože se v mnohém liší, musí být posuzovány jako paralely 
určené k zastavení nejhanebnějších trestných činů. Zdůrazněno je, že povinnost vydat 
nebo stíhat posiluje úlohu a využívání univerzální jurisdikce. Proto je důležitá její 
interpretace. 
Zločiny, které souvisejí s uplatněním univerzální jurisdikce v moderním 
mezinárodním právu a jejich charakteristika, jsou hlavnim cílem kapitoly IV. 
‘Závažné Mezinárodní Zločiny, které přitahují uplatnění Univerzální Jurisdikce’. 
Jejich hanebný charakter a stav jus cogens si vyžadují svojí ‘závažností’ u trestných 
činů velkou pozornost. Ta se rozšířuje z původního krytí pirátských zločinů a 
zahrnuje v současnosti mnohem více závažných trestných činů, jakými jsou například 
válečné zločiny. Studie příslušných dohod mezinárodního práva a akademických 
debat ukazuje, že prvotním důvodem pro použití univerzální jurisdikce je závažnost 
trestného činu. Na trestné činy, které mají vliv na mezinárodní společenství jako 
celek, lze tedy univerzální jurisdikci uplatnit. Kromě toho jsou také, v rámci této 
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kapitoly, uvedeny nově se objevující současné hrozby, které by mohly být řešeny 
právě pod záštitou univerzální jurisdikce. 
Kapitola V. nazvaná ‘Myšlenka Subsidiarity v Kontextu Univerzální Jurisdikce’ 
popisuje nově vznikající myšlenku subsidiarity jakožto zásady pro uplatňování 
univerzální jurisdikce. Využití subsidiarity pro výkon univerzální jurisdikce se může 
řídit zásadou komplementarity Mezinárodního trestního soudu, a to s využitím 
principu doplňkovosti. Lze dospět k závěru, že pojem subsidiarity může být použit 
jako možnost pro uplatňování univerzální jurisdikce v rámci soudní pravomoce 
základních složek, a zároveň zamezit zneužití v jejím výkonu a podporovat 
předvídatelnost při uplatňování univerzální jurisdikce v moderním jurisdikčním 
režimu. V souladu s tím, může kritérium subsidiarity na jedné straně ovlivnit výkon 
univerzální jurisdikce, tak že ani územní stát ani domovské státy nejsou ochotni nebo 
schopni pokračovat ve vyšetřování. Na druhou stranu, může také stanovit pravidlo 
nevměšování se jako bezvýhradné pravidlo priority pro postižené státy. 
A konečně, v rámci kapitoly VI. ‘Efektivnější využití Univerzální Jurisdikce’ jsou 
podány úvahy reagujicí na současné výzvy a omezení, ale i na rozsah a aplikaci 
univerzální jurisdikce. Jsou to například obavy, které vznikají v souvislosti s 
politickým zneužíváním nebo jinak nerozvážného rozhodnutí univerzální jurisdikce, 
jako například obavy týkající se mezinárodních vztahů, zásady rovnosti mezi 
suverénními státy a nebo spravedlnost trestního řízení. Zlepšení mezinárodní 
spolupráce v trestních věcech na mezinárodní úrovni (v souladu s mezinárodními 
závazky a vnitrostátními postupy), a poskytnutí veškeré podpory navzájem (včetně 
vzájemné právní pomoci) by vedlo k upevnění aplikace universální jurisdikce, a 
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Key words: universal jurisdiction, universality principle, state sovereignty, jus 
cogens, international crime, aut dedere aut judicare, complementarity principle, 
International Criminal Court, subsidiarity 
The present study describes the nature, scope and application of universal jurisdiction 
as an important tool against impunity in international criminal law, in a straight 
forward manner, where inquiry into the recent developments of universal jurisdiction 
is undertaken. Forthwith, the formation of the principle of universal jurisdiction - 
especially its practical application - must be guided by international consensus, not 
through advocacy action of states with short term and narrow objectives. The thesis 
seeks to identify and observe how far the law of universal jurisdiction has actually 
evolved and how far we should expect it to evolve in the near future, considering its 
restrains and challenges. It is argued that the concept of state sovereignty, which 
constitutes the greatest impediment on the exercise of universal jurisdiction, has seen 
various changes to its fundamentals elements in the 21st Century. The aim is to look 
at the universality principle, not as an isolated part, but as part of a broader 
framework in modern international law and thus special attention is given to the 
relationship between universal jurisdiction and the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare. These principles are interrelated, yet distinct, parallels in deterring 
commission of the most heinous offences of international concern and should be 
studied together. In addition, the recently emerging notion of subsidiarity in the 
context of universal jurisdiction is introduced; hence using subsidiarity as a modality 
to enhance the exercise and foreseeability in the application of universal jurisdiction 









Klíčová slova: univerzální jurisdikce, univerzální princip, státní suverenita, jus 
cogens, mezinárodní zločin, aut dedere aut judicare, princip komplementarity, 
Mezinárodní trestní soud, subsidiarity 
Předkládaná práce se zaměřuje na princip univerzální jurisdikce jako nástroj proti 
beztrestnosti v mezinárodním trestním právu. Povaha, rozsah a aplikace jsou popsány 
na základě aktuálního vývoje zásady. V součastné době se utváření principu 
univerzality, hlavně jeho praktické uplatňování, musí řídit všeobecným konsenzem, 
nikoliv obhajobou států s krátkodobými a úzkými cíli. Účelem práce je popsat a 
prozkoumat, do jaké míry se univerzální jurisdikce skutečně vyvinula a do jaké míry 
lze předpokladat, že se v blízké budoucnosti bude nadále vyvíjet vzhledem k 
omezujícím normám, zejména principu státní suverenity. V 21. století se dá říci, a 
tato práce konstatuje, že pojem státní suverenity, v souvislosti s univerzální jurisdikcí, 
změnil svůj význam. Hlavním cílem předkládané práce je analyzovat princip 
univerzalní jurisdikce v souvislosti a souladu s jinými koncepty mezinárodního práva. 
Zvláštní pozornost se věnuje vztahu mezi univerzální jurisdikcí a zásadou aut dedere 
aut judicare. Tyto dva principy jsou vzájemně propojené a přestože se v mnohém liší, 
musí být posuzovány jako paralely určené k zastavení nejhanebnejších trestných činů 
mezinárodního zájmu. Na závěr se dizertační  práce zabývá analýzou subsidiarity v 
souvislosti s univerzální jurisdikcí. Proto se doporučuje možnost použití subsidiarity 
jako modality pro uplatnění univerzální jurisdikce a taktéž předejití zneužívání a 
zvýšení předvídatelnosti při výkonu univerzální jurisdikce v rámci moderních 
jurisdikčních režimů. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
